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INTRODUCTION
With the revival of Calvinism in some of the 
new theological movements of Germany, - notably 
that of Earth, « and with the continued devotion 
to the great principles of the Calvinistic teaching 
on the part of such an able French scholar as 
Doumergue, it seems only fitting that British and 
American students should become more familiar with 
the Calvinistic system of thought as it is put 
forth by Calvin himself; especially since Calvinism 
has had such a profound influence upon the past 
history and development of the English-speaking 
world and has in these latter days become so little 
known, save through the extremely wholesale criticism 
of its opponents.
In the minds of a great many people 'Calvinism 1 
is synonymous with 'intolerance 1 ; and some, having 
heard of the burning of Servetus, consider themselves 
most upright in "saying all manner of evil" against 
any idea which could have come from 'so base a wretch 1 
as John Calvin.
It is really not necessary, however, to go into 
the question of the burning of Servetus, in order to 
consider the merits of the Calvinistic theology, - 
and indeed most of those who use this incident as 
the sole and sufficient ground for the rejection of 
Calvinism have not gone into it. It cannot be denied 
that when one has made due allowance for Calvin's
attempt to mitigate the punishment of Servetus by
1) 
endeavoring to alter the mode of his death, there
still remains the evidence that it was on the insti- 
gation of Calvin that he was arrested, and that
Calvin concurred in his death, if he is not actually
2)
responsible for securing it in the face of opposition.
But what is there in the admission of all this to 
cause us to conclude that Calvin's theological system 
is necessarily false and definitely unchristian? 
There is still to be considered the whole question of 
the punishment of heresy, together with the merits of 
this particular case; and in addition, this case must 
be studied in the light of the generally accepted 
view of religious toleration amongst both Romanists 
and Protestants of the day. The argument for religious 
toleration is not so simple as many of its advocates 
suppose; and even if one grants that all the ardent
1)See The Letters of John Calvin, edited by Jules
Bonnet, vol.2, Letter 329. 
a)Ibid., Letters 153,154,320,322,324,325.
religious enthusiasts of the 16th century were 
on this point, Calvin amongst them, this does not * 
all show that the Calvinistic teaching on other 
matters is equally fallacious. One must not forget
that perhaps the first protagonist for the
of heresy was Plato, and that his grounds for
eating it were exactly those of Calvin, - 
that the truth of the orthodox position could he 
proved, and that the dissemination of heretical Y!< 
was as destructive to the life of the soul as 
be the spreading of poison to that of the body. 
Moreover, there is much to be said for this c< 
contention, and surprisingly little in the way oT 
rational argument with which to oppose it. Yet, 
if one disagreed with Plato on this matter, It would 
scarcely be considered wise to disregard the whole 
Platonic philosophy simply on that account. It Is 
hardly the part of wisdom to maintain that unless 
every proposition in a man's philosophical or theo- 
logical system is right then the whole system is 
necessarily wrong; for to reason in this way would 
be to discard probably all philosophies, and to 
destroy among the rest, that of the contender himself 
- since few, if any of us, can claim to be above
A »« «» «»    «» »«,« *,«...   _ .. . . '
1)The Laws, Bk.10. ..."< •
religious enthusiasts of the 16th century were mistaken
X
on this point, Calvin amongst them, this does not at 
all show that the Calvinistic teaching on other 
matters is equally fallacious. One must not forget
that perhaps the first protagonist for the punishment
1)
of heresy was Plato, and that his grounds for advo- 
cating it were exactly those of Calvin, *» namely, 
that the truth of the orthodox position could be 
proved, and that the dissemination of heretical views 
was as destructive to the life of the soul as would 
be the spreading of poison to that of the body. 
Moreover, there is much to be said for this common 
contention, and surprisingly little in the way of 
rational argument with which to oppose it. Yet, even 
if one disagreed with Plato on this matter, it would 
scarcely be considered wise to disregard the whole 
Platonic philosophy simply on that account. It is 
hardly the part of wisdom to maintain that unless 
every prpposition in a man f s philosophical or theo- 
logical system is right then the whole system is 
necessarily wrong; for to reason in this way would 
be to discard probably all philosophies, and to 
destroy among the rest, that of the contender himself, 




It may seem quite ridiculous, but it is neverthe- 
less a fact that there are those who try to account 
for the distinctive features of Calvin's thought on 
the ground of his being a djspeptic. But surely,to 
contend so without firfct showing these distinctive 
features to be false, is worse than a waste of time 
as far as discrediting them is concerned. If the 
connection between Calvin's dyspepsia and his 
argument can be proved, and yet the argument itself 
cannot be answered, the pointing out of this 
connection does not in any way refute the Calvinistic 
position* On the other hand, if the argument can be 
proved false on logical grounds, then the establishing 
of this connection, while a very interesting historical 
observation, is wholly unnecessary from the standpoint 
of the refutation of the Calvinistic theology. But 
those who advance this contention, do so in order to
cast disfavor upon the tenets of Calvinism without
1)
taking the trouble of directly rebutting them, «»
I)It may indeed seem preposterous that an argument 
such as the one supposed should be advanced. But the 
astounding fact is that it is advanced in some American 
universities by otherwise very clever instructors, and 
that it is accepted as the obituary notice of Calvin- 
ism by a great many students, whose sole conception of 
the truth and falsity of arguments is so mixed up with 
a vague notion of -Freudian complexes that they consider
which is surely, not only a most unscholarly procedure, 
but scarcely an honest one.
If Calvin believed in Predestination (it is always 
this doctrine which is opposed as the distinctive 
tenet of Calvinism) because he was a dtspeptic, why
did Augustine believe in the same doctrine? And why
1) 2)
was it also held by Aquinas, and by both Luther
3)
and Melanchthon? Surely no one could accuse the
Angelic Schoolman, the robust and jocular Doctor Martin, 
and the benign Melanchthon of having dftspepsia. And
anybody necessarily mistaken who holds views which they 
themselves would not like to hold*
1)See BohJoannes 1 "Compendium of the Summa Theologica 
of St. Thomas Aquinas «  Pars Prima", chs.22,23,82, 
and 83 (though it nraat be admitted that Aquinas 1 
doctrine is scarcely that of Calvin).
2)See Martin Luther, "Bondage of the Will"(The Rev. 
Henry Cole's translation, London, 1823), especially 
pp.108,109,374,375. Here Luther contends:"! have 
shown before, that Free-will cannot be applied to 
anyone but to God only»"(pp.108f.) And again, in 
conclusion, he affirms:"! consider that I have now 
abundantly satisfied the godly man, who wishes to 
believe the truth without making resistance. For if 
we believe it to be true, that God fore-knows and 
fore-ordains all things; that he can be neither 
deceived nor hindered in his prescience and predes- 
tination; and that nothing can take place but accord- 
ing to his will,(which reason herself is compelled 
to confess;)then, even according to the testimony 
of reason herself, there can be no Free-will -in 
man, - in angel, - or in any creature!"(pp.37^f.)
3)See Melanchthon 1 s "Loci Communes"(Plitt-Kolde 
edition, Leipsig and Erlangen, 1935),PP.67,75*80. 
Melanchthon here declares:"Quandoquidem omnia quae 
eveniunt, necessario iuxta divinam praede&tin&tloaam 
eveniunt, nulla est voluntatis nostrae libertas. 
Paulus ad Ro.XI(v.36):  ; ad Ephe.Kv. 11):   ; 
Mat.X(v29) :*- . Obsecro, quid hac sententia clarius 
dici potuit?"(p.67)
can it be shown that Jonathan Edwards and all the other 
later Predestinarians have been dyspeptics? If not, 
then it is just possible that Calvin might have had 
the same reasons for believing in Predestination which 
these men had. One might ask: if it has really been 
observed that all dyspeptics have a tendency to believe 
in Predestination, and that Predestinarians are often 
dyspeptics; and if not, what reason there is to suppose 
that dyspepsia contributes in any way to the acceptance 
of this doctrine.
According to the late Professor James Ward,
"It is  *  generally allowed that in the 
long theological controversies, which for 
centuries have raged round our problem, 
logic has been on the side of those who, 
like Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin and Edwards, 
have maintained the doctrine of divine 
predestination. 11 !)
And since Prof. Ward was not himself an advocate of 
Predestination, this admission should have some weight. 
But our Calvinistic discreditors are not at all 
troubled about logic. Their idea of a further refuta- 
tion of the doctrine of Predestination would be to 
try to discover something wrong with the health of 
Augustine, Aquinas, and Edwards, or perhaps of Prof. 
Ward. It would scarcely occur to them to investigate 
the logical grounds of the doctrine itself.
1)James Ward, Realm of Ends, p.508.
But surely the influence of Calvinism upon the 
religious, moral, political, social, and economic life 
of men has been sufficient to warrant a more careful 
study of Calvin*s teaching than this; and it is Just 
possible that there is sufficient indebtedness on the 
part of English speaking peoples to obligate them to 
be at least fair in their consideration of Calvin's 
views. With Bungener,
"we shall protest against the strange eagerness 
with which, at the present day, he is abandoned, 
or denied by so many whom simple justice, 
not to say gratitude, should range among his 
friends. Between the apotheosis, which we 
want for none, and an abandonment so ready 
and complete, there is room at least for a 
serious study, worthy of the cause and of the 
man."1)
Oalvinism did a great deal for the world in a 
time when it sadly needed a great deal to be done for 
it. It revived a Pauline conception of God, and of 
man f s relation to Him, which filled the hearts of its 
believers with a high seriousness. Calvinists may have 
had many faults, but a lack of regard for God and a 
lack of zeal for righteousness were not among them;
and a renewed interest in God and righteousness might
2) 
not be amiss in our own day.
1)Felix Bungener,"Calvin: His Life, His Labours, and 
His Writings"(English translation,1863),P-5.
2)It does appear that, aa Professor Bavinck has said, 
"History has demonstrated that the belief in election, 
provided it be genuine, that is, a heartfelt convic* 
tion of faith, does not produce careless 01* Godless 
men."("Calvin and the Reformation",p.127.)
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It is passing strange that there should be such 
a high regard for Determinism in science today, and
o
such a low regard for Predestination in theology.
Prof. Kuijper says,"If you now proceed to the 
decree of God, what else does God's fore«ordination 
mean, than the certainty that the existence and 
course of all things, _i.e_. of the entire cosmos, 
instead of being a plaything of caprice and chance, 
obeys law and order, and that there exists a firm 
will which carries out its designs both in nature 
and in history."(Calvinism.p.148.)
"It is a fact that the more thorough development 
of science in our age has almost unanimously decided 
in favor of Calvinism with regard to the antithesis 
between the unity and stability of God's decree, 
which Calvinism professes, and the superficiality 
and looseness, which the Arminians preferred. tf (Op. 
cit.,p.l49.)
"Through evil report and good report Calvinism 
has firmly maintained its confession. It has not 
allowed itself to be deprived by scoff and scorn 
of the firm conviction, that our entire life must 
be under the sway of unity, solidity and order. 
established by God himself."(Op.cit.,p.152.)
It is indeed more than strange that men who 
firmly believe in the unchangeable and absolute laws 
of Nature, should yet ridicule the doctrine of Predes- 
tination. Do they consider themselves outside Nature? 
Many of them are likewise prone to ridicule all idea 
of a Super-nature. They confine God to Nature, and 
insist that He must obey her laws. According to them 
miracles are an impossibility - for God. If one knew 
all the laws of Nature, he could tell exactly what 
God would do; for God can do nothing new. But we can. 
We can do the unexpected, the unforeseen. Not even God, 
who must know all the laws of Nature, can tell what we 
shall do. For we have real freedom - within limits. 
Nature limits our possibilities, but it does not close 
us up to one unchanging course, as it does God.
But such a view seems highly questionable. And 
if it is a mere matter of personal preference, one 
might be excused for preferring not to be the one 
unstable and seemingly irrational element in an other- 
wise rational and ordered universe.
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For surely, if Determinism is to be the rule in science 
and philosophy, we cannot do without some form of
Predestination in theology,   if we are to have any
1)
theology at all.
It is scarcely true to say that the doctrine of 
Predestination is the distinguishing feature of Calvin- 
ism; since it has been a component part of several 
systems of theology. The distinguishing features of 
Calvinism in this sense, are its view of tiie sacraments 
and its church polity. And yet, the doctrine of 
Predestination is more fundamental to the Calvinistic 
system than either of these; and it is only through a 
consideration of it and its allied doctrines that one 
can discover Calvinism's affiliations and philosophi- 
cal consequences, because it is only through these
1)According to Reyburn,"Modern science did not appear 
above the horizon till generations after he (Calvin) 
had vanished from the stage of history, and after 
predestination had been everywhere spoken against. 
But one of the leading doctrines of modern science 
is Just predestination in a new guise. If Calvin 
speaks of those who are doomed to perdition and of 
those who are chosen to salvation, science speaks 
of the millions of immature lives both of plants 
and of animals which are doomed to be destroyed 
that the remainder may survive and perpetuate the
type. 11 (Hugh Y. Reyburn's "John Calvin - His Life, 
Letters, and Work", p. 369.)
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doctrines that one comes to the Calvinistic conception
of God, which is the proper beginning and the true
1)
heart of Calvinism. Consequently, it is to this most
opposed part of Calvin's teaching that we shall direct 
our attention.
The thesis of this paper is that Calvinism is an 
illogical form of Determinism, which errs, » contrary 
to the accusations of most of its opponents,   not 
through "being deterministic, but through not being 
deterministic enough,
By Determinism I mean a system of thought which 
considers the universe as all of a piece, each part 
causally related to every other part, and the whole 
merely an inevitable unfolding in time of an eternally 
fixed scheme. Of course the Determinism in Calvin is 
theistic. since the deterministic elements in his 
system all center around his cardinal doctrine of the 
Sovereignty of God.
We shall have no concern with that great body of 
Calvin's teaching which relates to such matters as the 
Trinity, the Person of Christ, the Sacraments, etc.;
1)Reyburn remarks:"Calvin's doctrine of predestination 
is not set forth as a primary doctrine of his theol- 
ogy. It appears as a logical development of his 
original principles. But it is the thread which 
binds the separate items of his teaching into a 
unity. It determines all he has to say on the char- 
acter of God, on the condition and destiny of man 
and on the work of the Redeemer and of the Holy 
Spirit."(Op.cit.,p.364.)
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since this has little or no bearing upon our subject. 
But we shall investigate Calvin's treatment of the 
doctrines of Creation and Providence, Total Depravity, 
Irresistible Grace, Perseverance, Justification, 
Prayer and Good Works, the Church and the State; 
because it is in these that we shall be most apt to 
discover the Calvinistic teaching with regard to the 
question of human freedom, and the bearing of that 
teaching upon the practical affairs^ of human life.
The Institutes will be our chief source, because 
it is only in them that we have the system as a whole 
set forth, and because they are not only the background
of his other writings, but in the last edition represent
1)
Calvin's most mature views on our subject.
1)See Calvin's "Institutes of the Christian Religion" 
(Alien's translation, London, 1813.), Preface (p.19), 
where Calvin explains that the Institutes are the 
proper background for the understanding of his 
Commentaries.
His treatise "De Libero Arbitrio" was written in 
1543 in reply to what he considered to be an attack 
by Pighius of Campania on an early edition of the 
Institutes. (See Corpus Reformatorum, v.34,cc.233*234) 
In connection with Pighius 1 question as to whether the 
idea of God's ordaining all things does not do away 
with all incentive to activity on our part, he remarks: 
"Si exspectat Pighius, dum novam responsionem excudam, 
fallitur: sed tantum ex Iristitutione mea mutuabor, 
quod solutioni satis sit."(c*256.) In 1552 he published 
a further reply to Pighius 1 attacks, entitled "De 
Aeterna Del Praedestinatione", in which he says: 
"Quid nos sentiamus, satis locujles, ut nihil praeterea 
addam, testis est Institutio."(Corpus Ref.,v.36,c.260.) 
Later in the same treatise he says:"Now, though I 
believe I have, in my 'Institutes', already refuted,
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We shall divide our study into four Parts: 
First, a consideration of the deterministic doctrines 
of Calvinism; Second, a consideration of the conse- 
quences of this teaching in other doctrines; Third, 
a criticism of this teaching; and Fourth, the 
development of it*
fi» w  > .«  w «k *» » » f» *»«»»
with clearness and brevity, the various absurdities 
of opposition which my adversaries heap upon my 
doctrine, * yet, as Pighius has found much delight 
in nibbling at my testimonies and my replies to 
opponents; I will not object to wash off from myself, 
as I proceed, his virulent soil."(Cole's translation, 
entitled "Calvin's Calvinism11 , v.1,pp.H6f.)
In a dissertation on Providence, appended to this 
treatise, he affirms:"Nudis tantum verbis quae uberius 
in mea Institutione exposita fuerant nunc referam." 
(Corpus Ref.,v.36,c.347. Cole's translation, op.cit., 
v.2,p.3.)
In 1557, he published another, briefer treatise 
on Predestination, and in 1558, a refutation of certain 
calumnies of his doctrine of Providence. But the last 
edition of the Institutes, in 1559* may be taken as 
the best statement of Calvin's whole position.
Prof. Doumergue in the Introduction to the 4th 
volume of his great work, "Jean Calvin", (p.1) 
remarks: "L*Institution chretienne, c'est tout 
Calvin et tout le calvinisme. Nisard ecrivait il y a 
deja longtemps: ' L f Institution  «*», c'est a la fois 
le systeme religieux de Calvin, sa conduite et son 
portrait.' Plus recemment et plus energiquement 
Brunetiere a repete: ' L*Institution chretienne, a elle 
seule, c'est presque Calvin tout entier.-*-« Homo unius 
librij Pour connaltre GBM&a*itmtxr3ik Besoin que de 
1 T Institution chretienne.* Tout cela est vrai, non 
sans quelque exageration. Pour connaitre vraiment tout 
Calvin, pensee, caractere, personnalite, il faut 
consulter non pas une source, mais trois: son Institution, 
sea Sermons et ses Lettrea.**(D.Nisard.Histoire de la 
litte*rature franpaise,!, 1844,p.301   F.Brunetiere, 
L'aeuvre littdraire de Calvin, dans la Revue des Deux~ 
Mondes. 15 octobre 1900> p.920,921.)
However, since ae are not so much concerned with
Calvin's character and personality, we need not trouble
so much about his letters and sermons.
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Part I*
THE DETERMINISTIC TEACHING OF CALVIN.
Chapter I*
CREATION and PROVIDENCE
The Doctrine of Creation and Its Deterministic Implications
The Calvinistic view of creation is simply that
D
of the first chapter of Genesis. In the beginning GOD
made the heavens and the earth by the word of His 
power in the space of six days. For Calvin
"Moses was an authentic witness and herald 
of the one God, the Creator of the world",
and the first chapter of G-enesis exhibits not the mere
essence only of God, but also
2) 
"his eternal Wisdom and his Spirit",
in that the progressive creation displays His providence 
and paternal solicitude towards man by evincing the 
fact that
"before he would make man, he prepared every 
thing which he foresaw would be useful Or 
beneficial to him." 3)
He could have made the world in a single moment of 
time; He chose to do otherwise, seemingly for the 
purpose of giving man the opportunity of contemplating
c»e0«ac»ei«a«»««kBca»«a




at a later date the orderly and progressive advance 
of the creative movements. For in spite of what Calvin 
has to say on the subject, if God had chosen to make 
the whole thing at once, the stage would have been 
as well set for man as it was through a six day process, 
since man would have preceded in neither case the 
things necessary for his existence. The only thing 
here of importance is that God is a purposive being, 
since
He "has demonstrated, by the very order of 
creation, that he made all things for the 
sake of man."!)
God is therefore an intelligent being, the Supreme
Intelligence, from whose image the soul of man is
2) 3) 
made, which is the seat of man's intelligence*
But the soul of man is in no sense an emanation from 
the substance of God, as the Manichaeans held; nor 
can creation be the mere forming of preexistent matter 
into a cosmos; for as Calvin maintains,
"Creation is not a transfusion, but an 
origination of existence from nothing. M4)
Creation is ex nihilo and teleological. In the 
beginning there was only God.
But now this doctrine of Creation, which it 
may be Justly remarked is not peculiar to Calvinism
1)0p.cit.,p.169 (Ch.14,par.22). - See also "Calvin's
2)Ibid.,pp.173ff.(Ch.15,par.3.) Calvinism", Part 2,
3) M p.172.(par.2.) pp.27, 
" p.177.(par.5.)
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as such, but is the generally accepted view of all 
orthodox Christians, is certainly deterministic. If 
God created all things for His own glory, the things 
themselves had nothing to say about it. They did not 
even exist until God called them into being, so their 
existence can in no sense be an expression of their 
own wills. And their nature is determined, not by 
themselves, but by the purpose of God. Consequently, 
even though man be the height of the creation as far 
as the earth is concerned, he did not choose this 
position for himself, but was placed in it by God. 
And the purpose of man's existence, which is the factor 
that would determine his nature according to Calvinism, 
is hid in the secret will of the Creator.
The Problem of Evil in connection with the Doctrine of
Creation*
But if God endowed everything in the world with 
its original nature, we are immediately confronted 
with the problem which was ever a thorn in the flesh 
of Calvinism, and which we shall find constantly before 
us in our study of the Calvinistic theology: namely, 
How came evil into the world?. Its presence here is 
something Calvin would be the last to deny. On the
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other hand, he will not admit that in its character as 
evil it is something for whose existence God is 
responsible; for this he feels would make God evil, - 
which for Calvin is unthinkable. God is wholly good 
and is perfection itself. How, then, does it happen that 
His world is at least partially evil?
1. The Devil,
Of course Manichaean dualism is an easy answer 
to the question. But from Calvin's standpoint it is 
unsatisfactory. God alone is eternally and independently 
existent, and the Devil himself is one of His creatures. 
How then comes the Devil to be evil; for Calvin admits 
that
"he is naturally depraved, vicious, malignant, 
and mischievous" and w that he is the author, 
conductor, and principal contriver of all 
wickedness and iniquity Mt1)
But Calvin denies that anything in the universe is
2)
evil in its original nature. According to him,
"Since the devil was created by God, -  
this wickedness which we attribute to his 
nature is not from creation, but from 
corruption. For whatever evil quality he 
has, he has acquired by his defection and 
fall. And of this the Scripture apprizes 




God, Just as he now is, we should ascribe to 
God himself that which is in direct opposition 
to him.*1 1)
But Calvin would not allow us to think that the 
Devil was in any sense free from God. He declares:
"The discord and contention, which we say 
Satan maintains against God, ought to be 
understood in a manner consistent with a 
firm persuasion, that he can do nothing 
without God's will and consent. -   Satan 
is subject to the power of God, and so 
governed by his control, that he is compelled 
to render obedience to him. Now, when we 
say that Satan resists God, and that his 
works are contrary to the works of God, 
we at the same time assert that his repug« 
nance and contention depend on the Divine 
permission. I speak now, not of the will 
or the endeavour, but only of the effect. 
For the devil, being naturally wicked, has 
not the least inclination towards obedience 
to the Divine will, but is wholly bent on 
insolence and rebellion. It therefore arises 
from himself and his wickedness, that he 
opposes God with all his desires and purposes. 
This depravity stimulates him to attempt 
those things which he thinks the most opposed 
to God. But since God holds him tied and bound 
with the bridle of his power, he executes 
only those things which are divinely permitted; 
and thus, whether he will or not, he obeys 
his Creator, being constrained to fulfil any 
service to which he impels him." 2)
Similarly, according to Calvin, God controls and 
directs all evil spirits. They can do nothing in actual
1)0p.cit.,par.16.
2)Ibid.,par.17. It must be noticed that Calvin here 
speaks as if the Devil's inclination to evil were some 
thing not determined by God, but something which God 
has to counteract and direct* It is the language of 
Pluralism, and the figure is that of a king ruling his 
subjects. But this figure is scarcely strong enough 
to do Justice to the relation of Creator and creature,
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opposition to His will.
We shall comment in a later chapter upon the 
consistency of this general position. The point to 
note here is that even though Calvin places all the 
responsibility for the evil character of the Devil 
upon the Devil himself, he is yet much concerned to 
maintain the continued sovereignty of God, and to 
deny to the Devil any real freedom from God's direction 
and power. The Devil may think he is opposing God; he 
does evil because he desires to do it, since it is 
evil. But in every act he is fulfilling the purposes 
of God.
But now, when Calvin speaks about the Devil being 
'compelled to render obedience to God', it is not 
certain whether he means conscious obedience or not. 
Obedience, strictly speaking, is a conscious activity; 
and being so, one whose inclination was to oppose God, 
could only be compelled to obey Him by the recognition
and its use indicates a confusion in Calvin's mind with 
regard to the exact relation between God and the Devil. 
In HDe Libero Arbitrio"(p.35) Calvin similarly contends: 
"Dicimus, non caeco aut fortuito casu sursum deorsum 
versari res humanas, sed certo Dei consilio administrari: 
ut nihil accidere possit quam quod decrevit ab initio: 
omnia eius potestati subiecta ease: ides nullam esse oj 
creaturam, quae non eius voluntati, aut sponte, aut 
coacta, obtemperet. Proinde quae fiunt, omnia necessario 
fieri prout ordinavit. Satanam quoque et omnes impios
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of his inability to do otherwise. But this could 
certainly not apply to evvajy Instance, since the very 
necessity for compulsion rests upon an admitted 
opposition of desire, and therefore there is a lack 
of conscious obedience in desire. Moreover, Calvin's 
following assertion that the Devil
"opposes God with all his desires and purposes" 
definitely indicates that in these things he is not 
consciously obedient to the will of God, but merely 
unconsciously dominated by God's greater power, which 
uses him in ways he knows not of. In any case, however, 
he is still merely God's creature and God's instrument; 
for
"whether he will or not, he obeys his Creator11 , 
and all that he does, even as the expression of his 
corrupted nature, is determined by God. But here the 
'obeys' must refer to unconscious service and not to 
what is strictly speaking 'obedience 1 .
2. The Corruption of Man*
When one has successfully acounted for the self- 
corruption of a powerful spiritual being like the Devil
 » » «* ** C*«» fi» t» i» « 
eius imperio esse obnoxios, ut se movere nequeant, nisi 
quantum iusserit: manu enim Aius velut fraeno aut 
capistro fco.erceri: ut turn eos retineat, quum libuerit: 
turn impe Hat at dirigat ad exsequenda sua iudicia." 
(Corpus Ref.,v.34,c.258.)
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in a world created by a wholly good, omnipotent, and 
omniscient God (which I think Calvin has not done), 
the problem of the corruption of man becomes a compar- 
atively simple one. And yet it is one which has 
peculiar difficulties of its own. Once there is admitted 
into the world a force of evil, the possibility of its 
corrupting man is one which must certainly be looked 
out for. But the question then arises: Did the force 
of evil corrupt man, or did man corrupt himself?. 
According to Calvin the responsibility for the corrup- 
tion rests upon man himself, though it was the Devil 
who tempted him. But here comes the whole question of 
temptation. If the Devil prevailed upon man through 
deceit, - because of man's stupidity and the Devil's 
superior subtlety,   then the responsibility for the 
Pall rests either upon the Devil for corrupting man, 
or upon God for making man unable to distinguish suffi« 
ciently between good and evil and for putting him at 
the mercy of the Devil. But in spite of possible
interpretations of God's prohibiting man to eat of the
1)
tree of the knowledge of good and evil, Calvin contends
1)Genesis 2:17. Calvin thinks that the special reason 
for God's prohibiting man to eat of this tree was 
"lest Adam should desire to be wise above measure", but 
that the more general reason was that "abstinence from 
the fryit of one tree was a kind of first lesson in 
obedience, that man might know he had a Director and 
Lord of his life, on whose will he ought to depend, 
and in whose commands he ought to acquiesce." 
(Commentary on Genesis « 2:16,17.)
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that God
"furnished the soul of man  - with a mind 
capable of discerning good from evil, and 
Just from unjust; and of discovering, by the 
light of reason, what ought to be pursued or 
avoided", and that "in this integrity man 
was endued with free will, by which, if he 
had chosen, he might have obtained eternal 
life." t)
Calvin therefore maintains:
"Adam    could have stood if he would, 
since he fell merely by his own will.    
His choice of good and evil was free; and 
not only so, but his mind and will were 
possessed of consummate rectitude, and all 
his organic parts were rightly disposed to 
obedience, till, destroying himself, he 
corrupted all his excellencies. --- There 
is no excuse for him; he received so much, 
that he is the voluntary procurer of his own 
destruction." 1)
Whatever the other difficulties of this position 
it would appear from this account of the Pall that the 
Devil was a wholly unnecessary party to the procedure. 
If the possibility of evil existed in the world - 
and it must have, or the Devil could never have chosen 
it - and the ability to recognize good and evil, and to 
choose between them, resided in man, there was no need 
of the Devil to present him with the choice; unless, 
of course, the Devil used wiles to persuade him to the 
choice of evil, - in which case, they must have been 
either appeals to his already existing moral weakness, 
or some form of deception which even his supposedly
1)Institutes,Bk.I.,ch.15,par.8.
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perfect understanding and reason were not sufficient 
to prevent. The whole point is that the supposition 
of an active personal force of evil in the situation 
is unnecessary and merely complicates it. For if the 
possibility of choosing evil did not exist already in 
man and in the situation in which he was placed, 
altogether apart from the influence of any active 
force of evil such as the Devil, then the real respon- 
sibility for man's defection rests in this active force 
and not in man; since the very idea of the necessity 
of an active force involves the idea of the necessity 
of some form of compulsion in order to man's overthrow. 
And the adoption of this explanation only pushes the 
difficulty one step farther back to the Devil's choice 
of evil. ;
It is insufficient to say that the Devil was 
simply a part of the situation in which man was placed; 
for this still leaves us with the seemingly insoluble 
problem of how that which is evil could have got inside 
a thoroughly good man and influenced him to do wrong. 
And if it did not in some way by its own initiative 
insinuate itself into man and as it were take up a 
position inside him, there is no possible meaning left 
for Jfche term "active 1 . For an active force can fcnly
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influence a man either by overpowering him, - in which 
case it compels him against his will, - or by deceiving 
him, or by making what he recognizes to be morally wrong 
attractive to him, - in which cases either his under­ 
standing is faulty or his character is already morally
. - *, fc
imperfect. To resort to the necessity of an active 
force in order to explain the Fall, therefore, is only 
to make the placing of the blame upon man more difficult 
than ever. Consequently, if the idea of the Devil 
only increases our difficulties in satisfactorily e p 
explaining the Fall, instead of lessening them, it 
would appear that we should do better if we left the 
Devil out of the consideration altogether.
But the important thing to note from the stand­ 
point of our present discussion is that, in spite of 
all his attempts to relieve God of the responsibility 
for the entrance of sin, or evil, into the life of man, 
and to fix the responsibility upon man himself, Calvin 
is, consistently or otherwise, still Unwilling to 
deprive God of the power to make and govern the world
*' ' • * • ' ' ' ; • '
in whatever way seems good to Him. In setting forth
the original goodness of man Calvin does not wish to^\~j . [••
preclude the possibility of later acknowledging that
,' •;. ..' ." .., ..,."• .. ' •' ..•'.' ." . '. ' • -~"J*V V'«. ~ '• •'"'• •'
the Fall itself was decreed by God; for he remarks:
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HHere it would be unreasonable to introduce 
the question respecting the secret predesti­ 
nation of Q-od, because we are not now dis­ 
cussing what might possibly have happened or 
not, but what was the real nature of man. H 1)
It is enough for him that,
"G-od was under no necessity to give (man) 
any other than an indifferent and mutable 
will, that from his fall he might educe 
matter for his own glory." 1)
However, the consistency of this passage with the 
previous one in which Calvin refers to man's will 
as being 'entirely conformed to the government of 
reason 1 , and a reason which was capable of discovering 
'what ought to be pursued or avoided 1 , is something 
which it is rather difficult to see.
Calvin would have us believe that man originally 
was a perfect creature, and that among his perfections 
was a free will, « free in every sense of the word, 
of which there are three: first, a real ability to 
choose either one of two courses; second, the ability 
to choose the morally right course,- which would be 
freedom from sin; and third, the ability to act in 
accord with one's own desires under the circumstances, 
which is freedom from external compulsion. But how 
man could have possessed such a free will, 'entirely 
conformed to the government of reason' , and a reason 
capable of discovering 'what ought to be pursued or 
avoided 1 , and yet have chosen the sinful course,
., same paragraph.
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remains still a profound mystery. In what sense was 
man's will 'indifferent and mutable 1 ? And in what 
sense had man the power to persevere in the good 
and not 'the will to use that power*? There must have 
been some reason for his choice of evil. It could 
not have been unbelief, for this would imply a faulty 
understanding or reason, «- neither of which Calvin 
would admit. And it could not have been pride; for 
a pride so developed would itself be already sinful, 
and thus we should only be contending that man's 
character was evil before he made any evil choice, « 
a position which would be consistently Calvinistic 
but distinctly unsatisfactory, since it would solve 
fco difficulties and would certainly not forward Calvin's 
present attempt to place the responsibility of the 
Fall wholly upon man, on the ground of his absolute 
freedom of will.
As a matter of fact the only freedom possible 
either before the Fall or after, is simply freedom 
from external compulsion. Adam's first choice, just 
as much as any of ours today, must have been determined 
by his character. Otherwise it was not his choice, 
and could only be explained on the Arminian supposition 
of the equilibrium of the will, which according to 
the apparently sound argument of the later Calvinists
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would preclude all possibility of Adam being responsible
1) 
for his conduct.
Calvin's attempt to explain the Pall is wholly 
unsatisfactory, and the problem of the origin of evil 
remains still unsolved. The problem of how it is 
possible for Adam to have been really confronted with 
two courses of conduct both of which were actually
possible when God had secretly decreed only one of
2) 
them, is a problem Calvin fails to consider. Bold as
Calvin is with regard to God's control of the later 
affairs of men through Providence, he yet seems labor** 
ing under the impression that somehow in the beginning 
the responsibility must be laid upon man through the 
supposition of some inexplicable form of free will. 
But it is very hard to see how the bondage of sin 
imposed upon man by the Fall could make him any more 
God's creature than he was to start with. If he is 
not in any sense free from the direction of God now, 
as the Spirit of God moves mysteriously upon his soul,
|)For instance, Jonathan Edwards,"On the Will",Part 3* 
section 6,- though the argument here is slightly 
different due to the context and general approach.
2)In the "Congregation on Eternal Election", in 1562 
(translation of the Rev.R.Govett,Jun., in a small 
volume entitled,"Calvinism by Calvin",London,1840), 
Calvin declared:"But, it will be said,'When God 
created Adam, did he not foresee what would occur? 
and did he not dispose it according to his will 1 . 
Yes truly, it cannot be denied. But man was created
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it is extremely surprising that he should have been 
immediately after his creation. Did God have no purpose 
in the creating of man? Or was this purpose thwarted 
by man's choice? Calvin would not dare to affirm either 
of these positions. For him God is absolute sovereign 
of the world, and the whole creation moves at His 
behest. The supposition of original freedom of choice 
and its loss in the Pall appears to be quite gratuitous 
and wholly futile. Pall or no Pall, God is the Creator 
of both the Devil and man, and He created them good, 
but, according to Calvin, they corrupted themselves. 
Calvin cannot begin to reconcile these two aspects of 
the situation, but his deterministic conviction asserts 
itself in his simple avowal that even this self-corruption 
could nit have been in any sense a thwarting of God's 
will, but must have been provided for by God's eternal 
decree.
In so far as Creation is concerned, the Calvinistic 
doctrine is simply:
"In the beginning GOD."
just and good and upright in his nature; and if he 
has stumbled and fallen, if he has committed so great 
a transgression (as he has), that comes from him and 
cannot be attributed to God. 'Well, but if God had 
not decreed it, it would not have been so.' —- 
Yes, but let us beware of murmuring against our 
Judge, and let us know that what he has ordained in 
his counsels from all time is hidden from us, and 
that we cannot conceive it." (pp.98f.)
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The Doctrine of Providence,
1)
We now come to the doctrine of Providence, where
Calvin stands superb above the shifting timidity of 
many of his followers.
God's governing of the world is absolute and 
extends to all its parts. Nothing is beyond His 
command, and there are no fortuitous accidents. For 
as Calvin declares,
"The providence of God —* is opposed to 
fortune and fortuitous accidents. —— 
All events are governed by the secret 
counsel of God." 2)
"Nothing can happen but what is subject to 
his knowledge, and decreed by his will."3)
Not a drop of rain falls but at His express command. 
No wind ever rises or blows but by His order.
11 All creatures, above and below, are ready 
for his service, that he may apply them to 
any use that he pleases." 4)
Nor is man excluded from this Divine control. 
He, too, is wholly dependent upon God; for as Calvin 
remarks,
"It is, indeed, a ridiculous madness for 
miserable men to resolve on undertaking any 
work independently of God, whilst they cannot 
even speak a word but what he chooses." 5)
M»«.*»«±**»k»Uiii>t*M0»
1)Institutes, Book I., chs.16-18.
2)Ibidl.,ch.l6,par.2. 3)Ibid.,par.3- 4) Ibid., par.7. 
5)Ibid.,par.6. In the "Congregation"("Calvinism by 
Calvin",p.111). Calvin maintains:"We ought also to 
recognise in general, that God so governs all things
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!• Providence distinguished from Fate.
But now let no one be so foolish as to contend 
that Calvinism is simply a belief in Fate, - as some 
mistakenly do. The distinction, as Calvin points out, 
is that the Stoics, who believed in Fate, imagined
"a necessity arising from a perpetual 
concatenation and intricate series of causes, 
contained in nature";
whereas Calvinism makes
"God the Arbiter and G-overnor of all things, 
who, in his own wisdom, has, from the remotest 
eternity, decreed what he would do, and now, 
by his own power, executes what he has decreed."1)
by his providence that his will is as it were the 
source of every thing."
See also "De Libero Arbitrio"(p-33), where Calvin remarks: 
"Qui fit enim, ut vir providus, dum sibi consulit, 
imminentibus etiam malis se expllcet: stultus inconsulta 
temeritate pereat? nisi quod et stultitia et prudentia 
divinae sunt dispensationis instrumenta in utramque 
partem." (Corpus Ref.,v.34,c.256.)
1)Institutes, Bk.I.^ch.16,par.8. See also "De Libero 
Arbitrio"(p.34), where Calvin declares:"Non sumus Stoici, 
qui fatum soinniemus ex perpetua rerum connexione: sed 
tantum dicimus, Deum mundo praeesse, quern condidit: 
nee modo rerum eventus habere in sua potestate, sed 
hominum etiam corda gubernare, voluntates flectere pro 
suo arbitrio hue atque illuc, actionem esse mdAeratorem, 
ut nihil tandem, nisi quod decrevit, efficiant, quidquid 
conentur. Proinde quae fortuita maxime videntur, ea 
dicimus fieri necessario: non suapte natura, sed 
quoniam aetenum et stabile Dei consilium in illis 
gubernandis regnat. Neque tamen idcirco media ilia 
excludimus, quae in voluntatis suae obsequium Deus 
destinavit: neque aut otiosa, aut supervacua dicimus, 
quae divinae providentiae complement© serviunt. 11 
(Corpus Ref»,v.34,c.257.)
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Whence it appears that the difference is the fundamental 
one between Naturalism and Idealism. Fate is not 
intelligent and purposive. It is simply an inevitable 
chain of meaningless material causes and effects. It, 
as well as Providence, is thoroughly deterministic as 
regards material things; since both make world events 
inevitable. But strictly speaking, the inevitability 
of Fate is a purely mechanical one. It places man at 
the mercy of the physical world; but it does not 
determine his reactions to the world. Instead of being 
an intelligent and purposive Supreme Being who moves 
through man and through the world, - securing His 
ends with regard to the activities of men by mysteriously 
allowing them, unaware of constraint, to choose for 
themselves what He has already decreed they shall choose, • 
Fate is something which shapes the destinies of men 
against their wills and in spite of all their efforts, 
compelling them by the antagonism of superior force. 
The one doctrine leads to the recognition of the 
futility of all effort and the wisdom of killing all 
desire. The other fills a few at least with the 
dangerous but most dynamic conviction that they are 
the instruments of Almighty God; and it makes no man 
feel that the course of his life is directed without 
regard to his own will. He may be a puppet in the
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hands of God; but if so, he is like all other puppets 
in that he is not conscious of being one: the strings 
controlling his life are the invisible cords which 
move his will, and not the thongs of Fate, which bind 
the soul and scourge the body until soul and body are 
stifled and beaten into the abject humility of defeat 
and despair.
But strangely enough, while Fate, in the strictest 
sense, means this Inevitable chain of mechanical 
causation, it is often in common speech used as synon­ 
ymous with 'Fortune*, which, in turn, is commonly 
interpreted as 'Chance 1 . Thus two things the very 
opposite of each other in their true natures are 
closely linked together in common thought, simply 
because, from our standpoint, they are alike in making 
the course of life something beyond our control, and 
not only wholly unknown to us, but wholly unknowable.
It is in this respect that the idea of Fate differs
1) 
from modern Mechanism. Both Fate and Chance are from
the human standpoint insoluble mysteries; though 
events, according to the former, are definitely 
determined, and according to the latter are not 
determined at all.
1)They differ also in this further respect, that 
modern Mechanism definitely makes us nothing more 
than a part of the whole, and the whole nothing more 
than a machine.
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In the light of present controversies regarding 
the true nature of statistical law, Augustine's 
statement of the nature of l chance 1 is most interesting, 
He puts in the form of a supposition:*
"Perhaps what is commonly teimed fortune 
is regulated by a secret order, and «-«• 
what we call chance is only that, with the 
reason and cause of which we are not 
acquainted",1)
* that which for him is more than a mere possibility; 
because for him as for Calvin, there was no doubt about 
the matter: nothing happened fortuitously.
Thus, according to Calvin, not only are the events 
of life beyond the control of men; they are definitely 
in the control of Q-od, and depend neither upon fickle 
Chance nor certain Pate. Though it must be admitted 
that, because the purposes of Q-od are beyond our compre­ 
hension, it does often appear that things happen 
fortuitously, yet, nevertheless, they are not really so,
2. The Practical Effects of the Doctrine•
In view of the fact that the opponents of Calvin­ 
ism generally hold that an acceptance of the Calvin- 
istic doctrine of Providence would make men either 
arrogant in the assumption of their election, or 
hopeless and terrified at the thought of their depen*
I) Quoted from the Institutes, Bk.|.,ch.16,par.8.
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dence, it might be well for us to note what Calvin 
himself says about the ends to be attained by the 
contemplation of God's omnipotent and universal 
government.
"The first end." he holds, M is, that it may 
keep us from all presumptuous confidence, 
and hold us fast in the fear of God; and 
also may stir us up to continual prayer. « 
A second end is, to bring us to rest upon 
God, with still and peaceful minds, and to 
teach us to despise, in all courage and 
security, the dangers which surround us 
on every side, and the numberless deaths 
which constantly threaten us from every 
quarter." 1)
Thus, if we have a proper conception of God, it does 
seem as if we should derive from this doctrine neither 
arrogance nor fear, but rather a truly Christian 
humility and courage. For one is inclined to agree 
with Calvin that the necessary consequences of the 
knowledge of our dependence upon God are:
"gratitude in prosperity, patience in adversity, 
and a wonderful security respecting the future. "2)
at the same time," Calvin adds, "a pious 
man will not overlook inferior causes"; 3)
he will not fail to thank those of God's ministers who 
aid him; nor will he fail to blame himself for his 
negligence and sin, - seeing that though these things 
are decreed by God, they are accomplished because of 
the creature's desire, the help of others being rendered
1)"Calvin's Calvinism", Part 2,p.9.
2)Institutes, Bk.I.,ch.17,par.7. 3)Ibid.,par.9.
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because they wished to extend it, his own sin being 
indicative of his own moral turpitude.
The Problem of Evil in connection with the Doctrine
of Providence•
But here again we are confronted with the problem 
of Evil. For if one admits that there is no event but 
what is ordained by God, one must hold that all sinful 
acts are so, as well as good ones. And Calvin is ready 
to go this length; for he says explicitly:
"I admit -•»» even that thieves, and homicide^, 
and other malefactors, are instruments of 
Divine providence, whom the Lord uses for 
the execution of the judgments which he has 
appointed. But I deny that this ought to 
afford any excuse for their crimes." 1)
And the reason for this qualification is, of course, 
that the criminal, Just like anybody else, does what 
he does, not because he is aware of God f s decree, 
but because he wishes to do this particular deed « 
generally in spite of the fact that he knows it to 
be against the revealed law of God and the dictates 
of conscience.
But this qualification is not enough to relieve 
God of the ultimate responsibility for the crime itself. 
The real problem is: how if all things are decreed by 
God, He is to be relieved of the responsibility for the 
evil character of the acts He decrees. For, as Calvin
t)Institutes, op.cit.,par.5
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admits, when it is said that God directs Satan and 
the reprobate to His own pleasure,
"the carnal understanding scarcely comprehends 
how he, acting by their means, contracts no 
defilement from their criminality, and, even 
in operations common to himself and them, is 
free from every fault, and yet righteously 
condemns those whose ministry he uses." 1)
Yet in trying to explain this Calvin will resort to no 
such futile subterfuge as the distinction between 
active and permissive decrees. All things happen as 
they do because God wills them so to be. Take what may 
be considered the most crucial test case: the death 
of our Lord.
"The Jews designed to destroy Christ; Pilate 
and his soldiers complied with their outrageous 
violence; yet the disciples, in a solemn 
prayer, confess that all the impious did 
nothing but what 'the hand and counsel of 
God determined before to be done;*(b) 
agreeably to what Peter had already preached, 
that he was 'delivered by the determinate 
counsel and foreknowledge of God,' that he 
might be ! crucified and slain.'(c) As though 
he had said that God, who saw every thing from 
the beginning, with a clear knowledge and 
determined will, appointed what the Jews 
executed; as he mentions in another place: 
'Those things which God before had showed by 
the mouth of ail his prophets, that Christ 
should suffer, he hath so fulfilled. f (d)" 2)
How is it, though, that God can so control and 
direct men? He does not command them to do these 
particular acts in so many words. If He did, and they 
thus rendered Him conscious obedience, how could there
1)Institutes,Bk.I.,ch.18,par.1.
2)Ibid. (b)Acts 4:28. (c)Acts 2:23. (d)Acts 3:18.
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be anything sinful in their doing these things? The 
fact is, according to Calvin, that sinful men comply 
with God's will without wishing to do so. The thing 
God does is to influence their minds and wills without 
their being aware of His influence. Calvin maintains:
"Nothing can be desired more explicit than 
(God's) frequent declarations, that he blinds 
the minds of men, strikes them with giddiness, 
inebriates them with the spirit of slumber, 
fills them with infatuation, and hardens their 
hearts." 1)
And in connection with the last point, it is interesting 
to note that Calvin has no regard for those who try to 
avoid the force of the assertions that God hardened 
Pharaoh's heart, by the foolish cavil that in reality 
God only permitted Pharaoh to harden his own heart.
But now does this not make God in a very real 
sense the author of evil? It is not enough to point 
out the distinction between God's secret will and 
His precepts. The fact remains that it has been 
admitted that God moves men to evil deeds for the 
fulfilment of His own designs; and the fundamental 
consistency of telling them not to do something and 
then so using them that they do it any way, is not 
as clear as Cal«vin seems to suppose.
It is all very well to say with Augustine that
"God fulfils his righteous will by the wicked 




but to contend further with him that
"(God) doth not make wills evil; but useth 
the wills of men already evil, as He 
pleaseth; nor can he, of himself, will 
anything that is evil", 1)
is to manifest the inadequacy of both the Augustinian 
and Calvinistic treatments of this basic problem of 
sin and evil. How can (Jod only use 'the wills of men 
already evil 1 , when He is the one who created the 
very men themselves and decreed, as Calvin holds, 
their original defection?
We shall have more to say with regard to the 
difficulties of the Calvinistic position later. 
For the present we can find no more succinct statement 
of the deterministic force of Calvin's doctrines of 
Creation and Providence than is contained in his 
own words:
"The Will of GOI) is the one principal and 
all high Cause of all things, in heaven 
and earth!" 2)




ORIGINAL SIN and TOTAL DEPRAVITY
We may consider that the doctrines of Creation 
and Providence, in some form or other, are the "back­ 
ground of any Christian theology or philosophy. But 
these doctrines in themselves give us no key to the 
specific conditions in the world; even in their most 
rigorous Calvinistic form, they give us no insight 
into the specific details of history.
But Christianity, being essentially a religion 
of redemption, presupposes a very definite situation 
in the world as regards the nature and condition of 
men. Whatever the origin of evil, Christianity accepts 
it as a present fact, and is essentially concerned 
with saving men from its power. Regardless of what man 
was before the Fall, or how he fell, all orthodox 
schools of Christian theology are agreed that afterwards 
he was a lost sinner. And Calvinism takes up the more 
extreme position that he was, and is, a helpless sinner.
The Doctrine of Original Sin,
The position is arrived at in this way: Adam, as 
the representative of the race, secured for all men by
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his defection an inheritance of sin. Therefore all men 
are born into the world with a sinful character as part 
of the punishment imposed upon them for the guilt of 
Adam's sin, which guilt they share with him. This is 
what is commonly known as the doctrine of Original Si,n: 
by which is meant the contention that before a child 
has had any opportunity to make sinful choices it is 
already guilty of sin because of its inherited sinful 
dispositions, which will naturally and inevitably impel 
it into sinful courses of conduct and will ultimately 
result in its eternal torment.
Now it is apparent that this doctrine contains 
some very definitely deterministic implications; since 
according to it, what I am, even to the extent of what 
my moral character and natural dispositions are, is 
something determined before I come into being as a 
specific individual entity. Of course, it is difficult 
to see how any theory of human nature can avoid 
postulating some hereditary influence which would be 
beyond the control of the individual and would to a 
certain extent determine what sort of an individual 
he was and was to become. But the doctrine of Original 
Sin is more definite than this. It says that I bear 
part of the guilt of my original progenitor, and 
because of my inheritance, am born, nfct only with a
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definite tendency toward evil, but with an inevitably 
evil nature. I am a sinner before I have had a chance 
to say whether I want to be or not; and when I am 
given the chance to say, my answer is already determined, 
- though of course the determination is effected 
through the Inevitability of my wanting to do the 
wrong thing when I am given the chance.
The Doctrine of Total Depravity.
But Calvinism is even more thoroughgoing thafc 
Just this. Some theologians, notably the Arminian, 
contend that though I am a sinner by birth, 1 am yet 
not beyond doing something tor-help myself out of the 
difficulty, because I have a free will, and when 
occasion offers I am perfectly able to make a good 
choice, which will be the first step in my redemption. 
But Calvin denies this. For him
"original sin —— appears to be an hereditary 
pravity and corruption of nature, diffused 
through all the parts of the soul, rendering 
us obnoxious to the Divine wrath, and producing 
in us those works which the Scripture calls 
'works of the flesh 1 . --« These two things 
therefore," he adds, "should be distinctly 
observed: first, that our nature being so 
totally vitiated and depraved, we are, on 
account of this very corruption, considered 
as convicted and justly condemned in the 
sight of God, to whom nothing is acceptable 
but righteousness, innocence, and purity. —-
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The other thing to be remarked is," he continues, 
"that this depravity never ceases in us, but 
is perpetually producing new fruits, those 
works of the flesh, which we have before 
described, like the emission of flame and 
sparks from a heated furnace, or like the 
streams of water from a never failing spring."1)
Original sin, on this view, is something more 
than a mere privation of original righteousness. It is 
an active thing, expressive of the corruption of the 
whole man. According to Calvin,
H Sin has possessed all the powers of the soul, 
since Adam departed from the fountain of 
righteousness. For man has not only been 
ensnared by the inferior appetites, but 
abominable impiety has seized the very 
citadel of his mind, and pride has penetrated 
into the inmost recesses of his heart. —- 
Paul removes every doubt by informing us 
that the corruption resides not in one part 
only, but that there is nothing pure and 
uncontaminated by its mortal infection. —• 
Man is so totally overwhelmed, as with a 
deluge, that no part is free from sin. w 2)
Yet neither the enemies nor the adherents of 
Calvin must foolishly misconstrue this doctrine of 
Total Depravity, as is so often done. Because depravity 
extends to every part of man, and is total in the
^Institutes, Book II., ch.1,par.8.
2)Ibid., par. 9. See also "De Libero Arbitrio"(p.35) , 
where Calvin says, "Dicimus, homini ingenitam 
perversitatem ex haereditaria corruptione: ut quidquid
quum in se ipso inveniat mali radicem. H (Corpus 
Ref.,v.34,cc.257f.)
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sense of leaving no part of him wholly good and un«=» 
affected by its taint, we must not suppose that each 
part of man is totally depraved and that man himself 
is therefore completely evil. For as Calvin says,
"Reason. — «* by which man distinguishes 
between good and evil, by which he under* 
stands and judges, being a natural talent, 
could not be totally destroyed, but is 
partly debilitated, partly vitiated, so 
that it exhibits nothing but deformity and 
ruin* In this sense John says, that 'the 
light 1 still f shineth in darkness 1 , but 
that 'the darkness comprehended it not.'C^) 
In this passage both these ideas are clearly 
expressed • that some sparks continue to 
shine in the nature of man, even in its 
corrupt and degenerate state, which prove 
him to be a rational creature, and different 
from the brutes, because he is endued with 
understanding; and yet that this light is 
smothered by so much ignorance, that it 
cannot act with any degree of efficacy. 
So the will, being inseparable from the 
nature of man, is not annihilated; but 
it is fettered by depraved and inordinate 
desires, so that it cannot aspire after 
any thing that is good." |)
Consistently or otherwise, Calvin is unwilling 
to consider even fallen man as entirely separated 
from God and the influence of the Holy Spirit, for 
he declares, in a passage which it would be well,for 
both those who ridicule Calvinism and those who reject 
all the innovations of secular science,to consider:
"Whenever, therefore, we meet with heathen 
writers, let us learn from that light of 
truth which is admirably displayed in their
OInstitutes,Bk.II»,ch.2,par.12. (Underlining mine.) 
(z|John 1:5.
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works, that the human mind, fallen as It is, 
and corrupted from its integrity, is yet 
invested and adorned by God with excellent 
talents. If we believe that the Spirit of 
God is th^"15nlv fountain of truth, we shall 
neither re.lect not despise the truth itself, 
wherever it shall appear, unless we wish to 
insult the Spirit of God; for the gifts of 
the Spirit cannot be undervalued without 
offering contempt and reproach to the Spirit 
himself. Now, shall we deny the light of truth 
to the ancient lawyers, who have delivered 
such Just principles of civil order and polity? 
Shall we say that the philosophers were blind 
in their exquisite contemplation and in their 
scientific description of nature? Shall we 
say that those, who by the art of logic have 
taught us to speak in a manner consistent 
with reason, were destitute of understanding 
themselves? Shall we accuse those of insanity, 
who by the study of medicine have been exer­ 
cising their industry for our advantage? What 
shall we say of all the mathematics? Shall we 
esteem them the delirious ravings of madmen? 
On the contrary, we shall not be able even to 
read the writings of the ancients on these 
subjects without great admiration; we shall 
admire them, because we shall be constrained 
to acknowledge them to be truly excellent. - —
"Yet let us not forget that these are 
most excellent gifts of the Divine Spirit, 
which for the common benefit of mankind he 
dispenses to~whomsoever he pleases» —•« 
Nor is there any reason for inquiring, what 
intercourse with the Spirit is enjoyed by 
the impious who are entirely alienated from 
God. For when the Spirit of God is said to 
dwell only in the faithful, that is to be 
understood of the Spirit of sanctification, 
by whom we are consecrated as temples to God 
himself. Yet it is equally by the energy of 
the same Spirit, that God replenishes» actuates, 
and quickens all creatures, and that according 
to the property of each species which he has 
given it by the law of creation. Now, if it 
hasnpleased the Lord that we should be assisted
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Physics, logic, mathematics, and other arts 
and sciences, by the labour and ministry of 
the impious, let us make use of them; lest, if 
we neglect to use the blessings therein freely 
offered to us by God, we suffer the just 
punishment of our negligence. -«•-
"Let us conclude, therefore, that it is 
evident in all mankind, that reason is a 
peculiar property of our nature, which distin­ 
guishes us from the brute animals, as sense 
constitutes the difference between them and 
things inanimate. *»— But whereas some excel 
in penetration, others possess superior judg« 
ment, and others have a greater aptitude to 
learn this or that art, in this variety God 
displays his goodness to us, that no one may 
arrogate to himself as his own what proceeds 
merely from the Divine liberality. —- More­ 
over, God inspires particular motions accord­ 
ing to the vocation of each individual. -*» 
Even in Homer, men are said to excel in 
abilities, not only as Jupiter has distributed 
to every one, but according as he guides from 
day to day. —» In this diversity we perceive 
some remaining marks of the Divine image, 
which distinguish;:the human race in general 
from all the other creatures." 1)
In this splendid statement we see not only the 
proper qualification of the doctrine of Total Depravity, 
but in addition a very noticeable application of the 
Calvinistic doctrine of Providence. Man is still 
God*s servant; and the world is still God's world.
1, Man the Slave of Sin,
But the really significant point is that men, 
with all their remaining natural endowments, are the
f* fa. fia «B Ml fc» fc* «— fat fi» t» «d a «»
OOp.cit.,pars.15-17. (Underlining mine.)
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slave* of sin, unable to discover a way of salvation, 
incapable of putting any plan into execution should 
they light upon one, indifferent to their bondage. 
They cannot through reason alone come to an adequate 
knowledge of the love of God and to a saving faith in 
His Son Jesus Christ, which is essential to redemption. 
For as the Apostle Paul says,
"No man can say that Jesus is Lord, but by 
the Holy Ghost." 1)
And as Calvin adds,
"Christ also has clearly confirmed this by 
his own declaraction, that no man can come 
to him, except the Father draw him. (p) —« 
It must be concluded, therefore, that there 
is no admission into the kingdom of God, 
but for him whose mind has been renewed 
by the illumination of the Holy Spirit."2)
But the deficiency is not alone an intellectual one; 
and the need is for a complete change of character.
a*-No Freedom of the Will in Libertarian Sense*
Whatever the endowments of the original Adam, 
man since the Fall has no such thing as freedom of 
the will a if by 'freedom of the will* we mean what 
Origen described as
"a power of reason to discern good and evil, 





Calvin agrees with Peter Lombard that, though we 
may no longer have r<an equal power to do or to think 
good or evil", yet we are free in the sense of being
"free from constraint 11 ; 
and he admits that ...'„.»',
"This liberty is not diminished, although 
we are corrupt, and the slaves of sin, and 
capable of doing nothing but sin." 1)
But as this freedom to sin is not what is generally
signified by the term 'Free Will 1 , Calvin advocates
2) 
discontinuing the use of it altogether.
What is the use of talking about 'freedom of the 
will 1 , when man is not free to do good unless he is 
liberated by Divine grace? As Calvin maintains,
"Simply to will belongs to man; to will 
what is evil, to corrupt nature; to will 
what is good, to grace."—* The will, 
being deprived of its liberty, is necessarily 
drawn or led into evil." 3)
2. Moral Freedom synonymous with Moral Necessity,
But let us not suppose that we sustain any real 
loss by giving up all title to 'free will 1 . The only
OInstitutes,Bk.II.,ch.2,par.6.
2)Ibid.,par.8.
3)Ibid.,ch.3,par.5. See also Calvin's "Answer to 
Certain Slanders and Blasphemies, etc."(translated 
by John Fielde, in a volume of Sermons, London,1574, 
! p.174)> where he declares:"You shall find throughout 
1 all my books, how I have taught, that we must not 
seek the cause of perdition anywhere else but in
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f freedom l worth having is synonymous with 'necessity 1 ; 
and this we still have, and is all we have ever had. 
But a great many misunderstand this because they fail
to distinguish properly between necessity and
1) 
compulsion. To say that man is 'necessarily drawn to
evil* is not the same as saying that he is 'compelled 
to do evil 1 ; for the ^necessity' spoken of here is not 
the 'necessity of compulsion', but simply the 'necessity 
of acting in accord with one's own nature 1 , - which in 
our case, since the Pall, is sinful. Consequently, the 
'necessity' here spoken of, instead of being the same 
as 'external compulsion', is exactly the opposite, and 
is really equivalent to 'freedom from compulsion'. 
Therefore 'freedom 1 as it is applicable to man is 
identical with this 'moral necessity'; for it means 
that man's volitions are spontaneous or voluntary . - 
which is simply another way of saying that they are 
conditioned or determined by the character of the man
ourselves, in our perverse will. But it followeth not, 
that it is in us to change our will, which is altogether 
given to evil."
We find throughout all Calvinism this strange 
assumption that man left to himself can always do evil, 
but never good. But how does it happen that the natural 
tendency is downwards? Is there in things a tendency 
towards not^being, which God alone can overcome? (See 
Gilson's "Le Thomisme",p. 121.)
1)For additional points about 'necessity', see "Calvin's 
Calvinism", Part 2,pp.l4f.; also Ch.X. of Thesis, and 
Edwards, "On the Will", Part 1, Sect. 3; Part 2, Sect. 8; 
Part 3, Sect. 3; Part 4, Sect. 4.
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himself. Wherefore, if man 1 * character is evil, his
volitions will necessarily be evil, as well. For, as
1) 
we have already seen, if this were not the case,
there would either be no sense in calling him evil, 
or else no sense in speaking of the particular volitions 
referred to as his. For if his volitions were not 
necessitated by his character, they would either be 
determined by nothing at all, •» in which case they 
would result from pure chance, and nobody and nothing 
could in any sense be responsible for them, - or else 
they would be determined by somebody or something 
other than the man himself; and in neither case could 
they be called his spontaneous and voluntary volitions.
The point in all this which is deterministic is 
that, being sinful, man is not free to choose between 
good and evil, but must inevitably choose evil. Thus 
because of the previous history of the race, man is 
shut up to an evil character and cannot free himself 
from the bondage of sin, » simply because being sinful 
by nature, he will never have sufficient insight or 
desire to be free from sin, unless God changes his 
heart; for the other half of the Calvinistic contention 
that man is a slave to sin, is the firm conviction
1) Above, p. 25.
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that all good works are from God. According to Calvin, 
Paul teaches that
"Our salvation is gratuitous, because the 
beginning of all good is from the second 
creation, which we obtain in Christ, -«»*» 
and all the parts of good works, even from 
the first inclination of the mind, are 
entirely from God." 1)
Aa a matter of fact, both Calvin and Augustine 
appear to contend that everything in man is derived 
from God, not in the sense of original creation, but
-, • " ' '
in the sense of Divine instigation; for Calvin quotes 
with highest approval the assertion of Augustine, 
that
"Men labour to discover in our will something 
that is our own, and not derived from God; 
and how any such discovery can be made, I 
know not." 2)
But if this is the case, how it is possible for God 
to be any more responsible for man's salvation than for 
his sin, it is difficult to see; for in both cases 
God acts through the human will, and every affection 
of this will, whether for good or evil, is instigated 
by Him.
One might justly argue that on the matter of 
all good coming directly from God, Calvin begs the 
question; for he assumes that all men are in themselves 




of goodness, he contends that this apparent virtue is 
either a sham, or the special gift of God, - because 
it is not possible for man to be truly good by himself, 
since while he is not wholly evil, there is no positive 
goodness in him. And this same weakness in the argument 
is brought to light by Calvin's contention that
"The origin of all good clearly appears, 
from a plain and certain reason, to be 
from no other than from God alone; for 
no propensity of the will to any thing 
good can be found but in the elect," 1)
• for our only way of determining who are the elect 
is by the observation of their good conduct. But 
there is nothing in 'good conduct 1 as such that 
indicates any special election, unless we have already 
assumed what we are trying to prove, namely that there 
is no source of good in man himself.
In passing, one other thing might be mentioned, 
linen Calvin speaks of God's renovation of the 'will 1 , 
and when he and Augustine refer to God's influence on 
the 'will', it would seem that they are both speaking 
very loosely, since in line with the whole Calvinistic 
and Augustinian position, the 'will' must remain 
exactly the same as it was before, and the part 
transformed by God and acted upon by Him must be 




It must be admitted th%t the Calvinlstic conten­ 
tion that God is the author of all good intention and
1)
good endeavor, coupled with the view that man is by
nature, since the Pall, the complete slave of sin, makes 
the ultimate destiny of man a matter solely of God's 
determination; for it shuts man up to an evil nature, 
an evil life, an eternal damnation - unless God comes 
to his rescue. If God does not rescue him, man's fate 
is sealed by the sin of the race in Adam; if God does 
rescue him, it is sealed by God. In neither case does 
the individual himself decide the matter, - simply 
because the individual does not decide before he comes 
into being, what sort of an individual he is to be, 
and simply because once he is, the absolute connection 
of cause and effect which underlies the whole Calvinifctic 
world «- since the Fall (and is the real core of any 
Determinism) - prevents him changing himself.
But unless we connect this doctrine up to that of 
Providence in such a way as to make all things depend 
on God •* evil as well as good - we get a dualistic 
Determinism (if such is possible), with God as a sort 
of overload, controlling and restraining Evil, but not 
its Creator. And this rests either upon an ultimate 
Manichaean dualism, or else upon an inconsistent one
l)0p.cit.,par.9.
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which had its beginning in a Fall which occurred in 
Time, but had no cause.
In any case, these doctrines of Original Sin 
an Total Depravity, with all their deterministic 
elements, really add nothing to the force of the 




IRRESISTIBLE GRACE and PERSEVERANCE
The Calvlnistic Doctrines.
Just as man is unable to free himself from the 
bondage of sin, so, according to Calvin, he is unable 
to resist the grace of God when the Holy Spirit lays 
hold upon him. He is unable to do good without God; 
he is unable not to do good when God inwardly impels 
him to it. As Calvin says,
God "moves the will, not according to the 
system maintained and believed for many ages, 
in such a manner that it would afterwards be 
at our optifcn either to obey the impulse or 
to resist it, but by an efficacious influence."!)
And in another place he affirms:
"We have a testimony from the mouth of 
Augustine to the point which we are princi­ 
pally endeavouring to establish; that grace 
is not merely offered by the Lord to be 
either received or rejected, according to 
the free choice of each individual, but 
that it is grace which produces both the 
choice and the will in the heart; so that 
every subsequent good work is the fruit and 
effect of it, and that it is obeyed by no 
other will but that which it has produced. 
For this is his language also in another 
place « that it is grace alone which performs 
every good work in us." 2)
These two ideas are so closely connected in
1)Institutes,Bk.II.,ch.3,par.10.
2)Ibid.,par.13. See also "Calvinism by Calvin",p.108, 
where Calvin remarks:"All believe not. Why? Because 
God exerts not his grace towards all."
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Calvin's mind that he is continually combining them: 
first, that man is incapable of good apart from the 
grace of God; second, that he is incapable of resisting 
the grace of God. Now it is apparent that the combi* 
nation is deterministic, in that it leaves man no 
ability to choose between good and evil on his own 
account. He retains the freedom of doing what he 
pleases; but without grace he pleases to sin, and 
with it he pleases to do otherwise.
Furthermore, out of this doctrine of Irresistible 
Grace there comes the other distinctly Calvinistic one 
of the Perseverance of the Saints. As Calvin puts it,
"God gives a constancy that is effectual 
to perseverance . M 1 )
Some, indeed, contend that perseverance is accomplished 
by God cooperating with us and by His conferring 
additional blessings upon those who are grateful for 
the first bestowal of grace and make good use of it. 
But as Calvin points out, all this assumes that we 
can either accept or reject grace as we choose; whereas 
the real truth of the matter is that our gratitude is 
a part of grace itself, and grace sufficiently bestowed 
insures its proper use, since it is actually not we 
who use grace, but grace which uses us. And surely,
ia <*«*<*<•> cat* a «a u«a «.«»«»
O§pstitutes,op.cit.,par.10.
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if we have nothing to say about the acceptance or 
rejection of grace, and our original impulsion to the 
good is wholly from God, there can be little sense in 
distinguishing between God 1 a operating through us to 
accomplish our perseverance and His cooperating with 
us to the same end; for there seems little indeed left 
to us in the way of an original contribution. And on 
the other hand, if we could not resist grace at the 
outset, there seems no reason to suppose we can resist 
its continuance: so that if God has determined that 
we shall persevere, our doingso is inevitable.
The conclusion of this phase of the matter is 
simply that, to use Calvin's words,
"The Lord both begins and completes the good 
work in us; that it may be owing to him, that 
the will conceives a love for what is right, 
that it is inclined to desire it, and is 
excited and impelled to endeavour to attain 
it; and then that the choice, desire, and 
endeavour do not fail, but proceed even to 
the completion of the desired effect; lastly, 
that a man proceeds with constancy in them, 
and perseveres even to the end." 1)
"But", Calvin says in another place, "the 
subject cannot be comprised in a more concise 
summary than in the eighth chapter of 
(Augustine's) treatise addressed to Valentine; 
where he teaches, that the human will obtains, 
not grace by liberty, but liberty by grace; 
that being impressed by the same grace with a 
disposition of delight, it is formed for 
perpetuity; that it is strengthened with 
invincible fortitudej that while grace reigns,
1)Institutes,op.cit.,par.9.
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it never falls, but, deserted by grace, falls 
immediately; that by the gratuitous mercy of 
the Lord, it is converted to what is good, 
and, being converted, perseveres in it; that 
the first direction of the human will to that 
which is good, and its subsequent constancy, 
depend solely on the will of God, and not on 
any merit of man. Thus there is left to man", 
Calvin concludes, "such a free will, if we 
choose to give that appellation, as (Augustine) 
describes in another place, that he can neither 
be converted to G-od nor continue in God but by 
grace; and that all the ability which he has 
is derived from grace." 1)
Certainly to call this 'free will 1 is to decorate a 
very diminutive thing with too superb a title.
The Problem of Evil*
But now this doctrine of Irresistible Grace leads
us again into a consideration of the problem of evil. 
For if as Calvin says,
"man is so enslaved by sin, as to be of his 
own nature incapable of an effort, or even 
an aspiration, towards that which is good",
but God may free whomsoever He will from this bondage 
by the irresistible power of His grace, then is not 
God the one ultimately responsible for man remaining 
in sin?
Calvin does not decline to admit that, in one 
way, it all ultimately goes back to God; for he contends:
"Those whom the Lord does not favour with 
the government of his Spirit, he abandons, 




All of which is very definite, except the matter of 
'righteous judgment 1 . This would seem to imply that 
the 'abandonment to the influence of Satan* is a 
'righteous Judgment' upon those whom 1 the Lord does 
not favour with the government of kis Spirit*, and 
that the 'righteous judgment' is for past sins. But 
now, the original 'abandonment to the influence of 
Satan' could not have been a 'righteous judgment 1 
for past sins; for according to the Calvinistic view 
of the Fall, the first sin was due to 'the influence 
of Satan', and man was most certainly 'abandoned', in 
the sense that he was not sustained by 'irresistible 
grace', » which must be the sense of 'abandoned' here.
But if we interpret this statement as meaning 
that God's 'abandonment' of men in the present to 
'the influence of Satan' is a 'righteous judgment' 
upon them for their sins in and since the Fall, then 
two things must be considered. First, have we really 
explained the Fall in such a way as to put the real 
blame of it on man, and have we shown at all clearly 
how it is that man in the present is to blame for 
his original sin, for which the 'righteous judgment 1 
is his 'abandonment to the influence of Satan1 ; and 
if we have not done both of these things, is there 
any real significance in talking about 'righteous
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Judgment 1 in this way? And second, granted that we 
have done both of these things, we have only shown 
that all men are under just condemnation and may "be 
Justly 'abandoned to the influence of Satan 1 so that 
they may become increasingly evil; we have not at all 
explained why it is that certain ones are 'favoured 
with the government of the Spirit 1 , while others no more 
unworthy are 'abandoned 1 . And such an explanation is 
impossible according to Calvinism; for the moment any 
distinction is made in the merit of individuals, the 
favor of the Spirit ceases, to that extent, to be of 
grace. Of course, it might be contended that none 
deserves the gift of the Spirit, but that God makes 
His selection on the basis of comparative excellence. 
But this would certainly make salvation depend in
part, at least, upon the inherent goodness of the
1)
individual, and as we have already seen, Calvin is
concerned to maintain that all men are totally depraved 
and that God makes no distinction between them on the 
basis of their own merits; for if Goii does make such 
a distinction, even though He is at perfect liberty 
justly to condemn all and makes the distinction 
gratuitously, yet, after it is made, salvation becomes 
not a matter of grace, but of reward. But now it might
1)Above, ch.2.
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very well be argued that if there is no such distinction 
actually existing between the merits of men, then the 
'abandonment 1 of certain individuals who are no worse 
than those who are not 'abandoned 1 can certainly not 
be a 'righteous judgment 1 upon their sinsI The sins 
may deserve such an 'abandonment 1 ; but in the light of 
the apparently arbitray exceptions, is the whole 
procedure Just? In any case the distinction is not 
shown to be a 'righteous judgment 1 , for no rational 
or just reason can be given for it. The sins of the 
abandoned are not the reason for their being abandoned 
while others just as sinful are satred.
With regard again to the whole question of the 
necessity for Satan, it might be well to quote two 
sentences from Calvin which appear in this connection. 
They are as follows:
"When the will of the natural man is said 
to be subject to the power of the devil, so 
as to be directed by it, the meaning is, not 
that it resists and is compelled to a reluctant 
submission, as masters compel slaves to an 
unwilling performance of their commands, but 
that, being fascinated by the fallacies of 
Satan, it necessarily submits itself to all 
his directions. —«* The blinding of the 
wicked, and all those enormities which attend 
it, are called the works of Satan, the cause 
of which must nevertheless be sought only in 
the human will from which proceeds the root 
of evil and in which, rests the foundation of 
the kingdom of Satan, that is, sin." t)
I)Institutes, Bk.II.,ch.4,par.1.
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There appears to be a distinction here between the 
action of God upon the wills of men and the action of 
Satan. God influences the will of the individual by 
His complete control of the man himself; the Devil 
influences the will by external appeals. Thus in each 
case th» willing is spontaneous and voluntary; but in 
the one case it is inevitably impelled; in the other 
it is simply attracted. But as a matter of fact, one 
could say all of real significance in these two 
sentences without even mentioning Satan; for 'sin 1 
itself might very well be substituted for 'the devil' 
and f Satan 1 without any substantial loss, - especially 
since the last sentence makes the human will the cause 
of all evil works, the root of evil, and the very 
support for the foundation of the kingdom of Satan: 
so that it is hard to see what important function the 
Devil himself fulfils which the very possibility of 
evil choice on the part of man would not itself 
account for.
However, it is God's part in sin that we are 
most concerned with at present. And with regard to 
the fact that He has a part Calvin speaks with no 
uncertain voice. According to him, God exerts upon 
the world a 'universal influence 1 ,
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H by which all creatures are sustained, 
and from which they derive an ability 
to perform whatever they do."
But it is not to this universal and general influence 
that Calvin is referring in this connection; it is 
rather to J- v.?>',
M that special influence which appears 
in every particular act."
The meaning of this muat be that not only does God 
decree the world as a whole and bring into being its 
entire history by the command which starts its universal 
order, and not only does the whole structure depend 
upon His wisji that it might continue, but the relation 
of God to the world is so close that every particular 
act is instigated by Him directly.
We have then the question: In what way does God 
instigate evil acts? - How is it possible for Him to 
instigate them at all and yet be free from the guilt 
of sin? As Calvin asks the question with regard to the 
particular case of Job's sufferings at the hand of the 
Chaldeans •
"How can we refer the same action to God, 
to Satan, and to man, as being each the 
author of it, without either excusing Satan 
by associating him with God, or making God 
the author of evil?"
His answer is in accord with Augustine:
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"Very easily, if we examine, first, the end 
for which the action was designed, and 
secondly the manner in which it was effected. 
The design of the Lord is to exercise the 
patience of his servant by adversity; Satan 
endeavours to drive him to despair: the 
Chaldeans, in defiaace of law and justice, 
desire to enrich themselves by the property 
of another. So great a diversity of design 
makes a great distinction in the action. 
There is no less difference in the manner. 
The Lord permits his servant to be afflicted 
by Satan: the Chaldeans, whom he commissions 
to execute his purpose, he permits and 
resigns to be impelled by Satan: Satan, 
with his envenomed stings, instigates the 
minds of the Chaldeans, otherwise very depraved, 
to perpetrate the crime: they furiously rush 
into the act of injustice, and overwhelm 
themselves in criminality. ««•• We see, then, 
that the same action is without absurdity 
ascribed to God, to Satan, and to man; but 
the variety in the end and in the manner, 
causes the righteousness of God to shine 
without the least blemish, and the iniquity 
of Sataft and man to betray itself to its 
own disgrace." 1)
But now, one cannot help wontering if this really 
does solve the difficulty. For instance, the reference 
to the Chaldeans being 'otherwise very depraved 1 : 
was not this very depravity due to the previous 
influence of Satan, which God had previously permitted 
or decreed? It is all very well to speak of three 
actors in the same event, and to point out three 
different motives. But according to strict consistency 
Calvin can only, in the last analysis, admit one 
actor «• God, - since, according to his own teaching,
*• bi mt fi» «••<•«*•» t» « ««*•
1)Institutes,Bk.II.,ch.4,par.2.
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it is God who acts through Satan and the Chaldeans to 
accomplish His ends, and they can do nothing without 
His decree and instigation. For Calvin is very definite 
in his opposition to those who resort to subtle 
distinctions between 'permission 1 and 'prescience 1 ,on 
the one hand, and an active influence, on the other. 
For he says,
H I think we are in no danger, if we simply 
maintain what the Scripture delivers. —— 
God is very frequently said to blind and
ohsrdenLthe)reprobate,oarid.to'turn,'incline, 
and influence their hearts, as I have elsewhere 
more fully stated. But it affords no explication 
of the nature of this influence to resort to 
prescience or permission. We answer, therefore, 
that it operates in two ways. For, since, 
when his light is removed, nothing remains 
but darkness and blindness; since, when his 
apititiisi withdraw^, our 1 Hearts harden into 
stones; since, when his direction ceases, 
they are warped into obliquity; he is properly 
said to blind, harden, and incline those whom 
he deprives of the power of seeing, obeying, 
and acting aright. The second way, which is 
much more consistent with strict propriety 
of language, is, when, for the execution of 
his judgments, he, by means of Satan, the 
minister of his wrath, directs their counsels 
to what he pleases, and excites their wills and 
strengthens their efforts. Thus, when Moses 
relates that Sihon the king would not grant 
a free passage to the people, because God 
fiad 'hardened his spirit, and made his heart 
obstinate 1 , he immediately subjoins the end of 
God's design: 'That he might deliver him into 
thy hand.'(o) Since God willed his destruction, 
the obduration of his heart, therefore, was 
the Divine preparation for his ruin." 1)
1)0p.cit.,par.3. (o)Deut.2:30.
DIFFICULTIES 64
But again certain difficulties arise. When Calvin 
speaks of 'the reprobate' whom God blinds and hardens, 
does he mean those who are already reprobate, or those 
who become so by this blinding and hardening process? 
Presumably he means the former, for on the latter 
interpretation they would not be reprobate at the 
time the process began, and as he held that all men 
were reprobate at biijth, they must have been already 
in that condition before they were blinded or hardened 
to any specific later act of evil. Consequently, the 
implication is that, being already reprobate, they 
deserve, in American slang, 'all that's coming to them', 
and God is quite justified innpunishing them with 
greater sinfulness if He sees fit. But of course this 
introduces a new factor, since, as has been pointed out 
above, one cannot account for their original reprobation
: !.&•"
as punishment for their already existing sinfulness; 
and it most certainly makes God the only one responsible 
for their particular increase of sinfulness or repro­ 
bation. The second portion of the argument is open 
to the same censure; for it, too, again makes God's 
part in the procedure a righteous judgment. But we 
have already seen that this is scarcely satisfactory. 
I think we must just admit that, in spite of all 
his attempts and the value of his suggestions, Calvin
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has not succeeded in solving the problem of evil 
(which, after all, is not strange). The specific 
instate of Sihon must be interpreted as being in 
accord with what precedes it, and it was doubtless 
meant to be so by Calvin. But there is no mention 
in it that the hardening of Sihon was punishment for 
his already existing sins: It only very definitely 
states that it was Divinely ordained preparation for 
his Divinely ordained ruin.
This after all is the only explanation open to 
Calvin: to explain sinfulness in terms of G-od's 
foreordained end for the individual, and not in terms 
of punishment for previous sinfulness; for this latter 
procedure only pushes the difficulty farther back, 
and unless dealt with ultimately in t.he way suggested, 
involves one in an infinite regress. The real question
N
is, why G-od foreordains some men to destruction and
some to eternal life. And the only answer is one which,
1)
strangely enough Calvin himself gives, that God is
motivated by some good and sufficient-treason which is 
beyond our comprehension (which again is nothing that 
should cause us undue alarm, since it would be strange 
indeed if we could fully comprehend all the wonders of 
the universe). The difficulties of such a position we
1)For instance in "Calvinism by Calvin",pp.89,93; 
but the same may be found also in the Institutes 
and other treatises.
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shall have to consider later; but they could certainly 
not be greater than those involved in this inconsistent 
attempt to excuse God's part in sin on the basis of its 
being punishment for previous sin. And it has the 
distinct advantage of simplifying the problem by making 
ItstfcFBatgeiifr consistent with the basic Galvinistic 
position of God's absolute omnipotence.
God f s All«pervasive and Acti¥e Influence,
The important point to note in all Calvin's 
treatment of Grace is its relation to Providence, 
and the fact that, according to Calvin, even in acts 
of evil,God exerts an active influence over the wills 
of men; for he maintains: •,•'.•••
"The power of the providence of God extends 
so far, as not only to cause those events to 
succeed which he foresees will be best, but 
also to incline the wills of men to the same 
objects."
And he goes on to say,
"Indeed, if we view the administration of 
external things with our own reason, we shall 
not doubt their subjection to the human will; 
but if we listen to the numerous testimonies, 
which proclaim that in these things also the 
hearts of men are governed by the Lord, they 
will constrain us to submit the will itself 
to the special influence of God." 1)
1)Institutes,Bk.II.,ch.4,par.6;
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Immediately afterwards he subjoins the following:
"God, whenever he designs to prepare the way 
for his providence, inclines and moves the 
wills of men even in external things, and --- 
their choice is not so free, but that its 
liberty is subject to the will of God. —— 
Your mind depends more on the influence of 
God, than on the liberty of your own choice." 1)
He then quotes the following from Augustine, as 
expressive of his own views:
"The Scripture, if it be diligently examined, 
shows, not only that the good wills of men, 
which he turns from evil into good, and directs 
to good actions and to eternal life, but also 
that those wills which relate to the present 
life, are subject to the power of God, so that 
he, by a most secret, but yet a most righteous 
judgment, causes them to be inclined whither 
he pleases, and when he pleases, either for 
the communication of benefits, or for the 
infliction of punishments." 2)
Calvin does not want us to suppose that the doctrine 
of Irresistible Grace in any way limits God's provi­ 
dential governing of the world and the hearts of men 
merely to His indispensable part in the rescuing of 
those who are saved. It is not the sole activity of 
God in the lives of men: it is only one part of His 
activity; but its invincibility may serve to indicate 
the determining power of the whole.
1. greedomt
And now, at the risk of repetition and of relying
1) and 2)0p.cit.,par.7» (Underlining mine.)
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too much ppon the exact words of Calvin, let us 
consider a paragraph from the Institutes, which 
expresses the problem of Freedom again very clearly 
and succinctly, perhaps bringing out a slightly different 
aspect of it. It immediately follows the above 
quotation from Augustine. Calvin remarks:
"Here let the reader remember, that the 
ability of the human will is not to be 
estimated from the event of things, as 
some ignorant men are preposterously accustomed 
to do. For they conceive themselves fully 
and ingeniously to establish the servitude 
of the human will, because even the most 
exalted monarchs have not all their desires 
fulfilled. But this ability, of which we 
speak, is to be considered within man, and 
not to be measured by external success. For 
in the ".dispute concerning free will, the 
question is not, whether a man, notwithstanding 
external impediments, can perform and execute 
whatever he may have resolved in his mind, 
but whether in every case his judgment exerts 
freedom of choice, and his will freedom of 
inclination. If men possess both these, then 
Attilius Regulus, when confined to the small 
extent of a cask stuck round with nails, will 
possess as much free will as Augustus Caesar, 
when governing a great part of the world with 
his nod." 1)
All of which is very true, but must not be 
interpreted as indicating that Calvin has suddenly 
turned libertarian, He is here only opposing those 
who take the wrong line of attack against the liber­ 
tarians. Man's freedom is not to be determined by 
his ability to do whatever he pleases regardless of
1)0p.cit.,par.8.
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circumstances; but is to be determined by whether or
not he is free to choose what he will do under these
circumstances. And in this sense Regulus is as free
as Augustus. Circumstances may limit the possibilities,
but they can never wholly determine a man f s choice
within the limits of the possibilities which remain.
One can never force a man's will! « except by influencing
the man. The only thiftg which wholly determines a
man*s choice is the character of the man himself.
But according to Calvin, behind the man himself is G-OD, «•
controlling and directing his will, by controlling and
directing him,
2. Necessity and Responsibility,
We have already seen that 'necessity 1 is synony-
0
mous in the, moral sphere with 'freedom 1 ; but it would 
perhaps be Just as well to consider here Calvin1 s 
treatment of the relation between 'necessity 1 and 
moral 'responsibility', « for after all,we are making 
a study not of specific problems but of Calvin's 
treatment of them, and it may be often necessary to 
bring the same or similar subjects in in different 




"If sin be necessary, it ceases to be sin; 
and if it be voluntary, then it may be 
avoided; 11
and he does so by flatly denying
"that sin is the less criminal, because it 
is necessary,"
I)
and avoidable because voluntary. The first part of
his denial he bases on Adam's freedom; but this, as 
we have seen, is wholly unsatisfactory, and he would 
have done better to resort to his previous explanation 
that the necessity here spoken of is not incompatible 
with spontaneity. As to the second part: he is exactly 
right in contending that Voluntary 1 does not mean the 
same as 'freedom* in the peculiar sense of ability to 
avoid what is determined by man's very nature. The 
fact that a crime is voluntary is the very thing which 
precludes the possibility of its being avoided; because 
it is the determination of volitions by character which 
is the absolutely certain factor. But according to 
Calvin, the fact that the choice of sin is voluntary
1)See "De Libero Arbitrio"(p.33), where Calvin says, 
in reply to Pighius* question regarding the punishment 
of crimes which are necessary: "Respondeo, in hoc 
consistere huius obiecti solutionem, si quis pia 
modestia, et non profana arrogantia, divinae provi- 
dentiae regimen in rebus humanis consideret. Neque 
enim sic necessario peccare dicimus impios, quin 
voluntaria deliberataque malitia peccent. Necessitas 
inde est, quod opus suum per eos Deus exsequitur, quod 
certum est ac stabile."|Corpus Ref.,v.34,c.256.)
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fixes the guilt of it oilman and makes him liable to 
punishment, since his voluntary choice of evil, with 
the knowledge that it is evil, indicates that the 
chooser's character is sinful. Therefore, because he 
chooses sin from the love of that which is sinful, 
he bears the guilt of it; and guilt invariably 
determines punishment. The simple fact of the matter 
is, as Calvin is never tired of proclaiming, all men 
are alike slanes to sin, save as God redeems them by 
grace.
3» Exhortation.
But now, simply because only those whom God chooses 
to redeem can truly pursue the good, is no reason why 
all should not be exhorted to pursuedit; since the 
pursuit of that which they recognize to be good is felt 
to be an obligation by all men, and the standard of 
right is not lowered to our ability, - because our 
'ability 1 here really means nothing more than our 
desire, and it would surely be foolish to say that a 
man is never obligated to do anything more than he 
desires to do. There is no external prohibition in the 
way of our pursuing the good.
Nor is this fact of redemption depending on grace 
any excuse for neglecting the preaching of the Gospel
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to all, as has been commanded. For the Word is to be 
preached that the elect may respond to it; and previous 
to such response, we do not know who is elected by 
God unto salvation, «» since His means of redemption are 
the outward preaching of the Word and the inner impulsion 
of the Holy Spirit to its reception.
In connection with this doctrine of redemption 
by grace, it is worth remembering that Paul explicitly 
teaches that the requirements of the law are no measure 
of our ability, and that the law was given us, not as 
a rule of life, but as a means of bringing us to a 
sense of our need of Divine help. As Augustine says,
11 "God requires faith itself of us, and finds 
not what he requires, unless he has given 
what he finds, 1 "
Mt Let God give what he enjoins, and let him 
enjoin what he pleases. 1 "
This is the conclusion of the matter as far as we are 
concerned. If God requires perfect goodness in us, He 
must give it Himself. The Good News is that He has « 
in Christ.
According to Calvin, God's reproach does not 
imply our freedom; it only implies our guilt. The 
only thing we are free to do is evil; because none 
of our abilities is good, truly and completely good.
DQuoted in the Institutes,Bk.II.,ch.5,par.?.
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The deterministic farce of the doctrine of Irre- 
sistible Grace is shown in the fact that it gives us 
another evidence of God's invincible power and of our 
dependence upon Him, while at the same time it leaves 
unbroken the necessary connection between character 
and will. God does not change our wills by beating 
them downj He changes them by changing the heart. 
And the fact that He can thus change the heart and 
cause it to persist in a new way, only serves to 
show how He may indeed be the sole ultimate actor in 
the universe, the Determiner of all things.
Chapter IV* 
JUSTIFICATION
Relation of the Doctrine to Those Preceding , and Its 
Further Deterministic Implications,
We have seen how Calvin contends that all things 
were created by G-od and are sustained by His eternal 
providence, that since the Fall man has been hopelessly 
lost in sin, totally depraved and unable to save 
himself, but that God can save him in spite of all 
opposition, and can make him to persevere in righteous­ 
ness. And we have further seen that all these particu­ 
lar views contain in themselves definitely determinis* 
tie elements; and that taken together, they form what 
certainly approaches a deterministic system. We have 
now to consider how it is that G-od makes men righteous, 
and whether or not the Calvinistic view of this process 
is also deterministic.
The doctrine of §ustification by Faith has been 
so famous as the corner stone of Protestant theology, 
ever since its promulgation by Luther, that there is 
no need for a lengthy discussion of it, nor for citing 
proof texts in the writings of Calvin to establish 
the fact of his adhering to it. We shall therefore 
merely concern ourselves with arriving at a sufficient
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understanding of it to see that it is logically a 
consistent development of the previously considered 
Calvinistic doctrines.
'• Dependence on the gospel,
In spite of the fact that that particular and 
special grace necessary to the salvation of men is 
irresistible, it does not seem to swoop down upon men 
in any magical fashion, but appears to be almost 
invariably connected with the preaching of the Christian 
Gospel, « a record of historical events particularly 
interpreted* Thus, according to the generally accepted 
Christian teaching, God saves men by means of certain 
definite events which He has decreed as part of the 
history of the world, - namely, the birth, life, death, 
and resurrection of His Son.
Now it is apparent that any view which considers 
these particular events absolutely necessary to salvation, 
is to that extent deterministic; since it is definitely 
beyond the power of men to order the birth, life, 
death, and resurrection of the Son of Q-od as events in 
the history of the world. Thus the very making of 
salvation to depend,in part at least, upon objective 
historical events, instead of making it less determin­ 
istic tnan if it depended upon some direct Divine
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influence alone, makes it equally a matter beyond our 
control and dependent upon the Divine Omnipotence.
But although Christianity connects salvation with 
specific historical occurrences, and thus makes it 
something more than the direct action of the Spiiit 
of God upon the souls of individuals, it does not wholly 
do away with this direct action of the Spirit, but 
retains it as an additional necessity in connection 
with these happenings. For it makes the salvation of the 
individual to depend, not alone upon the historical 
incident, but upon his acceptance of it as an historical 
fact with a definite significance, • which is an 
additional deterministic touch; since apart from the 
Divine revelation it would be impossible for men to 
perceive the significance of these events in the Divine 
economy. In other words, the Christian Gospel is a 
Divinely revealed interpretation of certain Divinely 
ordained events, both these and the revelation of 
their significance being necessary to the salvation 
of men, and both actually existing as God's means of 
saving men.
The third point is that the individual is saved,
• •.'*• •, '
according to the Christian teaching, by means of faith 
in this Christian interpretation of these facts. And 
according to Calvin, the Individual cannot believe in
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the Gospel without the definite impulsion of the Holy 
Spirit. In other words, the Gospel is rendered profitable 
to us by the Spirit, and faith itself is the gift of 
Qod. As Calvin says,
"It is accounted by the world exceedingly 
paradoxical, when it is affirmed, that no 
one can believe in Christ, but he to whom 
it is given. But this is partly for want 
of considering the depth and sublimity of 
heavenly wisdom, and the extreme dulness 
of man in apprehending the mysteries of 
God, and partly from not regarding that 
firm and steadfast constancy of heart, 
which is the principal branch of faith."t)
Events, interpretation,and belief, are all from 
God. Whether we look at salvation from the broad 
general Calvlnistlc principles of Original Sin, Total 
Depravity, and Irresistible Grace, or from the specific 
details of the actual process of salvation Itself, we 
come to a deterministic view of the world in so far as 
God's relation to the redeemed is concerned.
2. Repentance*
But we have yet to consider how it is that we are 
Justified by faith. To begin with, what takes place in 
the life of the individual when he accepts Christ as 
his Savior, believes in the Christian Gospel that Jesus 
is the Son of God and that through His life and death
OInstitutes, Book III., ch,2, par.35.
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all who believe on Him are redeemed?
In the first place, when one confronts Christ 
and acknowledges Him to be the Son of God, one immedi­ 
ately acquires a new and Concrete standard of righteous­ 
ness. And this leads to a new awareness of personal 
unwoUthlness and need, which in turn, if the heart has 
been affected as well as the head, leads to a grave 
dissatisfaction with one's life and a keen longing 
after righteousness, which is what is called 'repentance 1 , 
a return from sin to God, a 'change of mind and inten­ 
tion.' According to Calvin, repentance may be defined as
111 a true conversion of our life to God, 
proceeding from a sincere and serious fear 
of God, and consisting in the mortification 
of our flesh and of the old man, and in the 
vivificatlon of the Spirit. 111 1)
From which it appears that, as he contends, it follows 
upon faith. But as faith is the gift of God, it appears 
that the dependence of repentance on faith makes it 
also, at least an indirect, gift from God.
It is even more than this, however; for as some­ 
thing distinct from faith, it is apparently as much a 
direct gift from God as the faith on which it depends. 
In so far as it consists of the mortification of our 
flesh and the vivif ication of the Spirit, it requires 
a transformation of the soul itself: and this, it would
1)In8titutes,Bk.III.,ch.3,par.5«
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seem, could only be the work of Him who originally 
created the soul, and by whose decree it became sinful. 
For as Calvin remarks,
"No man ever hated sin, without having been 
previously captivated with the love of 
righteousness." 1)
And when one remembers man's bondage to sin through his 
love of evil, it becomes evident that this new love of 
righteousness and hatred of sin, which become the 
motivating forces of a new life, must come from God. 
Thus the Spirit of God so changes the mind and heart 
of sinful man that he is able to accept Christ in 
faith when he hears the Gospel, « preached to him by 
men motivated by the Holy Spirit to this good work, » 
and it is ^the Spirit of God which, on the occasion of 
faith, makes him amw^to Repent. But the life is not 
only transformed so that the man is capable of faith 
and repentance; the Holy Spirit so moves upon his 
heart and mind that he actually and inevitably accepts
Christ and repents. It is the process as a whole which•t '.
is regenration, and every part of it is effected by 
God, whfc must make the initial move and carry through 
the whole procedure to its completion.
And according to the Christian teaching, there 
follows upon faith and repentance, the remission of
1)0p.cit.,par.20,
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sine, in which is comprised both pardon and justifi­ 
cation. As Calvin contends,
"Repentance is preached in the name of Christ, 
when men are informed, by the doctrine of the 
gospel, that all their thoughts, their affec­ 
tions, and their pursuits, are corrupt and 
vicious; and that therefore it is necessary 
for them to be born again, if they wish to 
enter the kfagdom of God. Remission of sins is 
preached, when men are taught that Christ is 
made unto them *wisdom, and righteousness, 
and sanctification, and redemption,'(1) in 
whose name they are gratuitously accounted 
righteous and innocent in the sight of God. 
Both these blessings of grace —» are appre­ 
hended by faith." t)
Thus faith in Christ as the Son of 0od is the forerunner 
of repentance, and faith in His promise of the remission 
of sins through His name is that which enables us to 
enter into the blessed state of assurance of salvation.
Things Work Together For Good. w 
Before taking up the forensic nature of justifi­ 
cation here hinted at, it might be well for us to 
notice a point made by Calvin in the discussion of 
Christian'experience which has peculiar deterministic 
implications, in that it brings out again rather 
clearly the application of the general doctrine of 
Providence to the case of believers, in a different 
way from what was done in connection with the consider* 
ation of that doctrine itself. Calvin maintains that
1)0p.cit.,par.19. (i)I Cor.1:30,
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"Believers ahould accustom themselves to 
such a contempt of the present life, as 
may not generate either hatred of life, 
or Ingratitude towards God. For this life, 
though it is replete with innumerable 
miseries, is yet deservedly reckoned among 
the Divine blessings which must not be 
despised. —— To believers —— the whole 
of it is destined to the advancement of 
their salvation." t)
Thus the contention is that no event happens in the 
life of a believer, or one destined to become such, 
except by the direction of God to the end of bpinging 
him to a saving faith in Christ, and through that 
eventually to the perfection of Christian character. 
Consequently, however meaningless and random the 
•vents and experiences of his life may seem to a 
camAal observer, every circumstance, according to 
Calvin, is carefully and definitely determined,
The Forensic Character of Justification.
But we must now consider the relation of faith 
and repentance to Justification. For if justification 
is but the due reward of these, then it becomes in 
itself a matter of works and not of grace. It is 
Calvin's conviction, however, that we are not Justified 
by works in any sense; either by the good works which
)Institutes, op.cit.,ch.9,par.3.
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follow upon regeration, or by faith and repentance 
considered as works. Even though our life is changed 
we are not righteous. Perfection is not an immediate 
acquisition, "but is only to be attained by a life-long 
process of sanctification. Nor could the past be 
changed even if we should become immediately perfect. 
The sins of the past life are indelibly written into 
the record of what has been, and therefore of what is 
as long as time shall last. With all due reverence to 
the Father, neither He nor man can ever change the 
past and make it never to have been. Consequently, 
when we are justified before God and called righteous 
in His sight, it can taeanrnothingomore than that He 
forgives us and declares us righteous, for some reason, 
when really we are not strictly so.
This, however, seems a strange procedure. la it 
that God counts faith and repentance as sufficient 
recompense for our sinful lives? Calvin says not; 
because they are in no sense an equivalent. Faith, 
according to him, is a mere acceptance of the gifts 
of God - a gift itself. It is a means to our justlfi* 
cation, but it is in no sense the ground. Nor is 
repentance. Forgiveness without repentance appears to 
be a mere condoning of sin. But sorrow for the past, 
and a change of heart, do not make old ways different
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from what they were. We may accept God's gifts, we 
may be sorry for our sin, and resolve to sin no more; 
but neither of these things cleanses old scores. Prom 
this aspect of the problem (which is our aspect, though 
it may not be the ultimate one), if there is strict 
justice in the world, the penalty must be paftd.
And so it is that we are Justified by God, not 
on the grounds of faith and repentance, but on the 
grounds of the imputation of Christ's righteousness 
and His substitutionary death. In Calvin's words,
"Justification -— is no other than an 
acquittal from guilt of him who was accused, 
as though his innocence had been proved. 
Since God, therefore, justifies us through 
the mediation of Christ, he acquits us, not 
by an admission of our personal innocence, 
but by an imputation of righteousness; so 
that we, who are unrighteous in ourselves, 
are considered as righteous in Christ." 1)
Thus it is that our justification is most truly 
t>y grace; since God accepts for our righteousness not 
just some insufficient substitute which we provide 
(though even this substitute of faith and repentance 
would not be the offering of anything but God's own 
gifts to us, and could not be considered something of 
our very own which would in any sense merit such a 
reward), but a perfect fulfilment of the demands of the
1)Institutes,Bk.III.,ch.11,par.3.
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and a payment of the penalty of our guilt, which 
He himself provides. As Calvin maintains, such a 
gratuitous justification shows neither laxness on 
God's part, nor any harshness; but rather, manifests 
His righteousness more clearly: first, by showing the 
insufficiency of ours by comparison; second, by showing 
His demand for complete satisfaction; and third, by 
showing His perfect love and mercy in His supplying 
Himself this complete satisfaction.
Unable to save ourselves, we are saved by G-od's 
goodness in providing a way whereby the penalty of 
our sins might be paid and the righteousness of another 
substituted for our unrighteousness. There is nothing 
in the nature of the case which would require God to 
accept a substitute for us if such should be provided; 
nor is there anything in the demands of perfect justice 
which would preclude such an acceptance. Therefore 
God's decision to do this is a perfectly gratuitous 
one, which at the same time is in no way contrary to 
His perfect goodness. But He alone can provide the 
substitute which He has decided to accept; and as it 
would be unjust to provide an innocent creature to 
suffer for the sins of guilty ones, He must Himself 
be the substitute. So there is in all this a manifold
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display of His grace*
God decides upon a way to satpe us; He provides 
the way; He enlightens the minds of men that they 
may understand it; He awakens within our minds and 
hearts that faith which enables us individually to 
accept His gift; He arouses such sorrow within us 
that by His direction we turn to a new life in which 
we are motivated by an implanted desire for the 
righteousness of Christ, We are gratuitously justified 
by the gratuitous righteousness of Christ, applied 
to aiiiiwho possess the gratuitous mercies of faith 
and repentance. Thus, according to Calvin, the whole 
process of Justification is determined and effected 
by God alone; for as he says,
MThe efficient cause of eternal life being 
procured for us (is) the mercy of our heavenly 
Father, and his gratuitous love towards us;
•—- the material cause is Christ and his 
obedience, by which he obtained righteousness 
for us; and •— the formal and instrumental 
cause (is) faith; —» the final cause »-• 
the demonstration of the Divine righteousness 
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Relation to Preceding Doctrines and to Foreknowledge,
The doctrine of Predestination may be taken as 
the very heart of the deterministic elements in 
Calvinism. It is really the core of the whole system. 
Granted that God created the world and sustains it by 
His providence, that man, in accordance with God's 
decree, is, since the Fall, totally depraved and 
unabto to save himself, that God's grace is irresistible, 
that justification is by grace, the acceptance of Christ 
being the result of gratuitous regeneration; we have 
then to discover how it is that some are selected for 
regeneration and others are not. And this leads us, 
of course, to the question of predestination. For If 
there is no distinction among men, and salvation is a 
matter of grace, and all events are in accord with the 
will of God, we are forced to accept predestination, 
whereby some are elected to eternal life and some are 
damned (unless of course there are none who are lost), 
this election and damnation depending wholly upon the 
secret will of God. And since God, according to the 
orthodox Christian theology, is omnipotent and omniscient,
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all things must have been seen by Him and decreed by 
Him from all eternity.
Predestination, then, is simply God's providence 
as it relates to the destiny of individuals. In 
Calvin's words:
"Predestination we call the eternal decree 
of God, by which he has determined in himself, 
what he would have to become of every individual 
of mankind. For they are not all created with 
a similar destiny; but eternal life is fore­ 
ordained for some, and eternal damnation for 
others." 1) f -
In other words, to relate this doctrine to those of 
Total Depravity, Irresistible Grace, and Justification, 
we should simply say that the preaching of the Gospel
•depends upon God's providence, its reception upon His
2) 
election.
v At the very outset we must make it clear that, 
according to Calvin, predestination does not depend 
at all upon foreknowledge. God has foreknowledge because
,-.•••-. •'•:•-. "all things have ever been, and perpetually 
remain, before his eyes, so that to his 
knowledge nothing is future or past, but 
all things are present; and present in such 
a manner, that he does not merely conceive 
them from ideas formed in his mind, as 
things B»aembered by us appear present to 
our minds, but really beholds and sees them 
as if actually placed before him. 11
^Institutes, Book III., eh.21, par.5. 
2) Ibid., par.|. 3)IbicU,par.5. -
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Consequently, as Galvlnistis have ever maintained. 
God's knowledge of things as actual must follow from 
His ordination of them; since according to the doctrines 
of Creation and Providence, nothing exists without His 
willing it to be. And the doctrines of universal 
Total Depravity, Irresistible Grace, and Justification 
by Grace, further preclude the possibility of God's 
basing His predestination of individuals upon any 
foreknowledge of how they will receive the Gospel or 
how they will live; for it has already been shown in 
these doctrines that all men are lost in sin and unable 
to do good, and that only those who are impelled by 
the Holy Spirit are able to accept Christ. Wherefore, 
God cannot have a foreknowledge of anybody accepting 
Christ and leading a righteous life, without having 
previously selected such a one as a recipient of His 
special grace. Besides, if God sees all things as 
present, He decrees the whole universe at one time, 
and to talk about election following upon foreknowledge 
is unmeaning,
The Nature of Election*
If election means anything at all it is an act 
of God's free choice. Otherwise, there is is no such
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thing as election. For if man is free to accept Christ, 
and G-od has agreed to grant eternal life to all who do, 
then when a man does accept Christ he has won eternal 
life for himself, and there is no place for any election 
that has any real significance.
As Calvin points out in his treatise on Predesti**
1)
nation, those who with G-eorgius the Scicilian contend
that the word 'election1 is used in different senses
in Scripture, are not disclosing anything new. In the
2) 
Institutes Calvin cites at least three different kinds
of election: that of the nation in Abraham and Isaac 
and Jacob; that of a dynasty in David; and that of 
individuals.
It is the last which is the real 'election 1 , « 
an election of individuals to eternal life in Christ. 
The Hebrews were all elected to certain outward 
privileges and religious opportunities; but only those 
individually elected to eternal life availed themselves 
of these. As Calvin says,
"Though it is sufficiently clear, that God, 
in his secret counsel, freely chooses whom 
he will, and rejects others, his gratuitous 
election is but half displayed till we come 
to particular individuals, to whom God not 
only offers salvation, but assigns it in 
such a manner, that the certainty of the 
effect is liable to no suspense or doubt, M3)




H In conformity, therefore, to the clear 
doctrine of Scripture, we assert, that by 
an eternal and immutable counsel. God has 
once for all determined,, both whom he would 
admit to salvation, and whom he would 
condemn to destruction. We affirm that this 
counsel, as far as concerns the elett, is 
founded on his gratuitous mercy, totally 
irrespective of human merit; but that to 
those whom he devotes to condemnation, the 
gate of life is closed by a Just and irrepre* 
hensible, but incomprehensible, Judgment, 
*«• As God seals his elect by vocation and 
Justification, so by excluding the reprobate 
from the knowledge of his name and the 
sanctification of his Spirit, he affords an 
indication of the Judgment that awaits them."1)
Predestination and Determinism,
Now it is immediately evident that such a doctrine 
is thoroughly deterministic, - in spite of the difficult 
position with regard to the 'incomprehensible judgment 1 
upon the condemned. When it is said that 'eternal life 
is foreordained for some, and eternal damnation for 
others', and that 'by an eternal and immutable counsel, 
God has once for all,determined both whom he would
i
admit to salvation, and whom he would condemn to 
destruction 1 , we have as clear a statement of determin­ 
ism with regard to human life and deatiny as could be 
found. Yet even here, in this point about * Judgment 1
Dlnstitutes, op.cit.,par.7. (Underlining mine.)
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there is a discordant not* which Indicates that Calvin 
is trying to qualify his position in such a way as to 
avoid the appearance of accusing God of injustice*
But granting that no injustice could be committed 
by God, whom Calvin speaks of as 'the Judge of thet o
world 1 , one may yet find difficulties in the way of 
explaining the destiny of the lost on the basis of a 
judgment; for this is certainly attempting to get 
behind the veil which Calvin is so often telling us
it is impossible to penetrate, and sacrilegious to
2) 
try to penetrate* Instead of making a statement which
is dangerously near being inconsistent with our general 
position, to say the least, and then going no farther 
because of an admission of the incomprehensibility of 
the situation (an admission which is wholly justified), 
it might be wiser to admit the incomprehensibility 
sooner, and thus stop with the consistent assertion 
thattGtod has decreed the fates of men in accordance 
with His own good pleasure, and without injustice. We 
shall, however, consider this question in more detail 
later.
1)Institutes, Bk.III.,ch,23,par.4.
2)Ibid.,ch.21,par.?• See also "Calvin's Calvinism",Part 
I.»P»'4; and "The Congregation", in "Calvinism by 
Calvin",pp.90,91,93,94,102* » where Calvin says, 
"We must confess that G-od is just, although we cannot 
understand what is the reason of (reprobation). More-
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3!he Problem of Evil,
The conclusion of the whole matter for Calvin is 
that there is no cause for the particular destiny of 
individuals apart from God's will, and that it is 
impossible to get behind that. He declares:
"The Divine Will »«- is in fact, and is 
Justly entitled to be, the cause of every 
thing that exists." 1)
But what, then, about the fate of the lost? Calvin is 
here very straightforward in the matter.
"Many, indeed," he remarks, "as if they 
wished to avert odium from God, admit 
election in such a way as to deny that 
any one is reprobated. But this is puerile 
and absurd, because election itself could 
not exist without being opposed to reprobation, 
God is said to sefcaljrate those whom he adopts 
to salvation. To say that others obtain by 
chance, or acquire by their own efforts, that 
which election alone confers on a few, will 
be worse than absurd. Whom God passes by, 
therefore, he reprobates, and from no other 
cause than his determination to exclude them 
from the inheritance which he predestines for 
his children." 2)
over he is not bound to account to us for it. Let us 
then be contented to know that all his judgments take , 
place with equity and uprightness, and that his Justice 
will one day be known, when we shall see him face to 
face."(p.102.); and again, "Let us -~- learn only to 
adore the majesty of God, and to hold it as a settled 
principle, that everything that happens is wisely 
ordained though we see not why. This is what St.Paul 
shows, that we must not be wiser than the Spirit of 
God. —• For if we would pass beyond what he has 
declared in his word, we should not be good disciples 
in his school."(pp.9K«) 
I)Institutes,Bk.,III.,ch.23,par.2. 2)Ibid.,par.1.
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And in the special treatise he holds that
"If this being 'afore prepared unto glory 1 
is peculiar and special to the elect; it 
evidently follows, that the rest, the non- 
elect, were equally 'fitted to destruction: 1 
because, being left to their own nature, 
they wtre thereby devoted already to certain 
destruction. That they were 'fitted to 
destruction 1 by their own wickedness, is an 
idea so silly, that it needs no notice. W 1)
(We shall perhaps have occasion in a later criticism 
to use these words against Calvin himself; but for 
the present we must notice the full deterministic 
force of his utterances in connection with this doctrine 
of Predestination.)
Though it is impossible tor-oppose God's predesti- 
nation, Calvin holds that this is no excuse for the 
reprobate. It is a hard doctrine, but he reminds us:
"The declaration of Solomon ought to be 
universally admitted, that 'the Lord hath 
made all things for himself; yea, even the 
wicked for the day of evil, f (e) fl 2)
And he adds:
1 •% .
"All things being at God's disposal, and the 
decision of salvation or death belonging to 
him, he orders all things by his counsel 
and decree in such a manner, that some men 
are born devoted from the womb to certain 
death, that his name may be glorified in 
their destruction." 3)
How their death glorifies God is a point not made 
clear; but one need not on that account simply scoff
1)"Calvin's Calvinism11 , Part I.,p.60.
2)and 3)Institutes,Bk.III.,ch.23,par.6. (e)Prov.16:4.
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at the doctrine, for the problem still remains that 
some m.en apparently do go down to destruction in world 
created and governed "by an omnipotent God,
There is no use smoothing over the difficulties 
and accepting some easy solution which merely fails 
to notice them. Nor can one get over the obstacles by 
the schoolmen's device of contending that G-od simply 
foreknows the destruction of men but does not will it* 
We have already hinted at the inadequacy of this. 
Calvin is perfectly willing to admit that
"mere foreknowledge lays no necessity on 
the creatures";
but as Valla points out, controversy on this point is 
wholly unnecessary,
"because both life and death are acts of 
God's will, rather than of his foreknowledge.*
God does not simply foreknow the existence of men; He 
creates them! As Calvin says,
"If God simply foresaw the fates of men, 
and did riot also dispose and fix them by 
his determination, there would be room to 
agitate the question, whether his providence 
or foresight rendered tham at all necessary. 
But since he foresees future events only in 
consequence of his decree that they shall 
happen, it is useless to contend about fore­ 
knowledge, while it is evident that all things 
come to pass rather by ordination and decree." 1)
It does seem that foreknowledge without predestination 
t)Institutes,op.cit.,par.6.
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is an absolute impossibility, since if the Creator is 
omniscient, the very act of creating is a predestina­ 
tion.
But what, then, about Adam and the Fall? Calvin 
takes a most deterministic stand on the question when 
he says,
"I inquire again, how it came to pass that 
the fall of Adam, independent of any remedy, 
should involve so many nations with their 
infant children in eternal death, but because 
such was the will of G-od. —«• It is an awful 
decree, I confess; but no one can deny that 
G-od foreknew the future fate of man before he 
created him, and that he did foreknow it 
because it was appointed by his own decree. 
—•» Nor should it be thought absurd to affirm, 
that God not only foresaw the fall of the 
first man, and the ruin of his posterity in 
him, but also arranged all by the determination 
of his own will. For as it belongs to his 
wisdom to foreknow every thing future, so it 
belongs to his power to rule and govern all 
things by his hand." 1)
And of those foolish people who are continually insisting 
11 that Gk>d ptraltc the destruction of the impious, but 
does not will it 1 , Calvin very properly asks:
"But what reason shall we assign for his 
permitting it, but because it is his will?"2)
We shall see later, perhaps, that Calvin is not 
always consistent with himself on these matters; but 
it does seem that the Calvinistic doctrine of eternal 




unpopular doctrine of reprobation. And Calvin here
does not shrink from the full force of fefce implications 
of his position, for he maintains:
"That the reprobate obey not the word of 
God, when made known to them, is justly 
imputed to the wickedness and depravity 
of their hearts, provided it be at the same 
time stated, that they are abandoned to 
this depravity because they have been raised 
up,by the just but inscrutable Judgment of 
God, to display his glory in their condem­ 
nation.'1 2)
1)Now it may be, as Professor Mackintosh has suggested, 
that the word 'reprobate 1 in the New Testament is not 
used to refer to this pre«ordained and antecedent 
rejection; yet it does most certainly appear that if 
we grant that grace is irresistible and that justifi­ 
cation is only by grace, then those who are saved, are 
saved by God's election, and if there be any lost, 
they are lost because of His rejection. And if God 
has known all things from all eternity, this election 
and rejection have been from all eternity. It is Just 
as Calvin says:
"This is the point we must remember with 
regard to the reprobate, that God reprobates 
them inaamughoas they are not chosen and 
elected." ("Calvinism by Calvin",p.102.) 
It may be that there are no lost; all may be elected 
and come to a saving faith in Christ. But this does 
not alter the case. It would still be exactly as Calvin 
has said. He thought there were individuals who were 
lost* If he were mistaken in this, he would still be 
right in his contention that reprobation is ultimately 
mere failure to be chosen. The fact that all are 
chosen simply indicates that there are none in the 
state of reprobation; it does not change the conditions 
of that state. If one is to disagree with Calvinism 
here, the disagreement must start farther back; it is 
the whole Calvinistic system which must be rejected.
2}Institutes, Book III.,ch.24,par.14.
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If emphasis ia placed here upon the fact of f their 
being raised up 1 for this purpose, we have a most 
consistently deterministic assertion, and one in 
complete harmony with the main trend of Calvin's 
theology. But it is very clear that if they 'have 
been raised up 1 by God for this purpose, the idea of 
'judgment 1 cannot refer to any judicial disapproval 
of them, since they do not even exist at the time the 
decision of thetr fate is made. It may very well be 
that 'they are raised up 1 for condemnation, because 
the condemnation of the wicked will somehow redound to 
the glory of God, and it is for this that they have 
been created. But if it is so, it must be admitted 
that the whole matter is a mystery to us* Not that 
the reason for their creation and condemnation is a 
mystery, as Calvin seems to suppose; for this has 
been clearly stated to be the Divine glory. The mystery 
is just how this procedure,under the circumstances, 
does redound to the Divine glory. Yet the testimony 
of Scripture and of the observed facts in the world, 
should prevent anyone who believes in God from being 
too quick to ridiculaothe Calvinistic conclusion.
The end of the matter for Calvin is simply that 
God is not obligated to show mercy to all, and
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1)
evidently He does not* As Augustine points out, perhaps
we get at the real solution of the difficulty by asking
2) 
with Paul, -
MWho art thou, 0 man, that repliest 
against God? 1'







Sanctifieation Dependent <m God and Subsequent to
Regeneration.
It might appear that the doctrines of Predestination 
and Justification "by imputed righteousness did away with 
all necessity for good works. But anyone who thinks so 
has quite misunderstood the orthodox position. Good 
works are still a necessary part of the Christian life, - 
not that we are elected or justified because of them, 
but because they are the natural outgrowth of regeneration, 
No man can claim to be redeemed unless his life manifests 
the power of redemption in his conduct. Ultimately the 
Christian is saved by being made righteous, and if he is 
not made righteous it is simply a sign that he has never 
been redeemed.
But the point for us to note is that all Christian 
righteousness comes from the regeneration of the Holy 
Spirit, and that all our good works are from God. 
According to Calvin,
"It is beyond a doubt, that whatever is laudable 
in our works proceeds from the grace of God; 
and that we cannot properly ascribe the least 
portion of it to ourselves. If we truly and/
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"seriously acknowledge this truth, not 
only all confidence, but likewise all 
idea of merit, immediately vanishes. 
We do not, like the sophists, divide 
the praise of good works between God and 
man, but we preserve it to the Lord com­ 
plete, entire, and uncontaminated. -— 
Godd works, therefore, are pleasing to 
God, and not unprofitable to the authors of 
them; and they will moreover receive the 
most ample blessings from God as their 
reward} not becuase they merit them, 
but because the Divine goodness has freely 
appointed them this reward.* l)
And with regard to the matter of justification he 
specifically says,
"We do not justify men by works before God; but 
we say, that all who are of God are regenerated 
and made new creatures, that they may depart 
from the kingdom of sin into the kingdom of 
righteousness; and that by this testimony they 
ascertain their vocation, (y) and, like trees, 
are judged by their fruits." 2)
The position is simply that,
"We are justified, not without works, yet not by 
works; since union with Christ, by which we are 
justified, contains sanctification as well as 
righteousness." 3)
l) Institutes, Book III, ch. 15, par. 3. See further 
"De Libero Arbitrio" (p. 35), where Calvin presents the 
same view: "Dicimus hominem non modo nihil agere posse 
boni, sed ne cogitare quidem, ut totus a Deo pendere 
discat, ac de 89 desperans, in ilium penitus se reiiceres 
si quid boni egerit, illi acceptum, non sibi referats 
ned dimidian tanturn illi laudem tribuat bonorum operum, 
sed plenam ac solidam, nihil sibi reliquum facieigs, nisi 
quod ab eo accepit, quidquifl habet." ( Corpus Ref. Vol.34, 
c. 257). 2) Ibid.,par. 8. (y) 2. Peter 1:10. 
3) Ibid.,ch. 16, par.l. See also the "Congregation"-
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God imparts the ability to perform good works, 
and then rewards them as though they were our own. Yet, 
as we have seen, one must not suppose that the regenerated 
individual is immediately perfect. The process of 
sanctification is a life-long one, "beginning at the time 
of regeneration and progressing through the rest of our 
lives on this earth, culminating only hereafter in the 
perfect likeness of Christ. According to Calvin the 
Scripture
"beside prohibiting us to glory in works, because 
they are the gratuitous gifts of God, -— like­ 
wise teaches us that they are always defiled by 
some pollutions." l)
Consequently we cannot conclude from any Biblical pro­ 
mises of rewardsfor goodness that we are in any sense 
justified by works.
"Calvinism by Calvin", pp. 91 and 22, where Calvin de­ 
clares with regard to God's election, that "when he has 
elected us it is to this end that T we should be holy*", 
and that if we grow lax on the assumption of our 
election, it is simply an indication that we are not 
elected after all. 
1) Ibid. ch. 18, par. 5.
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Regeneration, faith, repentance, justification, 
sanctification, all are from God, and according to 
Calvin none depends in any degree upon our free will.
l) It is very interesting to note in connection with the 
Calvinistic emphasis of complete dependence on God, even 
for good works, that as Prof. Kuijper points out, 
Calvinism has not resulted in any moral laxness of the 
individual. On the contrary, as he remarks,
"The first thing that attracts our attention 
is the apparent contradiction "between a 
confession, which, it is alleged, "blunts the 
edge of moral incentives, and a practice, 
which, in moral earnestness exceeds the practice 
of all other religious. —— Romanists, Lutherans, 
Arminians and Libertines have ever charged 
against Calvinism that its absolute doctrine 
of predestination, culminating in the perse­ 
verance of saints, must necessarily result in a 
too easy conscience and a dangerous laxity 
of morals. But Calvinism answers this charge, 
not by opposing reasoning against reasoning, 
but by putting a fact of world-wide reputation 
over against this false deduction of fictitious 
consequences. 11 ("Calvinism," pp. 84, 85)•
Calvinism does not consider good works the means to 
salvation, but with its constant regard for logical se­ 
quence, it very rightly considers them the inevitable 
consequence of a true regeneration. Unlike some other 
systems of theology, it is not so much concerned with 
doing good as with being good. And thus while stressing 
the Law, it has avoided a Pharisaic confidence in the 
worth of its obedience. It has ever withstood all 
attempts to lower the standards of God, simply because 




The Problem of Prayer•
We come now to that most difficult problem of 
prayer. How can the Calvinist possibly believe in its 
efficacy? If God in His providence determines all events 
"by an eternal decree, why should one ever be so foolish 
as to ask Him for anything? Calvin, I think, does not 
answer this question specifically. In fact it pro­ 
bably never even occurred to him, because he seems never 
to have been quite aware of the completely deterministic 
implications of his teaching, - as he continues to use 
indeterministic language and in the chapter on prayer
combines in several places deterministic and indetermin-
l) 
istic expressions in the same sentence. But the
question must be answered, for it is clearly the teach­ 
ing of Christ that we should pray to the Father and that 
He hears and answers prayer. And this, moreover is the 
teaching of Calvin as well.
The Calvinistic answer must simply be that a man 
prays to God because he cannot help it. Prayers, like
l) Institutes, Book III, ch. 20, pars.
104
all things else, are determined "by Him who made us and 
prompts our every word and act. And they are in no 
sense foolishness, "because they are most efficacious 
second causes. TOien we ask God for something which 
He has already planned to give us, our prayer is not 
useless; because God has also decreed this prayer as a 
means to the end, so that while the prayer and the gift 
are all of a piece, the gift depends upon the prayer and is 
an answer to it. And when we ask God for something which 
He has determined not to give us, this, too, is a procedure 
decreed "by Him, and signifies not that the prayer is of 
no avail, but that it is best for us not to receive that 
for which we ask, but to ask and be disappointed in our 
asking, - which any sensible person will recognize as in 
many cases a most beneficial experience.
What Calvin does have to say about prayer is that
"We ought to remember this passage in John* 
'This is the confidence that we have in Him, that, 
if we ask anything according to His will, He 
heareth us. f (h) But as our abilities are very 
unequal to such great perfection, we must seek 
some remedy to relieve us. As the attention of 
the mind ought to be fixed on God, so it is nec­ 
essary that it should be followed by the affection 
of the heart. But they both remain far below 
this elevation; or rather, to speak more con­ 
sistently with the truth, they grow weary and fail 
in the ascent, or are carried to contrary course. 
Therefore, to assist this imbecility, God gives 
us the Spirit, to be the director of our prayers, 
to suggest what is right, and to regulate our 
affections. Por the Spirit helpeth our infir­ 
mities; f|pj_we_jkm>w_ m>t_ what we should pray for
l) See "Compendium of The Summa Theologica, 11 Ch. 23 (p.65)
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"as we ought; but the Spirit itself maketh 
intercession for us with groanings which can­ 
not "be uttered.' (i) —— The ability of 
praying rightly is a peculiar gift.* 1)
"God promises that he will be near to all 
who call upon Him in truth, and declares He will 
be found by those who seek Him with their 
whole heart. But to this, persons pleased 
with their own impurity never aspire. 
Legitimate prayer, therefore, requires re­ 
pentance. —— Whence it follows that none 
pray aright, and that no others are heard, 
but the sincere worshippers of God." 2}
Therefore it appears that according to the Calvin- 
is tic teaching acceptable prayers are directed by the 
Holy Spirit and that the ability to pray effectively is 
the gift of God and depends upon His previous gift of 
repentance. Which is in accordance with what we have 
said above would have to be the Calvinistic answer to 
the question one would naturally ask in view of the 
deterministic implications of Calvinism.
But now Calvin adds,
"that the inspiration of the Spirit operates 
in the formation of our prayers, so as not in 
the least to impede or retard our own exertions." 3)
By which he means that we must apply ourselves diligently 
to prayer, seeking the guidance of the Holy Spirit in 
the formulating of our petitions, but not being tempted
h) 1 John 5 * 14. i) Rom. 8 : 26. l) Institutes, op. 
cit., par. 5« 2) Institutes, op. cit., par. 7. 3) 
Institutes, op. cit., Par.
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to adopt any fatalistic attitude of indifference, as
though we expected the Holy Spirit to do the work alto-
apart 
gether/from us, instead of in and through us.
It must "be admitted that Calvin does not present 
a thoroughly worked out view of prayer here; for he 
urges us to implore the assistance of the spirit. But 
according to his previous assertions how can we do this 
effectively unless the Spirit is already guiding us? 
The answer is that we cannot, but that God desires that 
we shall ask for the Spirit and by means of the Spirit 
impels us to that end, and then through the Spirit forms 
those prayers of our hearts which are pleasing to Him and 
which secure for us the blessings He desires to bestow 
upon us. For Calvin later affirms that God,
"according to His incomprehensible designs, —— 
so regulates the events of things, that the 
prayers of the saints, which contain a mixture 
of faith and error, are not in vain." l)
Thus it appears that our prayers, like all our other 
works, fail of perfection, and yet in God's good provid­ 
ence are answered by Him in accordance with His plan for 
our well-being. Even the prayers of unbelievers are 
affirmatively answered by God when they accord with His 
desires. And since they, as well as the prayers of 
l) Institutes, op. cit., par. 15
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believers, are decreed by God, they inevitably are 
answered in some faahion r by the events which follow 
upon them.
The conclusion of the whole matter, it would seem, 
is that according to Calvinism prayer, (all prayer - that 
which apparently is not answered, as well as that which 
obviously is),like everything else, is decreed by God; 
but since we have no means of knowing God's secret will 
we should try to obey His revealed commands and teachings 
with regard to prayer, as with regard to all other conduct, 
And Calvin being more concerned with Christian living than 
with Christian philosophy is at greater pains to set forth 
our obligation to pray and the rules which should guide 
us, than to work out a deterministic explanation of this 
obligation and these rules. Nevertheless, it seems 
clear that his view of the part played by the Holy 
Spirit, the necessity of repentance, and God*s regulation 
of events so that the prayers of saints, though not 
perfect, are yet not in vain, is distinctly deterministic.
Good works, then, and prayers, like all things else, 
appear in the Calvinistic scheme to be determined by God 
and to fit into an eternally decreed order of events.
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THE CHURCH AND THE STATE.
The Church God'g Ifiatyma»nt f«* th * Salvation
of the Elect*
Calvin must necessarily consider the Church in re­ 
lation to his doctrine of Predestination, since accord­ 
ing to him the salvation of men is inevitably accom­ 
plished through faith in Christ and this is in turn depen­ 
dent upon the preaching of the Word. For it is his con­ 
tention that
"it is God who inspires us with faith, but it is 
through the instrumentality of the gospel, accord­ 
ing to the declaration of Paul, 'that faith cometh 
by hearing.* (q)" l)
And in his view the Church is simply that institution which 
provides for -the preaching of the Gospel, and the nurturing 
of believers by means of the two sacraments of baptism and 
the Lord's Supper. And as this office of preaching and 
these two sacraments are clearly commanded by Christ, 
Calvin, therefore, very consistently considers the Church 
as God's foreordained means of salvation for believers. 
He says,
"We see that though God could easily make his people 
perfect in a single moment, yet it was not Mis 
will that they should grow to mature age, but under 
the education of the Church. —— Hence it follows,
q) Rom. 10 8 17. l) Institutes, Book IV, ch. 1, par. 5
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"that all who reject the spiritual food for their 
souls, which is extended to them by the hands of 
the Church, deserve to perish with hunger and 
want." l)
Thus we see that the true Church is not something 
which just grows up in accordance with the will of men, 
merely as can institution which serves their purpose, but 
is a Divinely appointed institution to accomplish a 
Divinely appointed task,ihat of saving the elect, by means 
of bringing them that Gospel which they are to accept in 
faith, and nurturing this faith by the two Christian 
sacraments*
It is interesting to note that Calvin strongly 
contends for the fact that the 'power of the keys 1 has 
indeed been given to the church, but that this power is 
principally exercised in the preaching of the Gospel 
and the administering of the Sacraments. 2)
In accordance with a Calvinistic view one might say 
that the Church of Rome is simply a corruption of the true 
Apostolic Church, which must be accounted for,not by re­ 
ference to Predestination, but by reference to that all 
wise Providence of God, which in the last analysis accounts 
for the existence of evil as well as good in the world;
1) Op. cit., par* &..
2) Ibid,, par, 22.
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even though the corruption of the Roman Church is the 
corruption of sinful men.
According to Calvin, the permanent officers in the 
Church are only three* pastors, teachers, and deacons. 
It is the duty of the pastors, elders, "bishops, ministers, 
(all these names refer to the same office) to rule over the 
Church, to preach the Gospel, and to administer the sac­ 
raments. The teachers
"have no official concern with the discipline, 
or the administration of the sacraments, or 
with admonitions and exhortations, "but only with 
the interpretation of the Scripture, that pure 
and sound doctrine may be retained among 
believers.* l)
The deacons are those who look after the funds of the 
Church and care for the poor. Ho man is to assume one 
of these offices without being called to it by the members 
of the particular congregation which he serves; but - 
and this is what is important for a consideration of the 
deterministic teaching of Calvinism - the pastor must also 
be conscious of a call from God. 2) These offices, which 
date from New Testament times, are those which are
sufficient for all time, and the form of ordination found 
in the example and precept of the apostles is that
l) Ibid., ch. 3, par.4. ̂ Op. cit., par. 13.
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which should "be kept inviolate.
f; * Therefore we see that, according to Calvin, God 
foreordained the Church for an especial purpose connected 
with His eternal election of some to eternal life; that 
its form is prescribed in God's word; that its chief 
officers, the pastors, are Divinely called to their 
appointed tasks. Thus his whole view of the Church is 
one consistent throughout with the deterministic tendency 
dominant in his major doctrines.
Calvin*a Fatalistic Teaching with regard tn the Statg.
Just as the Church is a Divinely ordained institution 
connected with God's eternal predestination, so the State 
is a Divinely ordained institution connected with God's 
providential governing of the world. Calvin follows 
Paul in the contention that all rulers are God's agents, - 
in spite of the fact that they do not always recognize their 
responsibility as such, l) He further elaborates the 
position by maintaining that just rulers are God's 
"blessing upon an obedient people, and that unjust ones 
are His punishment for a people's inquity. 2)




All of which is thoroughly deterministic, and 
quite in line with the doctrine of Providence* Kb 
man can "be a ruler except by God's appointment; and 
all governments are, in one sense, established by God.
But Calvin's conclusions from this are for the most 
part entirely beside the point, and he is wholly mis­ 
taken in supposing that because all rulers are appointed 
by Divine providence, rebellion is in the nature of revolt 
against God. Where he really makes the first mistake 
is in assuming that all rulers are especially appointed, 
in some more particular way than other things are decreed, 
that they are actually God's vicegerents. If this were 
the case there would be no distinction between a good 
ruler and a bad one; both would be alike Divine re­ 
presentatives. A corrupt government and a wicked king 
may be appointed by God; but if so, they are appointed 
just as an earthquake is, or a plague. And this is 
not to say that men may not legitimately do their best 
to withstand the tempest and the earthquake, and try to 
stamp out the plague. It is perfectly true that there 
must be respect for legally constituted authority, and 
that in the changing of governments care must be exercised 
to avoid anarchy, by setting up some new government to 
take the place of the old, and that, really, the right 
to do this rests not with a few but with the people as a
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whole. Moreover, while it may be perfectly legitimate 
to try to improve the government, - is, as a matter of 
fact, even a Christian obligation, - yet one is never 
justified in disobeying the laws of his government 
except in allegiance to the higher laws of God as these 
are expressed in His Word. And this last is an exception 
which Calvin acknowledges, l) He furthermore recognizes 
the right of the representatives of the people, where 
they have any representatives, to withstand the tyranny 
of kings who have no regard for the true welfare of 
their subjects* Where there is no such representation 
already existing, Calvin seems to have no suggestion for 
acquiring it or for improving the government in any way 
save at the volition of the ruler; because while he 
advocates disobedience when the command of the ruler is 
contrary to the commands of God, this is a mere passive 
resistance and the recognition of it is no warrant for 
active opposition.
Probably one must understand Calvin's firm denial of 
the right of a private person to attempt the overthrow of 
the existing government, as a very legitimate opposition to
l) Op. cit., par. 32.
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individuals, apart from the concerted activity of the 
people as a whole, trying to tear down the existing order 
and set up one more in accord wi^tli their own personal 
ideas of what it should be. And in this he is absolutely 
right. From this, however, one must not suppose that 
all revolution and reform is contrary to the will of 
God; for the bloodiest revolution in history has been 
just as much the will of God as the corrupt government 
which it has overthrown, - since otherwise it could 
never have occurred.
Among the forms of government Calvin favours a com­ 
bination of aristocracy and democracy, and he has a very 
high ideal of what a magistrate should be and do, and of 
the nature and purpose of the laws. the end of govern­ 
ment is justice and equity, - a very democratic ideal. 
But if the government is not ideal, the duty of the private 
citizen is still to obey its commands, except in the 
case of the above mentioned conflict with the commands 
of the Sovereign of all men, whom the rulers themselves 
are obligated to obey, because He disposes of all king­ 
doms and appoints all Icings.
One cannot help feeling that the exception Calvin 
points out and his provision for the representatives of 
the people withstanding the injustice of tyrants, are, 
and have been in the history since his day, more
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important for the securing of righteous government 
than his insistence upon obedience and acquiescence 
"before wicked rulers. For the doctrine that God 
disposes all kingdoms and appoints all kings settles 
nothing; since the means God has generally used 
for the overthrow of corrupt governments is the act­ 
ivity of some man, or group of men, who were convinced that 
the existing government was not in accost with 
God's revealed will, however much it might be appointed 
by His secret providence. God's providential 
appointment of kings cannot be taken as establishing 
the authority of the existing order, because similarly 
in God's providence individuals overthrow kingdoms; and 
one does not feel very firmly convinced that Calvin's 
attempts to establish all governments from the Scrip­ 
tural passages which indicate that certain kings were more 
definitely appointed by God for a more or less clearly 
revealed purpose, is exactly satisfactory, - because 
the more definite appointment of these particular kings 
was connected with this clearly revealed and quite 
specific purposes so that to argue from these cases to 
all governments is simply to overlook the important 
point that these cases were distinguished in two particular
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features which do not characterize every government, - 
namely, the fact that the appointment was revealed in 
the Scriptures, not necessarily as a general rule for 
all time, "but as a particular instance, and secondly, 
the fact that the purpose of such a special appointment 
was likewise revealed.
If it were otherwise, Calvin's instance of the 
conquest of Nebuchadnezzar would serve very well to 
indicate that people should always submit to powerful 
aggression, because it is the will of God. Calvin says,
*To whomsoever, therefore, a kingdom shall evid­ 
ently be given, we have no room to doubt that 
subjection is due to him." l)
And all this he bases upon the Lord's command in 
Jeremiah, 27 * 6 and 12 -
"I have given these lands to Nebuchadnezzar; there­ 
fore serve him and live."
IShich clearly indicates that what Calvin means is that once 
we have assured ourselves that the authority is given by 
God, then our obligation is to submit and obey. But 
that is just the difficulty: how are we to know whether 
God has given the rule to a foreign aggressor or not? 
Apart from a specific revelation, - the days of which are, 
according to Calvin, passed, since New Testament times, -
l) Institutes, op. cit., par. 28.
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there is no way of telling except to oppose the in­ 
vader with all one's force and let the issue decide the matter 
And similarly how is one to know that a government is 
the government of God, unless it is a good government? 
Granted that individuals alone are not the ones to say 
about this, and are not to take it upon themselves to 
assassinate rulers on their individual initiative, 
this is not to say that the people themselves are not 
to overthrow a government, whenever they feel that it is 
an intolerably bad government.
But the very fact that Calvin recognizes the obli­ 
gation of a Christian to disobey the command of his 
earthly sovereign when he feels that this is contrary 
to the command of God, indicates that it is distinctly 
possible for a government to be in opposition to the 
revealed will of God; and in this case it surely is not 
apparent that the ruler governs as God's vicegerent or 
that the government has God's special sanction even as a 
punishment for the sins of the people, since there is no 
evidence of this redeeming punitive character manifest in 
the one observed fact that the commands of the ruler are 
contrary to the commands of God. If tjie ruler commands
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the people to do things contrary to God's revealed will, 
the only conclusion we can draw is that however much this gov­ 
ernment may be ordained by (rod's secret providence, it 
derives no special sanction from Him and there is conse­ 
quently no reason on this score for opposing the over­ 
throw of it. Calvin's conclusion that the1 representa­ 
tives of the people may oppose the ruler when he is not 
governing for the true well-being of the people, does 
not seem to go very well with the conclusion he draws 
from this instance of Israel's subjection to Nebuchadnezzar? 
since in this special case it was the people as a whole 
who were commanded by God to submit to Nebuchadnezzar 
and there is no recognition at all of their concerted right 
to oppose this foreign invader even though apart from this 
special revelation they could not but feel that he had no 
intention of considering their welfare but was wholly 
concerned with the extension of his own domains. Apart 
from God's special revelation that they should submit 
to Nebuchadnezzar, the princes and elders of Israel had 
no means of telling that it was best for them to submit, 
save their own judgment; and seemingly it was only 
Jeremiah who did consider it best to submit, and he was the
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one who had God's special revelation on the particular 
point. So it seems preposterous for Calvin to urge 
this as a general rule for submission, when it is only 
samredc by its specific peculiarities from being in direct, 
opposition to his statement with regard to the rights and 
duties of the guardians of the people's liberties* 
Besides, Nebuchadnezzar was not the king of Israel, but 
of Babylon. TThat indication, then, could there possibly 
be that Israelites should submit to him, unless God gave 
them a special revelation for the particular case, or 
unless they were unable to withstand Nebuchadnezzar's power< 
If one is to take this incident from Israel's history as 
being indicative of God's will for every similar situation, 
it is difficult to justify resistance against any power­ 
ful foreign invader, and we should strongly censure the 
Allies for resisting the Kaiser in the jfeatfc war. 
Fortunately for the common people of the world, Scripture 
has not always been so interpreted.
We know that Calvin's emphasis upon obedience is due 
to the conditions of the time in which he was writing and 
had regard to the practical needs of the people to whom 
he was writing. An advocate of reform, he felt the need 
of impressing Europe and especially the King of France 
and the German Protestant princes wi'th the fact that he
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was not an instigator of sedition and an abetter of 
revolt. In any case, his condemnation of anarchy 
is wholly justified, and was in all probability quite 
a beneficial note in the turbulent times of the Reform­ 
ation, when the need was for the strengthening of 
personal religion as a preparation and safe foundation 
for later political reform.
However, one cannot help observing that regardless 
of the practical import of his teaching, Calvin has not 
worked out clearly the theory of his political ideals, 
simply because he fails to distinguish definitely between 
God's secret providence and His revealed precepts for 
the moral life of men. The latter alone can be man's 
guide, and only a government's accord with the moral 
law can make its overtkrow a definite crime against 
the governance of God. To sanction all government as 
being in the same way the government of the vicegerents 
of God, is to turn Providence into Fate, and to advocate 
blind resignation to things as they are in place of 
intelligent obedience to a Universal Moral Governor* 
The only thing which saves Calvin from such an incon­ 
sistent identification of his system with a previously
l) See Translator's.Preface to Alien's translation of 
the Institutes,and Calvin's dedication Francift of Prance.
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denied Fatalism, is his insistence upon the obligation 
of opposition to the commands of the earthly ruler when 
these are felt to "be contrary to the commands of God and 
his admission that properly constituted representatives 
of the people can on occasion of misgovernment 
legitimately resist the oppression of the ruler. But 
one cannot help seeing that the exceptions destroy the 
"basic principle of the rule itself, and that, actually, 
Calvin is entirely mistaken in supposing that obedience 
to all earthly rulers regardless of their character and 
qualifications to rule is obligatory from the consideration 
that they rule by God's decree. They do rule by God's 
decree; but if they should ever be overthrown, that would 
be by God's decree as well, and the overthrow would there­ 
fore be as legitimate as the rule. When Calvin says,
"If we have this constantly present to our eyes 
and impressed upon our hearts, that the most 
iniquitous kings are placed on their thrones by 
the same decree by which the authority of all 
kings is established, those seditious thoughts 
will never enter our minds, that a king is to 
be treated according to his merits, and that it 
is not reasonable for us to be subject to a 
king who does not on his part perform towards us 
those duties which his office requires* 11 l)
he is simply blocking the way to all political progress
^•t ••• "• *H •• *• •• ̂ B ^Jf-'^BT'^fc ^_ MM ̂ _ ^_ ^_ ^— ̂ ~
l) Institutes, op. cit., par. 27,
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and undermining the grounds of his later assertions
* I am so far from prohibiting them (the repre­ 
sentatives of the people), in the discharge of 
their duty, to oppose the violence or cruelty 
of kings, that I affirm, that if they connive 
at kings in their oppression of their people, 
such forbearance involves the most nefarious 
perfidy, because they fraudulently betray the 
liberty of the people, of which they know that 
they have been appointed protectors by the 
ordination of God. 11 l)
For if it is a crime against God to think seditious 
thoughts, and this is surely Calvin's implication, then 
it is a ctime for the representatives of the people to 
oppose their king, and if a people have no representa­ 
tives to protect their liberty, how are they to get any? 
Calvin admits that their liberty should be protected - 
at least in cases where they have representatives. But 
if it is a good thing for their liberty to be protected, 
it is a good thing for other people to acquire some to 
protect, - provided, of course, they are capable of 
properly exerting it. Certainly it is well for any 
people to become capable of self-government.
But Calvin makes no provision -for improvement I 
Whatever kind of government one has is the kind God 
gave him, and it can never legitimately be changed in 
our time except by the ruler I - or by the hostile ruler
123
THE STATE.
of another countryl Kings can do whatever they 
please - so long as they do not command people to 
worship any other God than Jehovah, or do something 
equally in the realm of religion. If they want to be 
cruel, immoral, veritable devils, no one is to say 
them nay - unless there are already officially 
appointed magistrates for the purpose, and the rights 
of the king are "set down in black and white." Of course 
God will punish them. But this will most likely only 
occur in the next life and will do the people no good 
at the present. Or God may send another king to defeat 
this king; for it would seem one must be of royal 
blood to be God's delegate in our day, - though Calvin 
admits that God used lesser men in Biblical times. 
And this conquering king will, of course, in all probab­ 
ility be even harder, on the conquered people than their 
own king was. And so the condition of the people becomes 
worse and worse, and the worse it becomes the less 
possibility there is of improving it. The only hope of 
a people is that God will send them a wise and good king, 
who will voluntarily limit his own authority and allow 
the people some constitutional liberties and some official 
representatives to safeguard them. Thus as far as the
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people themselves are concerned, the scheme is wholly 
Fatalistic. They can do nothing to help themselves• 
But one cannot help asking: Are kings a different order 
of being from other men? Why should they not be treated 
according to their merits? Are they to steal and murder 
with impunity? Is one man to oppress and destroy a whole 
people, and these very people say 'Amen* I God save the King!'? 
Can God only reform the world by kings? How do consti­ 
tutional liberties arise save through the demands of the 
people?
Calvin himself admits that
"The vice or imperfection of men -— renders it 
safer and more tolerable for the government to 
be in the hands of many, that they may afford 
each other mutual assistance and admonition, and 
that if anyone arrogate to himself more than 
is right, the many may act as censors and masters 
to restrain his ambition 11 , ,' "because it very 
rarely happens that kings regulate themselves so 
that their will is never at variance with justice 
and rectitude; or, in the next place, that they 
are endued with such penetration and prudence, as 
in all cases to discover what is best.* l)
And with regard to the preferableness of the government 
of the many, he goes on to say,
* This has always been proved by experience, and 
the Lord confirmed it by his authority, when he 
established a government of this kind among the 
people of Israel, with a view to preserve them
l) Institutes, op. cit., par. 8
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"in the most desirable condition, till he 
exhibited in David a type of Christ. And 
as I readily acknowledge that no kind of 
government is more happy than this, where 
liberty is regulated with becoming moder­ 
ation, and properly established on a durable basis, 
so also I consider those as the most happy 
people, who are permitted to enjoy such a condi­ 
tion; and if they exert their strenuous and 
constant efforts for its preservation and re­ 
tention, I admit that they act in perfect 
w„.. consistence with their duty. And to this ob­ 
ject the magistrates likewise ought to apply 
their greatest diligence, that they suffer not 
the liberty, of which they are constituted 
guardians, to be in any respect diminished, much 
less to be violated: if they are inactive and 
unconcerned about this, they are perfidious to 
their office, and traitors to their country. 
But if those, to whom the will of God has 
assigned another form of government, transfer 
this to themselves so as to be tempted to desire 
a revolution, the very thought will be not only 
foolish and useless, but altogether criminal. 
If we limit not our views to one city, but look 
round and take a comprehensive survey of the 
whole world, or at least extend our observations 
to distant lands, we shall certainly find it to 
be a wise arrangement of Divine Providence 
that various countries are governed by different 
forms of civil polity; for they are admirably 
held together with a certain inequality, as the 
elements are combined in very unequal proportions. 
All these remarks, however, will be unnecessary 
to those who are satisfied with the will of the 
Lord. For if it be his pleasure to appoint 
kings over kingdoms, and senators or other 
magistrates over free cities, it is. our duty 
to be obedient to any governors whom God has 
established over the places in which we reside." l)
Which lastl^ is nothing more than Fatalism and con­ 
siders the world as completely stationary. It overlooks
l) Op. cit. t par. 8.
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entirely the fact that in most places where they 
have senators and free cities they have had to fight 
for them. Even a good king cannot give a nation a 
constitutional government unless the people desire one 
and are willing to assume responsibilities. And 
history has rather firmly established the fact that 
Divine Providence is not at all averse to revolution 1 
Calvin seems to overlook the fact that there may be such 
a thing as a political ideal towards which it is the 
duty of all nations to be working, - though he himself has 
a political ideal. He talks as if the only way of 
realizing it was for God to let it down from heaven.
His view here recognizes no difference as far as the 
obligation of the people is concerned between a bene­ 
volent despotism and a most vile and cruel tyranny. 
Now we need not deny the fact that there are some nations 
for whom in the present state of their culture a bene­ 
volent despotism is the very best form of government. 
But this is not to say that there is no difference between 
a good government and a bad one and, that if a people 
is so unfortunate as to have a bad one, nobody is morally 
obligated to try and secure them a good one. The 
distinction between good and bad, as in all other realms
12?.
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is a difficult one, and people are liable to make 
mistakes; but the obligation to seek the best is no 
less incumbent in political matters than in other realms 
and toleration of evil is no more a virtue here than 
elsewhere.^! Calvin's teaching with regard to government 
is undoubtedly deterministic; but he here confuses 
Determinism with Fatalism, and on that account makes 
the whole view appear puerile in the extreme. The 
position which his main thesis of God's Sovereignty 
would logically force him to adopt would not necessarily 
suffer from such contentions as he makes. The thing 
he fails to see is that because things are so, it does 
not follow that they must rightly remain so unless a 
king changes them. Kings are not a different order of 
being; God makes kings out of plain men, and He has even 
been known to overthrow them by means of the uprising of 
other plain men inspired by righteous indignation at the 
king's infringement of the common laws of humanity; and 
Calvin himself indicates some awareness of this in his 
admission of the fact that God had on occasion used mere
men to overthrow the power of kingdoms, e.g. as in the
l) 
case of Moses. But he contends that these men only acted
righteously when they acted at God's direct command; 
l) Institutes, op. cit. f par. 30
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and since the days of direct rerelation are past this 
can furnish no example for the present. However, the 
truth still remains that if God is to reform the world, 
He must reform it by men; and one need not agree with 
Calvin that God is principally limited to the use of 
kings as His instruments of reformation.
This much, though, should be said for Calvin: he 
was living "before the rise of modern democratic senti­ 
ments, and before such a general acceptance and application 
of them as exists in our own day, - and he did a great deal 
by recognizing the superiority of conscience even over 
kings to bring about the condition which now exists. He 
himself was an instrument of Divine Providence to over­ 
throw kingdoms, though he was not himself a king, and his 
influence was exerted not on kings who willingly surren­ 
dered their powers to their subjects, but on the people 
who demanded privileges from their kings.
But this is not a treatise on political theory, 
and we should not spend so much time in criticising the 
insufficiency and inexhaustiveness of Calvin's political 
views, were it not for the fact that their lack of sound­ 
ness is due ultimately to his failure clearly to dis­ 
tinguish between two different conceptions of God and 
the universe, and to combine them consistently.
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ITote on the actual social, economic t fond political
effects of Calvinism.
In a consideration of Calvin's political teachings, 
it must "be born in mind that, as Professor W.P.Paterson 
has remarked, Calvin was always trying to safeguard him­ 
self against three accusations of his opponents: first, 
that his theology left no place for the Christian sacraments; 
second, that it left no place for individual moral respons­ 
ibility; and third, that it was subversive of all stability 
of government and would lead to political revolution. Now 
Calvin was perfectly right in defending himself against these 
false attacks upon his theories and their consequences. But 
in his defence against the third, he overstepped the mark, 
and put himself in the position of opposing not only anarchy, 
but all progress or improvement in political affairs. For'-- 
tanatety, however, his followers evidently disregarded the 
extreme part of Calvin's political theory, and accepting his 
theological position, allowed it to have its own consequences. 
Many of Calvin's own social, economic, and political pro­ 
nouncements were revolutionary, and his whole system of thought 
was so different from that which was responsible for world 
conditions in his day that wherever his theology was accepted 
it could not help being conducive to a new order. Prom a con­ 
sideration of the political injunctions in the Institutes, one 
might suppose that Calvin's influence in this realm would have 
been wholly conservative; but subsequent history has not 
proved it to be so.
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One must not forget that Calvin, in spite of his 
less consistent admonitions, gave expression in his 
recognition of the merits of representative government,
the personal fallibility of kings, and the high res-
l) 
ponsibility of magistrates, to what may be considered
as practically a political ideal. At any rate the ideal
of Calvinists has not been mere acquiesence in conditions
and 
as they are,/politically the influence of Calvinism has
generally been toward the development of Democracy.
However, not having made a special study of this 
historical point, it would probably be advisable for me 
to quote the opinions of more learned men instead of 
giving my own. Accordingly let us see what Professor 
Kuijper has to say about Calvinism in this connection. 
He contends that:
"As a political name, Calvinism indicates that 
political movement, which has guaranteed the 
liberty of nations in constitutional states­ 
manship; first in Holland, then in England, 
and since the close of the last century (the 
18th) in the United States." 2)
According to Dr. RobertnFruin,
"Calvinism came into the Netherlands consisting 
of a logical system of divinity, of a democratic 
Church-order of its own, impelled by a severely 
moral sense, and as enthusiastic for the moral
l) Institutes, Book IV, ch. 20, pars. 8 - 10. 2) 
Kuijper, "Calvinism", pp. 7f.
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Has for the religions reformation of mankind.'" l)
"'In Switzerland, in France, in the Netherlands, 
in Scotland and in England, and wherever 
Protestantism has had to establish itself at 
the point of the sword, it was Calvinism 
that gained the day. 1 " 2)
It seems indeed that as Professor Kuijper remarks,
"Both in Holland and in Prance, in England as 
well as in America, the historic result affords 
most undeniable evidence of the fact that 
despotism has found no more invincible antagon­ 
ists, and liberty of conscience no braver, no 
more resolute champions than the followers of 
Calvin." 3)
And it is the opinion of a Dutch historian, Groen van 
Prinsterer, that*
" f ln Calvinism lies the origin and guarantee 
of our constitutional liberties.'" 4-)
But now, Professor Kuijper is both a Calvinist and 
a theologian; and though these other two men are not 
theologians, but a scientist and an historian, respectively, 
yet they, too, are from a Calvinistic country. Let 
us see what a German Lutheran modernist critic of Calvinism 
has to say about the deadening tendencies of Calvinistic
Fatalism*
Professor Troeltsch is here speaking of Calvinistic
1) Quoted by Kuijper on P, 8, - Fruin, "Tien jaren 
uit den tachtigiarigen oorlog", p. Ijl.
2) Kuijper, p. 44.
3) Kuijper, "Calvinism", p.57.




"It is," he remarks, "like all Calvinism, 
active, aggressive; it would transform the 
world, to the honor of God. —— In order to 
this end, it trationalizes and disciplines 
all life by its ethical theories and by its 
ecclesiatical discipline. —— In mere feeling 
(Gefuhligkeit and Stimmung) it sees only in­ 
ertness and lack of seriousness; it is filled 
with a fundamental sentiment: labor for God, 
for the honor of the Churchl Thus the spirit 
of Calvinistic ethics produces a lively activity, 
a severe discipline, a complete plan, a social- 
Christian aim." l)
Professor August Lang agrees with us as to the 
unsatisfactory character of Calvin's own political 
pronouncements, for he declares!
"It was, indeed, a thankworthy undertaking, 
when Calvin in his Institutio did not entirely 
ignore politics, but the results were of such 
a kind that they did$not give satisfaction even 
negatively, on the question of the obedience 
of subjects and the right of resistance, much 
less positively." 2)
But lest we should think this is all, he reminds us:
"Calvin had inspired in his disciples that 
energy of piety, which abhors all half-way 
measures, which boldly endeavours to make all 
the affairs of life subject to Christ, the 
Head and Lord. In this congregation of the 
elect, the individualism of the Reformation 
reached its climax, and despite all subjection 
under God's command, there was developed a 
thirst for liberty, which tolerated nothing
1) Ernst Troeltsch, "Die~Bedeutung des Protestantismus 
fftr die Entstehung der modernen Welt", p. 27. Quoted 
from Doumergue, "Cal. & Ref." pp. i6f.
2) "Calvinism and the Reformation", p»95»
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"that came in its way except after free and 
earnest investigation." l)
If one wants a succinct and able statement of how 
Calvin's theological doctrines of election and the 
witness of the Spirit, together with his definitely 
democratic Church polity, laid the foundations for
modern Democracy, he may find it in Reyburn's study of
2) 
Calvin. Before there could "be any real democracy,
there had to "be a definite change in the medieval atti­ 
tude toward the common man. And this Calvin supplied 
when by his revival of the New Testament conception of man, 
he conferred upon the lowliest peasant the dignity of 
being a son of God, independent of priests and the peer of 
princes in God's Kingdom, and delegated to him the 
responsibility of an effective voice in the government of 
the Church, It is all very well to attribute the de­ 
velopment of our modern democracies to such men as 
Rousseau; but one mus.t not forget that between Rousseau 
and the Middle Ages there is a vast gulf, which Calvinism 
helped to span. Besides, it was probably not for nothing 
that Rousseau was born in Geneva and lived in a Europe
which had a background of almost two hundred years of 
Calvinism*
1)opl«lt* f p. 96.
2) Reyburn, "John Calvin", pp. 343-349.
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If one considers the facts, it is not too much 
to say that Calvinism revolutionized the whole outlook 
upon life, and truly ushered in a new day. Its 
opponents to-day would have us believe that it has ever 
"been the enemy of true morality, that it logically leads 
to deadening of initiative, and to the destruction of all 
"beauty. But history has not shown it to be so. As 
Professor Kuijper remarks,
"The avoidance of the world has never been the 
Calvinistic mark, but the shibboleth of the 
Anabaptist." l)
And his appraisal of the effects of Calvinism in his own 
country, is as follows*
"Scarcely had Calvinism been firmly established 
in the Netherlands for a quarter of a century, 
when there was a rustling of life in all 
directions, and an indomitable energy was 
fermenting in every department of human activity, 
and their commerce and trade, their handicrafts 
and industry, their agriculture and horticulture, 
their art and science, flourished with a 
brilliancy previously unknown, and imparted a 
new impulse for an entirely new development of 
life, to the whole of Western Europe." 2)
It does seem that one must consider Professor Kuijper's 
challenge•
""When ••—• you observe how thoroughly corrupt 
and rotten Calvinism found the world,-— 
what censor among you will dare to deny the 
palm of moral victory to Calvinism, which in 
one generation, though hunted from the battle-




v "field to the scaffold, created, throughout 
five nations at once, wide serious groups of 
noble men, and still nobler women, hitherto 
unsurpassed in the loftiness of their ideal
: conceptions and unequalled in the power of 
their moral self-control?" l)
It was the Reformation which exalted the common 
duties of men; and it is this conception of vocation, 
which Professor Max Weber considers its entirely new 
contributioni
"the esteeming the accomplishment of duty 
in the earthly vocation, as the ideal of 
personal morality." 2)
Moreover, according to Professor Doumergue, Weber, 
though a professor at Heidelberg,
"accords to Calvinism a much higher social 
influence than to Lutheranism." 3)
He considers thatt
"Calvinism, historically, is one of the incon- 
testible factors of the 'capitalistic spirit tw . 4)
But we must not think of the 'capitalistic spirit* in 
terms of modern labour controversies. It is not the 
selfish spirit of a class which desires merely to 
accumulate wealth for its own pleasure at the expense 
of the efforts of another class; rather, it is, to use 
Doumergue*s words, the
f p. 97 •
2) Max Weber, "Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des 
Kapitalismus", Archiv fWx sozial Wissensohaft iiM ? sezial 
Politile. Vol. XX (1904)
Quoted from Doumergue, "Calvinism and the Reformation", p.31
3) Doumergue, op* cit., p.28.
4) Weber, op* cit., p. 26.
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"spirit which does not urge on to pleasure, 
"but to production,"a spirit Triiich Doumergue con­ 
tends, "is so contrary to human nature that it 
could only arise through the influence of an 
extremely efficacious spiritual power." l)
It is the spirit which glorifies trade and commerce, 
manufacture and all production of economic values, as 
nobler than aristocratic idleness and the profession of 
arms. And it is a new spirit, a modern conception, which 
Weber remarks
"would have "been proscribed in antiquity as well 
as in the Middle Ages, as sordid avarice and 
mentality without dignity." 2)
But that Calvinism does not stand for anything that 
may legitimately be called 'sordid avarice 1 is apparent 
from its emphasis upon the Christian conceptions of3)
stewardship, self-denial, and charity, together with 
its conviction that the present life is but the highway 
to a better, upon which the Christian should ever be
meditating, lest he lose himself in this lower way and
4) 
never attain unto the higher goal. Yet it was Calvin
who, to use Bavinek's words,
"formulated in a classic document the grounds on 
which it could be affirmed that a reasonable 
interest is neither in conflict with Scripture 
nor with the nature of money," 5)
4
Doumergue, p.
Weber, v. XX, p. 19.
Institutes, Bk. 3, chs. 6-8
Ibid., chs. 9, 1O.
"Calvin and the Reformation", p. 128.
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and thus gave to modern "business the sanction of 
religion. It was neither the jovial Dr. Luther, 
the loveable Melanchthon, the astute Zwingli$,nor the 
scholarly Erasmus, who did this, "but "the harsh, stern, 
impractically puritanic" Calvin - among the unaristo- 
cratic "burghers of the little manufacturing and 
commercial city of Geneva.
We may summarize the social, economic, and political 
effects of Calvinism in the words of Professor R.H. 
Tawing not a theologian "but an economist, who in his 
"Religion and the Rise of Capitalism" says:
"Unlike the Lutheranism from which it sprang, 
Calvinism, assuming different shapes in different 
countries, became an international movement, 
which "brought, not peace, "but a sword, and the 
path of which was strewn with revolutions. Where 
Lutheranism had "been socially conservative, defer­ 
ential to established political authorities, the 
exponent of a personal almost quietistic, piety, 
Calvinism was an active and radical force. It was 
a creed which sought, not merely to purify 
the individual, but to reconstruct Church and State, 
and to renew society by penetrating every 
department of life, public as well as private, 
with the influence of religion. —- It assumed 
an economic organization, which was relatively 
advanced:, and expounded!its social ethics on 
the basic of it.* l)
The reason why revolution followed in the train of 
Calvinism, when Calvin himself did not preach revolution 
as such, is to be found in the truth of Professor




"the impetus to reform or revolution springs 
in every age from the realization of the 
contrast "between the external order of 
society and the moral standards recognized as 
valid by the conscience and reason of the 
individual." l)
Calvin enlightened the conscience and reason of the 
individual as to the way all men should live, and his 
followers very naturally disregarded his injunction not 
to "be critical of rulers. Yet as Professor Tawney points 
out, neither Calvin nor Calvinism stood for any lax 
discipline either of Church or State, "but for its 
Strengthening in both*
,: Calvinism may have been intolerant; but its 
intolerance was that of the rigorous life and of devotion 
to truth, and not that of personal ambition and desire 
for personal aggrandizement. It was intolerant, not of 
those who tried to lead the way to a better life, but 
of those who lagged "behind or endangered the ideal which 
was the very nerve of the movement.
As Professor A.E. Taylor points out, (and as we have 
already suggested in the Introduction) the Romanist and 
Calvinist idea of the persecution of heresy was a thoroughly 
sound one intellectually. The heretic was persecuted 




of the State. It is the same as Plato's view that 
soul destroying error ought to "be repressed simply "because 
it is error and because it is soul destroying; which is a 
far sounder view than the Lutheran and Elizabethan one of 
allowing the ruler to decide all doctrinal matters for his 
subjects simply "because he is ruler and without regard 
to the truth of his opinions, or than the weak toleration 
so prevalent in our own day, which rests upon the 
assumption either that we cannot attain truth, or that it 
does not make any difference whether we do or not.
It is no virtue to be patient with error unless we are 
passionate in devotion to truth. And it might be remarked 
that a great many of those who prate so much about the in­ 
tolerance of Calvin, and condemn him with the utmost 
vituperation, for the burning of Servetus, are themselves 
not sufficiently tolerant to investigate the matter before 
they give vent to their condemnation. It may also be 
wondered whether they are in all cases devoted to the truth 
or simply strongly opposed to anyone who is. Too often 
Calvin is condemned by such people, not for being mistaken, 
but really for being in earnest. Yet tolerance of error 
can scarcely be set up as the chief virtue by people who are 
themselves truly virtuous and wholly devoted to the pursuit 
of virtue and truth. ,
140
NOTE.
Indeed it may "be wondered if the sternness of 
Calvinistic teaching did not do more to invigorate the 
morAl and religious life of the world, when it was in sore 
need of invigorating, than any modern views of toleration 
would have done f No great reform has ever been accom­ 
plished "by reformers who were not deadly in earnest, and 
the modern opponents of medieval intolerance who are most 
earnest show themselves not entirely free from the vice 
which they condemn; and they would do well to remember 
that the earnestness of the great Genevan reformer whom 
they condemn most heartily, manifested itself not alone 
in the strenuousness of his attack on opponents but
also in his willingness to pay the price of living himself
l) 
a hard life of rigorous discipline and study.
Those who judge Calvinism by the mistakes of some 
Calvinists, do both Calvin and Calvinism a grave injustice. 
Calvinism is not opposed to the proper enjoyment of life.
Calvin himself pointed out the obligation to appreciate
2) 
its beauties, and to be grateful for them, - which makes
all the difference between a mere lover of beauty, and a 
lover of God. He was a man who drew to himself true
11 See* latrodu^ctl-on above.See Institutes, Book 3> chs. 9, 10. Also the comments of 
Prof ess ors Douinergue and Bavinck in "Calvin and the Reformation" , 
PP« 35-37 and 124-129, reap.
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friends; and while he lived a life of hard study and 
almost constant labor, he ever enjoyed the fellowship 
of his friends, and his letters manifest his sincere interest 
in all their concerns and his own participation in the 
normal social life possible to a cultured gentleman who 
found himself weighed down with many responsibilities, 
which honor and Christian fidelity prevented his casting off.
Those whose ideal of beauty is the immoral, whose 
conception of pleasure is licentious abandonment to 
sensual enjoyment, whose chief aim in life is idleness, 
will ever find in Calvinism an ardent antagonist. For 
Calvinism has rightly been called M the gospel of hard 
work*; its conception of the highest enjoyment is the uncom­ 
promising morality of a truly good life; its ideal of 
beauty is to be found in the face of Christ. It makes 
a distinction between righteousness and wickedness, and 
it prefers the former. It is not always easy to distinguish 
between the two, and Calvinists have not always drawn the 
line in the right place; but it is a grave injustice to 
Calvinism to say that it despises 'beauty' and 'happiness' 
as synonymous with 'evil'. It rather says that true 
'beauty' and true 'happiness' are to be found only in the 
'good'; and that consequently, the chief end of life is the 
pursuit of righteousness. All who have this ideal will
142. 
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find in Calvinism that with which they can sincerely 
"be in sympathy. Those who have it not, will find 
themselves in opposition not only to Calvin, "but to Christ • 
and are in much need of Him.
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Part III. 
CRITICISM OF CALVIN'S TEACHING,
Chapter Till.
The Two Approaches* Providence and Total Depravity.
If one starts with the idea of God's Sovereignty, 
one comes inevitably to the Calvinistic doctrine of 
Providence, which is nothing more than the contention 
that all things happen in accord with and "because of 
the Divine decree* In this alone we have a complete 
and absolute Theistic Determinism, the elaboration of which 
will logically lead to the formulation of the Calvinistic 
doctrines of Creation and Predestination; for since on this 
view, all things are dependent upon God, nothing can come 
into being except by His decree, and the destiny of 
individuals must be fixed by Him$ Undoubtedly this idea 
of God's Sovereignty was a basic conception in Calvin's 
thought, and forms one approach to his system of theology, - 
a philosophical approach through the development of a par­ 
ticular cosmology centering around the doctrine of Providence.
But this was not the only approach. Calvin, like 
Paul, Augustine, and Luther before him, was much impressed 
by his own sinfulness and man's general inability to save
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himself. This conviction of human bondage to sin found 
theological expression in the doctrine of Total Depravity. 
Han himself was imperfect; every part of him was sinful; 
everything he did was evil. There was no hope in him. 
The moral law demanded perfection, and he was wholly 
incapable of it. If he was to be saved from sin, he must 
be saved by the power of God. But the power of God must 
not only be offered to him, it must lay hold upon him; for 
he had not enough strength to lay hold upon it. And thus 
we have the doctrine of God's Irresistible Grace. Moreover, 
if man was to persist in the way of righteousness, he must 
not only be laid hold upon, he must be kept by the power of 
God; in saying which we have expressed the need for the 
doctrine of Perseverance. All of man's subsequent 
righteousness depended not upon himself but upon God; even 
his Christian faith was gratuitous. He was regenerated by 
the Spirit of God; justified by the imputed righteousness 
of Christ; gradually sanctified by the indwelling of the 
Holy Spirit. His whole redemption was the work of God.
, •.'!-.
But why should God have singled out this particular man for 
His peculiar bounty? The answer to this was the mystery of 
the Divine Election. Some men were from all eternity 
elected to eternal life in Christ. This is the religious 
approach.
DUAL APPROACH.
To a casual observer these two developments may seem 
to end at the same place. But this is scarcely true. 
The first approach gives us a complete and absolute 
Determinism. It gives no specific details. But none 
are needed. Iflhatever the actual history of the world and 
of men, all things are as they are because God has willed 
them to "be so. That is the ultimate explanation of all 
things, the connecting thread that runs through all that 
is. God is the ground and cause of all things.
The other approach does not necessarily carry us so 
far. It leads us to suppose that the destiny of men is 
fixed "by God; but apart from a theory of strict universal 
causation, it does not imply that all the details of life 
are determined. It does imply a doctrine of Providence; 
"but it is a sort of lax overruling Providence, which is 
concerned to secure its ends, but is not concerned to trouble 
about how it secures them. It is a Providence which is 
satisfied so long as things "turn out all right", and it is 
the sort of Providence which can assure that they will 
"turn out all right" in spite of what happens in the meantime
Now this may be a very loose and unjustifiable view 
of God's government of the universe; but it is a most 
common one, and strangest of all, it is a view from which 
Calvin himself, in spite of all his opinions to the contrary,
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could never get wholly free. It starts with man as 
separate from God, distinctly and definitely other than 
God, as an object upon which God exerts His power. It 
does not matter that man is unable to resist God's power; 
the significant point is that he is something for God to 
exert Hiw power upon.
But how does he become so?
Obviously if one starts with the doctrine of Total 
Depravity, or any other such view of man's separation 
from God, one has sooner or later to confront the difficult 
question of how it happens that man is so depraved. One 
may occupy himself for a time with working out the details 
of how the redeemed get out of this deplorable condition; 
but this never answers the question as to how they got into 
it.
If God created men, - and the doctrine of Creation 
from this approach rests upon an independent foundation 
in Christian theology, - how does it happen that they are 
sinners? The historic answer is: the Fall.
The Fundamental Inconsistency of Calvinism* The Fall and 
Providence.
But how does one reconcile the Fall with the
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Calvinistic doctrine of Providence? This appears simple 
enough. One need only say that the Pall, like every other 
event in the history of the world, was decreed "by God. 
And this, when he is opposing Libertarians, Calvin admits; 
for he expressly declares:
"But not to wrangle about words, I willingly, and in 
a moment confess, that what I have written is this, - 
'That the fall of Adam was not by accident, nor by 
chance; but ordained by the secret counsel of God. 11 l)
But if God decreed the Pall of Adam, it must have been in 
accord with His will. And this, Calvin will not deny; for 
he definitely affirms that:
"The WILL of GOD is the one principle and all 
high CAUSE of all things, in heaven and earthl" 2)
But while this is a most consistent and thorough-going 
view; it has still one difficulty in its way: Does it not 
make God the author of evil? Calvin
"that a whole volume might be made of -— passages 
of the Holy Scriptures, where God is made the author, 
as commander, of the evil and cruel deeds done by 
men and nations." 3)




Calvin's Calvinism, p. 6l.
Calvin's Calvinism, p. 26. See above, ch.l.
Calvin's Calvinism, p.80§
Above, ch.l., op. cit., p.86. See also "De Libero Atbi—
.trio", p. 3^> where Calvin sayss "Turn intelligemus, nee L>eum 
fieri malorum autorem, quum dicitur impios agere quo vult, et 
per illos opus suum peragere et exsequi: sed potius confite- 
bimur esse eximium et mirificum artificem, qui bene etiam malis 
instrumentis utatur: iustitfcam eius cogemur suspicere, quae npn 
modo in media iniquitate viam inveniat, sed ipsa quoque ini- 
quitate utatur in bonum." (Corpus Ref. vol. 34, col. 258),
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on the ground that God's motives and ends are always good, 
even when He wills these evil deeds of men. God, then, is 
not the author of sin, Calvin contends, "because sdll is something 
which characterizes evil motives, and only the creature's 
motives can ever be evil.
But now, while this proves that God's actions are not 
sinful, because His motives are good, it does not prove that 
God is not the author of sin in exactly the same way that it 
may be contended that He is the author of everything else. 
The sinful motives may belong to the creature, and may not 
be God's motives at all; yet God most certainly wills them, 
and they are as much a part of His decree as the acts towards 
which they tend.
However, it appears that Calvin never quite perceived 
this. For while he was firm to maintain that nothing 
happened save by God's decree, and declares:
"God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, and 
the ruin of his posterity in him, but also arranged 
all by the determination of his own will; 11 l) 
and argues that it is foolish to try to relieve God 
of the responsibility by resorting to an impossible 
distinction between permission and will; M 2)
i) Institutes, Book III, ch. 23, par. 7. Ibid,, Book 3, ch. 23. par. 8.
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he never seems to see the full import of his own 
teaching, and is forever trying to show that man is the 
one ultimately responsible for the existence of sin. 
He professes to have proved,
"with all possible clearness, that God was 
not, in any sense, or degree, or manner, 
whatever, the author of sin." l)
and agrees with Augustine, that
"God "doth not make wills evil; but useth 
the wills of men already evil, as He pleaseth; 
nor can he, of himself, will anything that is 
evil." 2)
But the ambiguity of his whole position may be seen 
from the following quotations from the Institutes^ where 
he is treating the subject of the Pall and original sin:
"Now, let us dismiss those who dare to charge 
God with their corruptions, because we say 
that men are naturally corrupt. They eri* 
in seeking for the work of God in their own 
pollution, whereas they should rather seek 
it in the nature of Adam while yet innocent 
and uncorrupted. Our perdition therefore 
proceeds from the sinfulness of our flesh f 
not from God? it being only a consequence of 
our degenerating from our primitive condition. 
--- Ifffoerefore let us remember, that our ruin 
must be imputed tft tjfojSc.-••frorr-tffi-'fe'i-oit of our nature• 
that we may not bring an accusation against 
God h;ipipej.f f the author of our nature. That 
this fatal wound is inherent in our nature, is 
indeed a truth; but it is an important question,
CGalvin's GaUpini&m % Part II., p. 86.
t P» 25• See also- Ch. I. of*Thesis.
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"whether it was in it originally, or was 
derived from any extraneous cause. But 
It is evident that it was occasioned bv 
sin. ?4- It is clear that the misery of 
man must be ascribed solely to himself, 
since he was favoured with rectitude by the 
Divine goodness, but has lapsed into vanity 
through his own folly.
"We say, therefore, that man is cor­ 
rupted by a natural depravity, but which 
did not originate from nature." l)
The absolute uselessness of such argument, appears 
when we ask what caused the sinfulness of our flesh f 
and how does it happen that an innocent and uncor- 
rupted creature could have degenerated from thig^ 
primitive condition. It is most enlightening to ^be 
told that the corruption of our nature was occasioned 
bv sins but what we naturally want to know is* Who 
or what occasioned sin? How is it that there can be an 
extraneous cause for our corruption, when
"the WILL of GOD is the one principal and all 
high CAUSE of all things, in heaven and earth!"?
But that this ambiguity is not just a temporary 
oversight on Calvin's part, is apparent from the 
following display of it in his discussion of the doctrine 
of Predestination in a later book,of the Institutes. 
Here he declares t




"It is not probable —— jjmt man procured his 
own destruction by the mere pennies ion f and 
without ajiy appointment, of God; aa though 
God had not de_te.rmiqed what he would choose. 
to be the condition of the principal of his 
creatures. I shall not hesitate, therefore, 
to confess plainly with Augustine, 'that the 
will of God is the necessity of things, and 
that what he has willed will necessarily 
come to pass; as those things are really 
about to happen which he has foreseen.' Now, 
if either Pelagians, or Manichaeans, or 
Anabaptists, or Epicureans, —— in excuse 
for themselves and the impious, plead the 
necessity with which they are bound by God's 
predestination, - they allege nothing applicable 
to the case. For if predestination is no 
other than a dispensation of Divine justice,
- mysterious indeed, but liable to no blame,
- since it is certain they were not unworthy 
of being predestinated to that fate, it is 
equally certain, that the destrudtion they 
incur by predestination is consistent with 
the strictest justice. Besides, their -perdition 
depends on the Divine predestination in such 
a manner, that the cause and matter of it 
are found in themselves. For the first man. 
fell bedanse the Lord had determined it was 
so expedient. The reason of this determination 
is unknown to us. Yet it is certain that he 
determined thus, only because he foresaw it 
would tend to the 3'ust illustration of the 
glory of his name. Whenever you hear the glory 
of God mentioned* think of his justice. . For 
what deserves praise must be just. Man falls, 
therefore f according to the appointment of 
Divine Providence; but he falls by his own 
fault. The Lord had a little before pronounced 
'everything that he had made' to be 'very good 1 . 
Whence, then, comes the depravity nof man to revolt 
from his God? Lest it should be thought to come 
from creat i on r God had approved and commended what 
proceeded from himself - !Qy hjJ,a
neaa f therefore, he corrupted the nature he had 
received pure from tfre Lord f and by his fall he 
drew all his posterity with him into destruction.
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"therefore let us rather contemplate the evident 
cause of condemnation, which is nearer to us in the 
corrupt nature of mankind, than search after a 
hidden and altogether incomprehensible one in the 
predestination of God. ———
"The reprobate wish to be thought excusable 
In sinning, because ^h ftr cannot avoid a necessity 
6f sinning; especially since this necessity is 
laid upor^ thep\ "by tfae ordinatioq of God. Bu/fc 
we deny this to "be a just excuse; "because the 
ordination of God, "by which they complain that 
they are destined to destruction, is guided bv 
eauitv f unknown indeed to us, but indubitably 
certain. Whence we conclude, that they sustain 
no misery that is not inflicted upon them by 
the most righteous judgment of God. In the next 
place, we maintain that they act preposterously. 
who p in seeking for the origin of their condem­ 
nation, direct their views to the secret 
recesses of the Divine counaelf ajncl overlook 
the corruption of nature f which is its real 
source. The testimony God gives to his creation 
prevents their imputing it to him. For though f 
by the eternal providence of God f man was 
created to that misery to which he is sub.iect T 
.vet the ground of it he has derived from 
himself, not from God; since he is thus ruined 
solely in consequence of his having degenerated 
from the pure creation of God to vicioua and 
impure depravity.* l)
Such an argument as this, indicates that the whole 
problem was very much confused in Calvin's mind and that 
he was never able to reconcile his doctrine of Providence 
with his conception of the Pall - simply because they 
were absolutely contradictory. One minute he contends 
that God aointed a,nd willed the destruction of
l) Institutes, Book III, ch. 23, pars. 8 and 9
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and with the next breath foe maintains that God had 
nothing to do with it. But now obviously both of 
these assertions cannot "be true, in view of the fact 
that God created man and knew what he would do. Again, 
how is it possible for man to have corrupted his nature 
"by his own wickedness, when, if such is the case, he 
must have been wicked prior to his corruption? Calvin,
as we have seen, had himself contended in his treatise
l) 
on Predestination, that to hold that the non-elect
"were 'fitted to destruction 1 by their own 
wickedness. is an idea so silly, that it needs 
no notice. 11
Yet here he is himself making exactly this contention. 
His reasoning is most extraordinary. He appears 
to contend that there are two causes for man's condemnation: 
the one hidden in God's incomprehensible predestination; 
the other obvious in man's corruptions and that there is 
no connection between them. But in the very next para­ 
graph he seemingly admits that the reprobate do have a 
necessity of sinning laid on them by the ordination of 
God. And obviously, if God decreed the !£all, as Calvin 
firmly maintains He did, then His ordination must be as 
much the cause of aeaai's sin a,a of his condemnation.
l) Calvin's Calvinism, Part I., p. 60. See also Ch. 5 of thesis.
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It is all very well to contend that the reprobate 
sustain no misery that is not inflicted upon them "by the 
most righteous judgment of God; but if, as Calvin does 
not deny, their sin is from a necessity laid upon them 
by the ordination of God, then a legal judgment can in no 
sense b^ the ultimate explanation of the situation. It 
is not enough to say that the men being sinners deserve no 
better at God's hands. The real problem is that their 
fate was decided before they became sinners, when they 
deserved nothing at God f s hands, either good or evil. 
His decision of their destiny, therefore, cannot be 
based upon their evil desert, since this is really but 
a part of it.
How anybody could maintain in the same sentence that
"by the eternal providence of God, man was created 
to that misery to which he is subject, yet the 
ground of it he has derived from himself, not 
from God; since he is thus -ruined solely in 
consequence of his having degenerated from the 
pure creation of God to vicious and impure depravity11 ,
is more than one can readily understand. Here Calvin is de­ 
claring that God created man to misery, but the reason for the 
misery, is to be found in man himself. But surely the 
ultimate reason for the misery cannot be found in man himself,
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if God created him with deliberate knowledge of the end 
of his creation. It sounds very much as if Calvin 
were trying to say that God created man to a particular 
fate, which fate was a condemnation for something man 
did after he was created. But this is as if a judge 
passed sentence on a man for a crime which he had not 
yet committed, on the strength of his assurance that he 
would commit it because he, the judge, would see to it 
that he did. The figure of the judge simply breaks 
down as an ultimate explanation of the situation. It 
is perfectly all right for Calvin to contend that the 
ground for man's misery is derived from himself, in the 
sense that his misery is the consequence of his voluntary 
sin. But on the theory that this result is a definite 
part of God's eternal decree, we are forced to say that 
the ultimate cause of man's voluntary sin is this same 
eternal decree. The ultimate ground for the whole 
situation cannot be discovered in a part of the situation 
itself, but must be in God, who along determined that this 
situation should be. Otherwise we must have God decreeing 
the misery of man subsequent to the Fall, and not prior 
to it. And ajgfcttti we must ask Calvin how a pure creature 
could have degenerated into a depraved one.
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The Heart of the Trouble: Supposition of Adam's Freedom*
In the last analysis the whole difficulty goes 
"back to Calvin's attempt to relieve God of the responsi­ 
bility for sin, through maintaining that in his original 
state Adam possessed a real freedom of the will. 
This is shown not only from the preceding argument, "but 
more directly "by the following quotation from the 
Institutes! where Calvin is referring to the primitive 
condition of man!
"God has furnished the soul of man, therefore, 
with a mind capable of discerning goodf^om evil, 
and just from unjust; and of discovering by 
the right of reason, what ought to be pursued 
or avoided. —— To this he has added the will, 
on which depends the choice. The primitive 
condition of man was ennobled with those 
eminent faculties; he possessed reason, 
understanding, prudence, and judgment, not only 
for the government of his life on earth, but
l) See "De Libero Arbitrio", pp. 3^f «» where Calvin declares: 
MNe tamen id declinandi causa facere videar, respondeo, 
et Lutherurn, et nos omnes, duplicem constituere naturam: 
priorem, qualis a Deo condita fuerat, quam puram et 
integram fatemur fuisse; alteram quae lapsu hominis 
vitiata, suam integritatem perdidit. Huius vitiositatis 
culpam homini tribuimus, non referimus in Deum. --- 
Aut si malit, ex Augustini ore respondebimus, quod libro 
ad Bonifacium primo habetur* homines esse opus Dei, in 
quantum homines sunt, sed sub diabolo esse, in quantum 
peccatores sunt, nisi inde per Christum eruantur. A Deo 
igitur boni, a se ipsis mali sunt. M (Corpus Reformatorum, 
vol. 34, col. 259.)
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* to enable him to ascend even to God arid 
eternal felicity. To these was added choice, 
to direct the appetites, and regulate all the 
organic motions; so that the will should "be 
entirely comformed to the government of reason. 
In this integrity man was endued with free 
will t "by which, if he had chosen, he might 
have obtained eternal life. For here it 
would be unreasonable to introduce the 
question respecting the secret predestination 
of God, because we are not discussing what might 
possibly have happened or not, but what was the 
real nature of man. Adam, therefore, could 
have stood if he would, since he fell merely 
by his own will; but because his will was flexible 
to either side, and he was not endued with con­ 
stancy to persevere, therefore, he so easily fell. 
Yet his choice of good and evil was free; and 
not only so, but his mind and will were possessed 
of consummate rectitude, and all his organic 
parts were rightly disposed to obedience, till, 
destroying himself, he corrupted all his 
excellencies. —— At present be it only remembered, 
that, man, at his first creation, was very 
different from all his posterity, who, deriving 
their original from him in his corrupted state, 
have contracted an hereditary defilement. 
For all parts of his soul were formed with the 
utmost rectitude; he enjoyed soundness of mind, 
and a will free to the choice of good. --- 
He had received the power, indeed, if* he chose 
to exert it; but he had not the will to use 
that power; for the consequence of this will 
would have been perseverance. Yet there is no 
excuse for him; he received so much, that he 
was the voluntary procurer of his own destruction; 
but God was under no necessity to give him any 
other than an indifferent and mutable will, 
that from his fall he might educe matter for 
his own glory." l)
It is Calvin's contention, more ere ey, that man lost this 
freedom of will in the Fall, and that he is now no longer
l) Institutes, Book I., ch. 15, par. 8. See also Book 
II, ch. 1, par. 10, quoted above on page 150.
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possessed of the power to choose between good and evil, 
"but is merely free from external constraint.
"What Calvin is saying really amounts to this: God
foreordained just what man would do; but man was cbn-
2) 
fronted with real alternatives(for otherwise he was not
really free to choose gopd when as a matter of fact 
he chose evil).
But now this is a clear contradiction; unless God's 
foreordination is ineffectual. Either what God wills 
is absolutely certain of fulfilment, or it is not. 
If it is, then Adam was not confronted with any real 
alternatives; because God had already decided what Adam 
was to do, and all possibility of his doing otherwise was 
precluded. If it is not, then the doctrine of God's 
Sovereignty is a mere fiction. Again, either Adam's 
conduct was fixed and determined by God, or it was not* 
If it was fixed and determined by God, Adam had no real 
freedom of choice; because the only thing he could do 
was exactly what he did. But if his conduct was not fixed 
and determined by God, it was absolutely uncertain; and 
God could have no knowledge of what Adam would do. In
1) See Institutes, Book 2, ch. 2, and ch. 2 of Thesis.
2) For an attempt to combine these positions through the 
idea of remote and proximate causes, see "Calvin's Calvinism11 , 
Part 1, pp. 76, 77> Calvin seems to vary his emphasis 
according to his opponent. When he is opposing a man who 
contends for free will f he stresses the proof of God's 
foreordination even of the Pall. But when someone accuses 
him of putting the responsibility for sin upon God, then 
turns and argues for the freedom of Adam.
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other words, if Adam had the real freedom of choice 
for which Calvin is here contending, God instead of 
decreeing the event, had to wait until after it occurred 
before He could even know what it was to be. But if 
God did foreknow exactly what thie particular man, Adam, 
would do under these particular circumstances, then when 
He created this particular man,Adam, and placed him in 
these particular circumstances, He definitely determined 
exactly what Adam would do, and Adam was not free to do 
otherwise.
It may be perfectly true that Adam could have been 
otherwise if he had wanted to. But this is only to say 
that he was free from external comr>ulsion f and is to 
accord him no different freedom from that with which alli)
men since the Fall have been endowed. We are free to 
do good if we want; the trouble is that being sinful, we 
do not want to bad enough.
It is a mere myth to suppose that Adam had any 
different sort of freedom from that which we possess 
to-day; namely, the freedom of expressing his own character 
under the circumstances in which he found himself. He
l) See Institutes, Book 2, ch. 2» Also A,quinas, Summa, 
Part 1, Question 33, Second Article: "Man is said to have 
lost free-will by falling into sin, not as to natural 
liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as regards 
freedom -from fault and misery. 11
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was free to do as he pleased? "but he was not free to 
please contrary to the decree* of God. If we suppose 
otherwise, we introduce an element of real chance and 
irrationality into the universe. The only freedom 
possible in a rational universe is the freedom of self- 
expression. It is this freedom which definitely fixes 
and determines our own conduct; it was exactly the same 
that determined Adam's. Adam could do whatever he wanted 
to do under the circumstances; "but God determined exactly 
what he would want to do, by making him just the person 
he was. If there is any difference between us and Adam, 
it relates not to any different freedom of the will, but 
to difference of character.
But now, was Adam's character any different from ours? 
It would seem that Calvin's whole description of Adam is 
self-contradictory. He had "a mind capable of discerning 
good from eveil", and a will "entirely conformed to the 
government of reason", and "his mind and will were possessed 
of consummate rectitude"; yet this being, in whose original 
nature there was no evil whatever, when confronted by the 
choice between good and evil, chose the evilI "By their 
fruits ye shall know them"; but here is a good tree which 
bears evil fruit! Moreover, Calvin speaks of Adam's will
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as indifferent and mutable. But how can it be indifferent 
and mutable when it is "entirely conformed to the govern­ 
ment of reason"? Was Adam's will so free that it was not 
even controlled by his character and understanding? If 
so, it can scarcely be called his will, and it certainly 
relieves him of all responsibility for his conduct. In 
our own day, a conscientious magistrate would consign such 
a person to a place of safe-keeping, lest he do himself 
and others harm; and if Adam were such a creature, 
God appears highly reprehensible for turning him loose 
in the world, to ruin himself and the whole race. -Instead 
of making him superior to the rest of men, such an endow­ 
ment makes Adam a most inferior creature, below the level 
of a rational human being.
But if Adam's will were governed by his character 
and understanding, and there was no fault in either his 
character or his understanding, how could he possibly 
have chosen evil instead of good? It is useless to say 
that he had become dorrupt. Perfectly good creatures in 
a good universe created fey a good God, do not just become 
corrupt without a definite cause of their corruption. 
But what cause can be found? It can certainly not be 
contended, as Calvin is guilty of doing, that man corrupted
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himself; because prior to his corruption it is 
Calvin's contention that man was wholly good.
• Calvin could never get around the (Fall, and in 
contending that in it man lost his real freedom, he 
puts himself in the strange position of making 
sub .lection to God synchronous with "bondage to sin* 
For he maintains that since the Pall man is in bondage 
to sin. But he also maintains that since the Fall man 
is absolutely controlled by God, for the following 
quotations relate to man in his fallen state.
"It is, indeed, a ridiculous madness for miserable 
men to resolve on undertaking work independently 
of God, whilst they cannot even speak a word but 
what he chooses." l)
"Men -— can effect nothing but by the secret 
will of God, and can deliberate on nothing but 
what he has previously decreed, and determined 
by his secret direction." 2)
"Whatever conceptions we form in our minds, they 
are directed by the secret inspiration of God." 3)
Now if Adam were so controlled by God, he was incapable 
of doing other than he did and he possessed no more freedom 
than we do. But if Adam was really free, and our present 
lack of freedom is, as Calvin affirms, due to our bondage 
to sin, we might well contend that if we were not slaves to 
sin we would be free from god - just as Adam was.
i! Institutes, Book 1, ch. 16, par. 6 Institutes, Book 1, ch. 18, par. 1 
3) Ibid., par. 2.
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The thing Calvin failed to see was that Adam's 
will, just as ours, was in bondage to his character, 
and that Adam himself, just as the r^est of us, was in 
bondage to God, - merely because God made him and had 
determined from all eternity exactly what he was to "be 
and how he was to live. If there is a Calvinistic 
Providence, there is not to-day, and there never has 
"been, any such freedom of the will as Calvin attributed 
to Adam.
Calvin li here "between the devil and the deep blue 
sea*. If he contends that God is not the author of sin 
in the sense of being the one ultimately responsible for 
its existence in the world, he must introduce a break in 
the causal order of the universe, and contend that 
although God created man, man himself is solely responsible 
for sin, and God had nothing to do with it. But if he 
admits that God is the author of sin in this sense, he 
has then to acknowledge, it would seem, that if God is 
good, sin in the last analysis is not evil.
He attempts to escape from this situation by holding 
to both Providence and Freedom. But this procedure is 
absolutely futile; for even if the conditions were as he 
maintains, he does not relieve God of the ultimate
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responsibility for sin. His position seems to "be 
that God created a perfectly good creature, "but that 
He knew from the very beginning that this perfectly 
good creature, if left to himself, would eventually sin. 
How hB could sin, and how God could know that he would, 
without actively causing him to, are questions to be 
waived for the sake of argument; but if God foreknew 
the fall of this creature, even though He had no active 
part in it at the time, yet in His creation of this per­ 
fectly good creature, He was sanctioning the existence 
of sin in a world for which He was ultimately responsible, 
and actively participating in bringing it about, since 
He was actively making the being whom He knew definitely 
would bring it about. The only possible way of reliev­ 
ing Him of this ultimate and active responsibility for 
sin, is to deny altogether that He is the Absolute 
Governor of the universe, and to contend that sin is 
something definitely opposed to His will f and something 
which He did not foresee. But Calvin seems laboring under 
the old Gnostic delusion that one relieves God of the 
responsibility for sin by putting several intermediaries 
between Him and it. But the only way of making this 
process really effective is to sever all connection
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between the two; and one can only do this by postulating 
either a Manichaean dualism, or a God who is not 
omnipotent and omniscient. It can never be done by 
putting in any amount of time intervals or subsidiary 
agents.
And after all, why should Calvin fce so particular 
to have Adam possess a different sort of freedom from 
that which is required to fix moral responsibility in 
us? All that is required in our case is that our sin 
be voluntary. The only freedom Calvin will accord to us 
is freedom from coercion. Yet he contends that this is 
sufficient to establish our guilt and justify our condem­ 
nation. But if this is so, why was it not sufficient in 
Adam's case? The very fact that Calvin apparently thinks 
it not to have been, seems to indicate that he only con­ 
siders it so in our case because he believes that ultim­ 
ately our responsibility rests upon a more absolute freedom 
possessed by us in Adam. But if Adam actually possessed
' f •• • . • ^ , • •
no other freedom than we possess, then Calvin will be 
forced to conclude, either that this is sufficient to 




Calvin's whole supposition of the original 
perfections of Adam has no foundation whatever in the 
facts of the case. All he knows about Adam is that 
he was the sort of person who under the circumstances 
of the situation in which he was placed voluntarily 
chose evil instead of good. But since he was created 
by God, the only thing we can conclude is that G-od 
made him just the sort of creature who would act this 
way under these circumstances. And if he is to be 
held morally responsible or accountable for his conduct, 
the only conclusion the facts warrant is that spontaneity 
or the quality of voluntariness is sufficient to ground 
it. If he had been made to sin against his will, he 
could not have been held accountable. He sinned because 
he wanted to, and the fact that God made him the sort of 
person who would want to, does not argue that he deserves 
eternal life instead of destruction. The only question 
to be asked of Adam is whether he sinned because he 
wanted to. If so, it indicates his character, and his 
character indicates his desert. It is so with the clay 
in the hands of the potter: no one contends that the
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vessel of dishonor deserves a place of honor. It 
is so with men.
General Evidence of Pluralism: the Conception of God 
as Ruler and Judge *
It is apparent from these inconsistencies in his 
dealing with the Problem of Evil, that Calvin is not 
a conscious Detenninist, in spite of the deterministic 
trend of his teaching. If he consistently held to his 
cardinal doctrine of Providence, he would be a thorough­ 
going Determinist; but throughout all his theology, in 
spite of his reputation for having developed such a logical 
system, there is an evident vagueness and ambiguity, and 
even a definite conflict of conceptions. The idea of a 
limited freedom appears not only in connection with the 
Fall, but as a sort of haunting spectre through all his 
thought. Calvin is generally not aware of its presence; 
but even when he is most vehemently denouncing it, it 
leers through the very figures of his speech.
We are not so much concerned here with isolated 
paragraphs, as with the whole tenor of his writings, 
Even when he is trying to convince us that the whole 
world is sustained by the power of God, and that hothing
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happens but "by His direction, that the presence of the 
Divine power is Mno less in the perpetual state of the 
world than in its first origin", l) that,
"unless we proceed to his providence, we have 
no correct conception of the meaning of this 
article, 'that God is the Creator 111 , 2)
that,
Hall creatures, above and below, are ready for his 
service, that he may apply them to any use that 
he pleases"; 3)
even when he gives us the impression that he considers 
God the sole ultimate Mover of the universe; there is 
the very definite feeling that he is only thinking of 
God as a glorified Ruler and Judge.
When Calvin in speaking of the subjection of men 
to God, declares*
"Their deliberations, wills, endeavours, and 
powers, are under his control, so that it is 
his option to direct them whithersoever he 
pleases, and to restrain them as often as he 
pleases", 4)
one cannot help asking what in them there is to restrain 
except that which He has Himself created and inspired.
All such language, which implies that we are separate 
from God and that He governs us merely by the external use
Institutes, v. 1, p. 182. (Bk.I., Ch. 16, par 1. } 
Ibid., pp. l82f. (ibid.) ' 
Ibid., p. 191 (Ibid., jar 7.)
4 Institutes, Book 1, ch. 17, par. 6. See also the whole
of Book 1, chs. l6-l8, and Book 2, ch. 4.
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of greater power, fails entirely to do justice to the 
relation of Creator and creature. The reason all 
pluralistic conceptions are inadequate is "because the 
difference between us and God is not one of degree, 
"but of kind. We are not simply influenced by God; 
we are wfcfljly and in every wav dependent upon Him• 
But while Calvin tries to emphasize our dependence, 
one cannot help feeling that he himself never quite 
gets beyond the conception of God as a great King, from 
whom His subjects are really separate, a King who exists in the 
same world with us, and against whom it is the height of 
folly but nevertheless possible to revolt - at least in 
mind. The suggestion of this pluralistic conception 
of God as merely another Being in the realm of our being 
comes out especially in Calvin's attitude towards sin and 
punishment,-and strangely enough, even 
in that part of it which deals with what might "be con­ 
sidered by some his most deterministic doctrine*- that of 
Election.
Erroneous Defence of Election.
In his defence of Election, Calvin often speaks of 
it as though it were selection; and such a mode of thought 
is inherent in the whole traditional idea of God's mercy.
ELECTION.
Calvin maintains:
"There will, therefore, be no contradiction 
in our affirming, that according to the good 
pleasure of his will, God chooses whom he will 
as his children, irrespective of all merit, 
while he rejects and reprobates others. Yet, 
for the sake of further satisfaction, the 
matter may be explained in the following 
manner: They ask how it happens, that of 
two persons distinguished from each other 
by no merit, Goc^ in his ejection f leaves 
one and takes another. I, on the other hand, 
ask them, whether they suppose, him that is 
taken to possess anything that can attract 
the favour of God. If they confess that he has 
not, as indeed they must, it will follow, 
that God looks not at man, but derives his 
motive to favour him from his own goodness. 
God f s ejection of one man, therefore,, while 
he re.lects another, proceeds not from any respect 
of man f but solely from his own mercy; which 
may freely display and exert itself wherever 
and whenever it -pleases, l)
Calvin agrees with Augustine that:
"The whole mass of mankind having fallen 
into condemnation in the first man, the 
vessels that are formed from it to honey, are not 
vessels of personal righteousness, but of 
Divine mercy; and the formation of others 
to dishonor, is to be attributed, not to 
iniquity, but to the Divine decree. 11 2)
And he himself remarks:
"The Lord, therefore, may give grace to whom 
he will, because he is merciful, and yet not 
give it to all, because he is a just judge; may 
manifest his free grace, by giving to some 
what they never deserve, while, by not giving
1)op£M-U,3ook III, ch. 23, par. 10. Underlining mine.
2) Institutes, Book III, ch. 23, par. 11.
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H to all, he declares the demerit of all*" l) 
But what place has all this in connection with 
the Calvinistic doctrines of Creation and Providence? 
Calvin speaks here as if God were making his election 
from creatures already in existence, and not only already 
in existence, but already in sin; whereas according to 
his own profession, it is an eternal decree, made in the
secret recesses of the Divine Will before man was ever
2) 
created.
Calvin only increases the difficulties of his defence 
of the doctrine by not clearly perceiving the full import 
of it. Augustine is wise enough to see that if we attri­ 
bute God's election of some from among those who are al­ 
ready in condemnation, not to any merit in themselves, but 
to God's mercy, we must attribute His rejection of the others, 
not to their iniquity, but to His Divine decree* But 
Calvin is determined to defend the whole procedure on 
the grounds of a combination of justice and mercy.
But now it should be clear that if there is admittedly 
no difference between men, God can have no reasonable 
grounds for discriminating between them. Calvin seems
1) Op*c'it-,par. 11.
2) Institutes, op. cit., ch.21, par. 5*
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to suppose that because on Ms theory the punishment 
meted out to those rejected in the Divine election is 
only that already due to them as sinners, there can be 
no question of its justice. But the whole point is that 
these rejected ones deserve this punishment no r^ore than 
those excused from it; and that if there is no ground for 
discrimination in the individuals themselves, the discrim­ 
ination is unjust: so that God must either forgive all, 
or condemn all, or else be unjust to those who are re­ 
jected - who merit salvation just as much as those who 
gain it. Their original defection may be just ground for 
their punishment, if we are to consider the matter from the 
standpoint of a judgment; but it can certainly not be 
in any sense the ground for their rejection in the election 
of some to eternal life. If as Calvin maintains, the 
reason for the Divine election is to be found solely in 
God, it follows inevitably that the reason for rejection 
must be found there also; and that if there is no refer­ 
ence to the merits of man in election, there can likewise 
be none in rejection.
But the motive of mercy in God, which Calvin 
maintains is the sole basis of Divine election, cannot 
possibly be the basis of God's discriminating between
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two men of equal guilt. There is nothing in the sub­ 
jective motives of mercy and justice which makes a dis­ 
tinction between the men elected and those rejected. 
Pure will, in itself, even though it be the -Divine Will, 
cannot be the grounds of a decision in a rational universe. 
God must have some reason for willing as He does. And 
in the situation supposed this reason must have regard 
to some Divinely discernible differences between men. 
But Calvin denies the existence of any such differences, 
or that the Divine decision has any reference to them. 
Therefore, since there is absolutely no way out of the 
situation which he supposes, we must conclude that this 
whole supposed situation is an entirely erroneous one. 
And such on the basis of Calvin 1 s fundamental presupposi­ 
tions it can be shown to be»
What Calvin should have seen was that if, as he 
maintains, God's election was from all eternity, men 
were not as Augustine depicted them, in a condition of 
sin and condemnation at the time of election, - they 
were not even created. The whole difficulty which 
Calvin is trying to get around is one which logically 
has no place at all in the Calvinistic system. For the 
Calvinistic position is simply that God makes no
ELECTION.
selection "between already existing individuals I 
He merely creates individuals for specific ends. And 
since this involves no discrimination "between existing 
persons, it cannot "be accused of injustice on that 
score; though it may have to meet other criticisms.
Calvin, however, is wedded tb the idea of punishment 
as a basic fact of God's relation to men. The wicked 
are damned in "punishment for their sin3 t and God is 
the righteous Judge who condemns their disobedience. 
He proudly acknowledges:
"I everywhere teach, that no one perishes but 
by the just judgment of God. 11 l)
But while it is certainly true that God never 
allows the righteous to perish, but only consigns the 
wicked to destruction, it appears from what has just been 
said with regard to Election, that the fate of the wicked 
cannot in the last analysis be considered as punishment 
for their wickedness, - simply because according to the 
Calvinistic view, both their wickedness and their 
destruction rest upon God's eternal decree. From His 
standpoint, therefore, the basic explanation of the 
whole proceeding cannot be that of punishment, but
l) "Calvin's Calvinism," Part 11., p. 117.
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must rather be that of means and end.
The idea of punishment and judgment is an essentially 
pluralistic conception, and implies a separation between 
Creator and creature which is not warranted by a con­ 
sistent statement of the Calvinistic conception of 
Providence.
The Source of Difficulty: Dependence upon Scripture; 
the Two Conceptions of (rod.
The real source of the difficulty, however, in 
Calvin's theology goes back to his complete dependence
upon Scripture, and to the fact that he unconsciously
different
takes over from the Bible the/conceptions of God which
run through the whole of both the Old and the 
Testaments. There, on the one hand, we find God as 
the omnipotent and omniscient Creator and Governor of 
the Universe; on the other, we find Him as a very power­ 
ful, but not omnipotent, 3?orce for Righteousness. In all 
probability the second conception is but a paring down of 
the first; but neither seems to supplant the other, and 
we find the two side by side throughout the whole of the 
Bible, "^ and throughout the whole of subsequent Christian
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theology, as well. Yet they are distinct and con­ 
tradictory conceptions, and consequently, cannot "both 
be true on the same level of reality* But the Hebrew 
writers are continually interchanging them on the same 
pages of Scripture; and Christian theologians have 
inherited the custom.
"In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth;" 
all the nations of the world are His: the evil of Joseph's 
brethren serves His purposes; the obstinacy of the 
Egyptians is in perfect accord with His ends; the 
Chaldeans, the Assyrians, the Persians, are but His tools, 
the instruments of His wrath; Cyrus is His an/iointed; 
Nebuchadnezzar is His servant; all men are but as clay 
in His hands; the heaven declare His glory, and the 
firmament showeth His handiwork; He can do all things, and 
no purpose of His can be restrained; no man can come unto 
Christ, "except it be given unto him of the Father"; and 
all which the Father giveth shall come unto Christ; "all 
things work together for good, to them that are called 
according to His purpose"; seeing that "whom he foreknew, 
he also foreordained to be conformed to the image of his 
Son, —— and whom he foreordained, them he also called; 
and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he
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justified, them he also glorified"! even as he chose 
them in Christ "before the foundation of the world, —— 
having foreordained them unto adoption as sons through 
Jesus Christ unto himself, according to the good pleasure 
of his will; because in God Hwe live, and move, and have 
our "being"; "for of him, and through him, and to him, are 
all things"; He is the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning 
and the end, the first and the last; and He shall be all 
in all. Now these expressions are all Biblical and all 
deterministic.
But side by side with them we find others to the effect 
that man revolted against God at the instigation of the 
devil; that God had to destroy all His human creatures 
but those preserved in the Ark, because they were evil; 
that God was continually struggling with Israel, a way­ 
ward people in the wilderness, an idolatrous one after 
they were settled in Canaan; that He was ever striving 
to restrain them from oppressing their weaker brethren, 
from injustice, from running after the effeminate luxuries 
of their heathen neighbours; that He sent His prophets 
to them with little or no avail; that in the end He 
sent His Son, and Him they killed; but in spite of all 
this, that God wills not the destruction of any but that
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all might be saved. The picture is always one of a 
righteous God, wooing a sinful people, now entreating 
them, now chastening them, now conferring His favors 
upon them; and they are ever turning away from Him and 
disobeying Him, returning to Him occasionally for healing, 
but turning again to follow their own ways, which are not 
His ways. It runs continually through the prophets, in 
Isaiah, Amos, Hosea. We find it again in the New 
Testament in the thought of God sending His Son into 
the world as an evidence of His love to all, as a last 
and supreme attempt to win men to His kindly rule. It 
underlies the thought of His eventually destroying the 
wicked and finally establishing His universal reign; for 
this is the language of a definite pluralism in which 
God is merely the strongest factor, who, unable to succeed 
by persuasion, finally resorts to conquest. The world is 
beyond His control and does not move in accord with His 
slightest wish; and men are other than His agents. His 
supremacy may never be threatened; His absolute rule 
may be reestablished; but there are other wills in the 
world than His, wills which are independent of His will, 
and which are most often contrary to it.




Strangely enough, however, this latter is not the 
picture of God which we find in Pau?.; nor is it the one 
we find dominant in the teachings of Our Lord. With 
all His witness to the love of the Father, Jesus seldom, 
if ever, gives us the impression that any act of God's 
is futile. Especially is this true if we look to His 
teachings in the Fourth Gospel. As a matter of fact, in 
spite of its prevalence in Christian theology, this is not, 
I thini, the dominant teaching of the Scriptures at all; 
though, of course, one's opinion on this point may "be 
largely affected "by personal temperament and a personal 
scale of religious values. Some; people seem $o be of an 
indeterminist temperament, and they find Christianity in 
accord with their desires. Others have no longing for a 
"William James universe 11 , and they find the glory and 
majesty and power of God shining from every page of Holy 
Writ and evidencing itself in every event of daily life. 
Both conceptions are to "be found in Scripture, - probably
because the writers, like other men, were of different
w 
types and temperaments, had different religions experiences,
and occasionally, - again like other men, - themselves 
changed from one view to another according ais they were
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impressed "by different aspects of life.
One thing is clear: neither the Hebrews nor the 
early Christians could understand the existence of evil 
in a world created "by a good God. Job, the Psalmist, 
and Isaiah, may have occasionally struck a very hold 
note; "but they were all loath to place the responsibility 
for sin upon the Creator, and generally it is shifted to 
the creature in a fashion similar to that in the 3rd chapter 
of Genesis. But how the responsibility for it can rest 
solely upon the creature in a world created and governed 
by an omnipotent and omniscient God, is a matter they 
could never decide. It would perhaps be safe to say that 
the dominant conception of God in the Scriptures is the 
deterministic one of an Omnipotent and Omniscient Sovereign 
whose purposes are sure of fulfilment, and that the 
indeterministic element here, as in Calvin, comes in only 
as an incomplete and inharmonious answer to the difficulty 
felt in connection with the problem of evil. Neither 
element is carried to its logical extreme; but because 
the latter leads ultimately in a thoroughly rational 
universe to a cosmological dualism which is at variance with




Christian writers, it cannot "be looked upon as other
than the minor and secondary element in their religious 
thought.
Calvin, of course, following Augustine, stressed 
the deterministic element; "but, as we have seen, he 
could never quite free himself from the other as well. 
Striving to systematize the teaching of Scripture, he was 
aware of the same difficulty which had puzzled the 
Palestinian writers, and he attempts to push it as far 
"back as possible. But he can never eliminate it; and 
perhaps he never quite clearly perceived the distinction 
between the two conceptions, and their contradictory 
character. He is certainly unable to reconcile them. 
But his complete dependence upon Scripture is probably 
what prevents him seeing the full force of the contra­ 
diction. For him the teaching of Scripture was a unity. 
Apparent inconsistencies were only apparent; they could 
not be real. If we could not solve the difficulties pre­ 
sented, it was only because we could not pierce the veil 
of the Divine mysteries. God had given us in His Word 
all the truth it was well for us to know. It was definitely
l) One is not entering here into the controversy as to 
exactly at what date in Hebrew history the monotheistic 
conviction prevailed; it certainly prevailed in later 
times and was the point of view from which until recently 
the whole of the Old Testament was interpreted*
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wrong for us to "be curious to learn more than He had 
seen fit to reveal. One thing was certain: nothing 
which He had revealed could possibly be untrue. There­ 
fore Calvin inherited both elements of the Scriptural 
teaching and struggled with them as best he could. To 
one of them he gave his heart's completest allegiance; 
but loyalty to God and his Christian faith forced him to 
retain the other as well. However often he may be just 
on the point of boldly declaring that God is perfectly 
able to bear the responsibility for sin Himself, feeling 
forced to this declaration by the logic of his own 
argument, he yet never quite goes so far; and we find 
him elsewhere qualifying his position by returning to
what was also his inherited conviction, namely, that sin
God, 
must be the act of the creature alone, since,/being
wholly good, could not possibly be its author. He 
subordinates this latter as much as possible. He tries 
to believe that it is all of a piece with God's absolute 
sovereignty; but he can never quite make it so. God 
the author of all things - except sin: that is as far 
as he can go. The motive for making sin thte one exception 
is perfectly plain. But how it can be so, is a question 
Calvin never clearly answers.
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Attempt at Reconciliation* A Mechanic and HlH
Calvin attempts to reconcile the conflicting ele­ 
ments of his theology, and the two conceptions of God 
which he has inherited from Hebrew thought, by resorting 
to that peculiar orthodox combination of God's tram - 
8<senfflence and immanence by which God creates the world. 
and then in His providence is forever interfering with 
its natural movement, - a view which resembles nothing 
so much as the idea of a mechanic who is always 'tinkering 
with the machine which he has made. According to this 
conception God neither makes the world (by which we mean 
not just the physical 'world 1 , but the whole world of 
human affairs) so it will run properly of its own accord, 
nor is He continually working out His purposes through 
every part of it to the same extent. Calvin would have 
us believe that the laws of Nature more the laws of God, 
but God must step in and act directly at times - simply 
because Nature is apparently an inadequate expression of 
His will, and consequently, without His guiding hand the 
world would not go as it should. Calvin concurs in the 
assertion of Augustine that
"God retains, hidden in himself, the causes of 
some of his actions, which He has not inter­ 




"These causes He brings out to their effects; 
not by that, operation of his providence, by 
which He has appointed certain natures and 
their powers to be, and to act; but by that 
operation, by which He rules and directs, as 
He will, the creatures that He has made* 11 l)
But why the world will not run properly of its own 
accord after God has made it, is not clear. And neither 
is it at all clear how a God to whom Time has no direct 
significance, - to whom Past and Future are always 
Present, - can Himself participate in the activities 
of a world which is in Time; nor is it clear how, if 
He does participate in its activities, its whole 
movement is not as much His direct activity as any part. 
If all events depend upon the ^Hyine decree, it is 
difficult to see how God can be in any cue of them more 
than in all others, And it is extremely difficult to 
see how it can be the nature of things to 'go wrong*, 
if God is the one ultimately responsible for the 'nature 
of things'. If we adhere to the idea of the Pall, as it 
is presented to us in orthodox theology, the only explan­ 
ation of history consistent with Calvinism seems to be 
the contention that God creates, overthrows, and redeems 
at least a part of that which He has Himself overthrown. 
1)"Calvin's Calvinism"., Part II., p, 27.
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CONCLUSION.
The conclusion we must come to is that Calvin, 
through his dual approach to theology, "becomes 
involved in a fundamental inconsistency with regard to 
the Problem of Evil, which with his complete dependence 
on Scripture prevents him from ever reconciling the 
dual conception of God which runs through all the Bible 
and all Christian theology: so that his system of 
thought contains definitely indeterministic elements 
in spite of the marked trend of his major doctrines 
toward Determinism.
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THE SOURCES CF_aAXVI^ f S TEACHING.
The Bible.
Calvin's dependence upon the Bible is a matter 
that needs no argument, and the burden of proof certainly 
rests upon any who would contend that the dependence is 
not genuine. Calvin professes a supremely high regard 
for Scripture, and the Yhole of his work bears out his 
profession. At the very beginning of the Institutes he 
contends that man cannot know himself unless he alsoi)
knows Godj and later he declares that man cannot know 
God truly apart from the Scriptures; for he says,
"The Scripture, collecting in our minds the 
otherwise confused notions of Deity, dispels 
the darkness, and gives us a clear view 
of the true God." 2)
And he concurs in what he declares to be the testimony 
of the Word itself,
"that the Scripture discovers God to us as the 
ureator of tne world, and declares wh-.it senti­ 
ments we should form of him, that we may not 
be seeking after a deity in a labyrinth of un­ 
certainty." 3)
going so far as to affirm that
"no man can have the least knowledge or true 
and sound doctrine, without having been a 
disciple of the Scripture." 4)
l) Institutes, Book I, ch. 1. 
2i.-*n& 3) Ibid., ch. 6, par. 1. 
4) Ibid., par. 2.
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His whole theology is merely an attempt to 
systematize u.i;e teaching of the Bible under one iour 
iieaas or Uie ApostieS 1 Ureea. He beeics uo substantiate 
every one of his doctrines, relating to the Father* 
the Son, the Holy Spirit, and tiie Churcn, u^, ^j.ear 
prv/ois iron one woru, cuiu o^e pa&es ox nib writings 
are filled with Biblical references. That he does not 
just use Scripture to commend to other people doctrines 
which he has derived from other sources, is made fairly 
evident "by his contention that in it is revealed all tha 
it is necessary or useful for man to know and that all 
desire to pry into matters not herein revealed is idle 
and sinful curiosity. His position is that one must 
believe all that is taught in Scripture and never go
beyond the teaching of Scripture on matters with which
1)
it deals at all. In the of his treatises he re­
marks
"I do not so approach (God's Secret Counsel) as 
to wish, by an insolent curiosity to search into 
those tilings which God wills to keep deeply 
hidden in himself. But that which the Scrip­ 
ture openly declares, I embrace with a sure 
faith, and look upon with reverence."
1) Def. of Secret Prov. of God, "Calvin's Calvinism," 
Part 2. See also Institutes, Book 3, ch. 21. In the
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There can be little doubt, I think, but that 
Calvin's doctrines are to be found in Scriptures. It 
is plainly the teaching of the Bible that God is the 
Creator and Governor of the world, and the common accept­ 
ance of all Christians through the ages of the doctrines of 
'Creation and Providence in so.ne form or other is ample 
proof that Calvin's profession to derive them from Scrip­ 
ture is neither a pose nor a peculiarity. There may be 
some question with regard to Calvin's strict form of the 
doctrine of Providence, and many Christians may be doubt­ 
ful as to|whether or not the Bible teaches that every 
event is decreed by God; but individual texts in support 
of this teaching are not wanting, as a glance at the 
marginal references in chapter XVI of the. First Book of 
the Institutes will show. The Hebrews very definitely 
believed that
"Congregation on Election", "Calvinism by Calvin", he 
declares:
"As soon as God has broken up the road we must 
stop there at once. And thus let us know it be­ 
longs to God to declare to us, what he wishes 
to be known and manifest; and to us it belongs, 
to receive it with all humility, and so to en­ 
quire no farther*" (pp. 90, 91).
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"The earth is the Lord's,
and the fulness thereof; 
The world, and they that dwell therein." l)
If any one doubts this, let him reread the Book of Job; 
and if he feels that there is still no warrant for such 
a view in the New Testament, let him again carefully 
consult the Epistle to the Romans. The Hebrews and 
the early Christians very definitely felt that the 
world and men were dependent upon God,.and that such 
apparent mishaps as the invasions of enemies and the un­ 
belief of Israel were matters which served some purpose 
of Divine Providence; while the Master Himself taught 
that even such comparatively insignificant matters as 
the fall of sparrows and the number of the hairs of one f s 
head were things not too small for the concern and dir­ 
ection of our Father.
When it comes to trie' doctrine of Total Depravity 
3. 30 :>} ]>i2.-ay people raay feel that here surely Calvin ha.s 
little Scriptural ground to stand upon. But to think 
this is to forget the 51st Psalm, the history of 
Israel in the wilderness, with the defection even of 
I/iOses,and all their subsequent depravity, the cruci­ 
fixion of our Lord, together with certain assertions of
1) Psalms 24:1.
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Paul in the Epistles to the Ephesians,to the Romans, and 
to the Corinthians? and the words of Jesus in the 6th 
chapter of John (vv.40,65) \&. the effect that no man could 
^eHieVe in Him except God gave him special grace.
And with regard to the doctrine of Irresistible 
Grace, we find Jesus in the same chapter of John saying,
"All that which the Father giTeth me shall come 
unto me; and him that cometh to me I vd.ll in 
no wise cast out." (John 6:37)
The conversion of Paul (Acts 9) is- a, car^e in point; 
pnd God's 'promise to give a new heart to r!!s people and 
to put T-Ii s Spirit within them to cause then to walk in 
His statutes, is also substantiation for the Calvinistic 
view.. But it is impossible to go over all the particular 
passages. If one questions the Scriptural foundations of
i
Calvinism he must study the Institutes and the particular 
treatises and note for, himself Calvin f s use of texts and 
see if he quotes enough of them, correctly interprets 
them, ani really does draw his doctrine from them.
If one doubts the Calvinistic doctrine of. Gratuitous1 •*
Justification, let him try to refute it from Paul's 
Epistles to the Romans and to the Galatians; and the 
exercise may convince him that not only are there certain
Scriptural difficulties in the way of the refutation-, but
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that there are some definite teac'iiM^G ->-° ?>•,:! 'h'.ch see'i 
to support the position of Calvin. And the same may "be 
said for the Calvinistic doctrines of Good Works and 
Prayer, though the latter of these is a minor doctrine
and ,-iore in need of ^lisniiient vdlh the jonsr,-,! 
sy<rbe:i th,i:i ;i:.i ^ctii.^l :vilvr-,rh re1 it ,
doctrine of Jood T.7orks» however, I think, will he found 
to he strictly Pauline.
The pe^l test for Calvinism comes, though? i i the 
consideration of the doctrine of Predestination. Most 
Christians will have little complaint as to the Biblical 
grounds of the other doctrines so long as they are not 
carried to the extent of supporting this doctrine of 
God's eternal election of some to eternal life and the 
rejection of others to damnation.
It can scarcely "be denied* however, that there is
V
the very evident teaching of election in the Bible. But 
a good many people would limit it to the Divine election 
of a nation or a tribe. That Israel throughout is 
considered a chosen people, an elect nation, cannot be 
overlooked by anyone. It may be explained away as merely 
the opinion of the Israelites; but it is nevertheless 
most clearly the teaching of the Bible. The whole history
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of Abraham, of Isaac, of Jacob, is a history of God's 
narrowing election. One may point out with Paul that it 
was not the election of a people to eternal life but mere­ 
ly to outward privileges. But the privileges were spiri­ 
tual opportunities and religious privileges, and they 
must have had some effect upon the individual's chances 
of eternal life. The knowledge of God and of His law, 
presented as peculiar to the Hebrews, would not be worth­ 
less. If Israel were in any sense chosen by God above 
other nations for the gift of true religious knowledge, 
this is a piece of Divine discrimination quite along the 
same line as the more extreme personal election to eternal 
life itself.
In the prophets one does find the foreshadowing of 
a time when the whole people, or at least a remnant,shall 
be led by God into the ways of Moral perfection; but the 
whole tone of the Old Testament is so national and 
"worldly" that one would not expect to find there in 
clear detail the distinctly Christian doctrine of indiv­ 
idual salvation through personal faith. The real 
question is: Is this also a matter of Divine election, 
or does it depend upon the individual's own free choice?
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To find an answer to this question we shall have to look 
to the Hew Testament,
One does not have to read far in some of Paul's 
Epistles before he comes across what certainly appears 
to be this doctrine. At the very beginning of Ephesians 
(chapter 1, verses 3-5) we find these words:
"Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus 
Christ, who hath blessed us with every spiritual 
blessing in the heavenly places in Christ: even 
as he chose us in him before the foundation of 
the world, that we should be holy and without 
blemish before him in love: haying foreordained 
us unto adoption as sons through Jesus Christ 
unto himself 9 according to the good pleasure of 
his will*" 1)
And in 2 Timothy 1:8,9, we find Paul saying to his young 
disciples
"Be not ashamed therefore of the testimony of our 
Lord, nor of me his prisoner: but suffer hard­ 
ship with the gospel according to the power of 
God; who saved us, and called us with a holy call­ 
ing, not according to our works, but according 
to his own purpose and grace, which was given us 
in Christ Jesus before times eternal." 2)
And in the 9th chapter of Romans (14-21) we read:
"What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness 
with God? God forbid. For he saith to Moses, 
I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will 
have compassion on whom I have compassion. So 
then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him 
that runneth, but of God that hath mercy. For
l)»2)» Quoted from the American Revised Version.
Italics mine. So throughout this part of the 
chapter*
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the Scripture siath unto Pharaoh, For this very 
purpose did I raise thee up, that I might show in 
thee my power, and that my name might "be published 
abroad in all the earth. So then he hath mercy on 
whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Thou 
wilt say unto me, Why doth he still find fault? 
For who withstandeth his will? Nay but, 0 man* 
who art thoti that repliest against God? Shall 
the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why 
didst thou make me thus? Or hath not the potter a 
right over the clay, from the same lump to make one 
part a vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor? 11
And again in Romans 11:33-36, Paul says:
"0 the depth of the riches "both of the wisdom and 
the knowledge of GodJ' how unsearchable are his 
judgments, and his ways past tracing out I For who 
hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been 
his counsellor? or who hath first given to him, and 
it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him, 
and through him, and unto him, are all things* To 
him be the ^psxry for ever. Amen."
And in 1 Corinthians 1:26-31 we read:
"For behold your calling, brethren, that not many 
wise after the flesh, not many mighty, not many 
noble, are called: but God chose the foolish 
things of the world, that he might put to shame 
them that are wise; and God chose the weak things 
of the world, that he might put to shame the things 
that are strong; and the base things of the world, 
and the things that are despised, did God choose, 
yea and the things that are not, that he might 
bring to nought the things that are: that no 
flesh should glory before God. But of him are ye 
in Christ Jesus, wno was made unto us wisdom from 
God, and righteousness and sanctit'ication, and re­ 
demption: that accorain& as it is written, He 
that glorieth, let, him glory in the Lord. ft
Again, Paul commends himself to Titus (chapter 1, verse 1)
DEPEHDEBTCE OH SCRIPTURE. 195
as
a
"Paul,/servant of God, and an apostle of Jesus 
Christ, according to the faith of god's elect**
And he is forever speaking of his own apostleship as due 
to God's special grace.
To show that such phrases are not peculiar to Paul 
among the apostles, let us look at Peter's salutation in 
his first Epistle. He "begins his writing with the words:
"Peter, an apostle of Jesus Christ, to the elect 
who are sojourners of the Dispersion in Pontus, 
Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia, accord­ 
ing to the foreknowledge of God the Father, in 
sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and 
sprinkling of the "blood of Jesus Christ: Grace 
to you and peace be multiplied."
But now someone may say that these are only casual 
phrases taken out of their context and that they do not 
really mean what they are interpreted to mean. It is 
really not a question of interpretation when one considers 
such expressions by themselves. They very definitely 
express what may be cmlled a Predestinarian view of God's 
relation to men in Christ, and one wonders how such a 
view could be more clearly expressed. Yet it is true 
that one must look at the whole of a man's teaching to 
make sure that some other meaning is not attached to the 
words than the one which they appear to have when taken
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by themselves. But if one looks at the teaching of Paul 
as a whole, he will discovert I think, that these are not 
just chance expressions which do not really disclose the 
apostle's true view. The whole Pauline doctrine of sal­ 
vation by grace, which is the core of Romans and Galatians, 
and the background for all the other epistles, is one which 
is in perfect harmony with the doctrine of Predestination. 
In fact the logic of gratuitous salvation seems to force 
Paul to Predestination, whether he ever gave verbal expression 
t3 the latter doctrine or not.
But if there is any question of the fact that Paul 
did actually give verbal expression to the doctrine of 
Predestination, one is led to inquire how it is possible 
to express the doctrine any more clearly and succinctly 
than in the following passage from the 8th chapter of
Romans (28-33):
"And we know that to them that love God all things 
work together for good, even to them that are 
called according to his purpose. For whom he 
foreknew, he also foreordained to be conformed to 
the image of his Son, that he might be the first 
born among many brethren: and whom he fpreordained§ 
them he also called; and whom he called, them he 
also justified: and whom he justified, them he also 
glorified. What shall we say to these things? 
If God is for us, who is against us? He that 
spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for
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us all, how shall he not also with him freely give 
us all things? Who shall lay anything^to the 
charge of Sod's elect? It is God that justifieth."
Calvin's formulation of the doctrine may be more 
detailed than Paul's; but the germ of it is certainly to 
be discovered in Paul. And regardless of what one may 
think, the Pauline Epistles are still in the Hew Testament, 
and thus conformity with their teaching gives some claim to 
a doctrine's being Biblical.
However, if one wished to distinguish between Paul's 
theology and our Lord's on this point, he would do well to 
consider some of the sayings of the Master* For instance 
the following:
"Ho man can come to me, except the Father that sent 
me draw him; and I will raise him up in the last 
day." (John 6:44);
"For this cause have I said unto you, that no man can 
come unto me, except it be given unto him of the 
Father." (John 6:65);"I pray not for the world, 
but for those whom thou hast given me; for they are 
thine. 1* (John 17:9); "KTeither did this man sin, nor 
his parents; but that the works of God should be made 
manifest in him." (John 9:3).
And the author of the Fourth Gospel himself says in 
trying to explain the Jews' rejection of Christ:
"But though he had done so many signs before them, yet 
they believed not on him: that the word of Isaiah the 
prophet might be fulfilled, which he spake, 
Lord, who hath believed our report? 
And to whom hath the arm of the Lord
been revealed? 
For this cause they could not believe, for that : '
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Isaiah said again*
He hath blinded their eyes, and
he hardened their heart; 
Lest they should see with their eyes,
and perceive with their heart * 
And should turn* 
And I should heal them.
These things said Isaiah, because he saw his glory; 
and he spake of him. 11 (John 12:37-41)
But, lest some one should say that this is merely 
the idea of the author of the Fourth Gospel, and not 
at all the true mind of Christ, let us notice two sayings 
of Jesus recorded by ISffatthew. In Matthew 13:10-17 we 
read:
"And the disciples came, and said unto him, Why 
speakest thou unto them in parables? And he 
answered and said unto them, Unto you it is given to 
know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to 
them it is not given. • For whosoever-hath not, from 
him shall be taken away even that which he hath. 
Therefore speak I to them in parables; because 
seeing they see not, and hearing they near not, 
neither do they understand. And unto them is 
fulfilled the prophecy of Isaiah, which saith,
By hearing ye shall hear, and shall 
in no wise understand;
And seeing ye shall see, and shall 
in no wise perceive:
For this people's heart is waxed gross,
And their ears are dull of hearing,
And their eyes they have closed;
Lest haply they should perceive with their 
eyes,
And hear with their ears,
And understand with their heart,
And should turn again,
And I should heal them.
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But blessed are your eyes* lor tney see| and your 
ears* for they hear. For verily I say unto you* 
that many prophets ana righteous men desired to see 
the things which ye see* and saw them not; and to 
hear the things which ye hear, and heard them not."
And in Matthew 15:13 Jesus says*
"Every plant which my heavenly Father planted not* 
shall be rooted up."
In the former of these passages from Matthew we have 
Jesus 1 own interpretation of the same prophecy,/of Isaiah 
which John has applied to His rejection, and however much 
of sad irony there may be in the reference to his teaching 
in parables, it yet shows that the Master Himself felt that 
the ultimate explanation.went back to the decrees of the 
Father.
And that this vievr of God's relation to the affairs 
of the Ysforld was the one held in the early Church is 
shown by a few passages from the Acts. To begin with* in 
the 2nd chapter (verses 22-25), Peter says:
"Ye men of Israel, hear these words: Jesus of 
Nazareth* a man approved of God unto you by mighty 
works and wonders and signs which God did by him 
in the midst of you, even as ye yourselves know; 
him, being delivered up by the determinate counsel 
and foreknowledge of God, ye by the hand of law- 
less men did crucify and slay."
In the 13th chapter, the 48th verse, we read:
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"And as the Gentiles heard this* they were glad, and 
glorified the word of God: and as many as were 
ordained to eternal life believed*"
And again, in the 14th verse of the 16th chapter:
"And a certain woman named Lydia, a seller of purple, 
of the city of Thyatira, one that worshipped God, 
heard us: whose heart the Lord opened to give heed 
unto the things which were spoken by Paul*"
AUU. in tne 28tii chapter, tixe 2btn uiroug.u "one <!sth verses, 
we find that Paul interprets the a"bove quoted passage from 
Isaiah in exactly the same spirit as our Lord and John. 
The Fault of Calvin f s attitude toward the Scriptures*
It would seem, then, that there is, after all, some 
Biblical ground for Calvin's doctrines,!) and that there 
is a strong prima facie case for the genuineness of his 
profession of dependence upon the Scriptures. It is 
impossible for us to determine definitely whether he was 
trying to systematize the teaching of the Bible, or was 
trying to make the Bible support his teachings. In all 
probability, he, like every other professedly . orthodox 
theologian, was trying to do both. There is no reason at 
all to suppose that he formed his opinions previously and 
then came to the B'ible to secure its confirmation. The 
whole evidence of the Institutes, Tracts, a.nd Commentaries,
l) Those of the Church and State have already been 
&fently considered, and they are not of any great 
t&np$ for the argument anyway, the real "bone of contention" 
"feeing the doctrine of Predestination.
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indicates the extent of his Bible study, and it is most 
unnatural to suppose that this study had no effect upon the 
forming of his ideas. Doubtless there are other influences 
in his thought, as we shall see; but as has already been 
pointed out, there is ample support for his doctrines in 
the Scriptures, and the very fact that he is so careful 
to secure their aid in the proof of his points, and often 
times rests his whole case upon their teaching, seems to 
indicate that this was done not just for effect upon a 
generation which knew comparatively little about them,, 
and often cared, less, but from a genuine desire to have his 
views conform to those of the Bible.
As a matter of fact his dependence upon the teaching 
of the Scripture, and his conviction with regard to its 
unity, forces certain difficulties upon him, from which 
he would .be free otherwise. For instance there are 
certain texts which it is extremely difficult to fit 
into his scheme. But never once does he belittle the 
authority of God's Word. Sometimes he is forced, in 
consequence, to do a great deal of twisting of texts. 
But he gladly twists them rather than consciously acknow­ 
ledge any discrepancy in Go-d's Word. The doubtful point
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is not regarding the contention that his own doctrines are 
Scriptural, "but regarding his conviction that all the texts 
of Scripture may be fitted into an harmonious whole. He 
is undoubtedly guilty at times of trying to hammer a square 
text into a round hole, - and sometimes there is nothing 
at all left of the text when he is through with it. For 
example, in Book III., ch.19, paragraph 15 of the Institutes, 
in trying to explain
s injunction xo obey magistrates 'not oru.y 
i or wrath, but also for conscience* sa>:e ri! ,
he real.ly snovrs , not tn?,t Paul means what he should mean, 
but that from a consideration of reason and other texts of 
Scripture what Paul apparently meant is not true. Which, 
only on the assumption that Paul could ndt make a mistake 
about anything, is the same as showing that his opponents'
interpretation of this text, which is the natural one, is
*
incorrect. Calvin's whole point here is that his opponent's 
interpretation cannot be correct, for it" it is Paul's 
statement is patently false: but Paul's statements must "be 
true 5 therefore Paul :nust raean something other th^n Vie 
text seems to say. .
As a matter of fact, it would appear that Calvin, 
doubtless unwittingly, denies the verbal inerrancy of the
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Scriptures when, in the same "book of the Institutes,chapter 
24, paragraph 9, he is referring to Jesus 1 assertion that 
none of His sheep is lost but the son of r.rriition'; for 
he there remarks: : .
"Here is, indeed, some inaccuracy of expression* 
"but the meaning is clear* For he was never
reckoned among the sheep of Christ, as "being really 
such, "but only as he occupied the place of one."
Thus he presumes to criticise either the words of our Lord
•
or of His recorder as inaccurate in themselves, "because they 
do not mean exactly what according to Calvin 1 s view they 
must mean. But he expresses himself as being convinced 
that this is actually what the Lord 'meant to say, - even if 
His words (as reported) were not well chosen* And in 
paragraph 16 of the same chapter we have him trying to 
"get round" Paul's assertion that
"God will have all men to "be saved" 
and Peter's that
"the Lord is not vailing that any should perish, 
but that all should come to repentance."
The context of the former of these may indicate that Paul is 
here speaking,
"not of individuals, but of orders of men," 
as Calvin contends; and, if so, this probably does destroy
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the force of the text as a weapon for his opponents, l) 
But his assertion that this text
"must he explained in a manner consistent with 
another, where God says, f l will be gracious to 
whom I will be gracious, and I will show mercy 
on whom I will show mercy'"»
is something which itself requires proof, and seems in no 
case to be of much effect, since this text in itself might 
very well mean that God may choose to save all, and that if 
He should, it would be nobody else's concern. And surely, 
when he takes up Peter's statement and begins to explain it 
by saying that
"the second clause furnishes an immediate solution 
of this difficulty; for the willingness that they 
should come to repentance must be understood in 
consistence with the general tenor of Scripture",
and then proceeds to try to show (something which the 
texts he quotes scarcely make beyond reasonable doubt) 
that (God most certainly does not will that all should 
come to repentance, it appears as if all he had succeeded 
in doing was to refute the text itself and show that it 
simply is not true that
"the Lord is not willing that any should perish, 
but that all should eouie to repentance."
l) For a different treatment of this text, see Calvin's 
"Answer to a Libel against Predestination" in a 
volume of his sermons, translated by John Fielde, 
and published in London in 1579.
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We have a similiar instance of Calvin's interpre­ 
tation of difficult texts, in Book 11., chapter b, yara- 
j.3, wiiex e ne bays:
"some other passages also are frequently objected., 
which show that God sometimes tries men by with­ 
drawing the assistance of his grace, and waits to 
see what course they will pursue; as in Hosea: 
f l will go and return to my place, till they 
acknowledge their offence, and seek my face.' 
It would be ridiculous, they say, for the Lord 
to consider, whether Israel would, seek his face, 
unless their minds were flexible, capable of 
inclining either way, according to their own 
pleasure; as if it were not very common for God, 
in the prophets, to represent himself as despising 
and rejecting his people, till they should amend 
their lives. But what will our adversaries infer 
from such threats? If they maintain? that th-ose 
who are deserted "by God, are capable of converting 
themselves, they oppose the uniform declaration 
of Scripture."
And then Calvin proceeds to give an interpretation of 
this and simillar passages of the Testaments. The inter­ 
pretation is not very convincing; but it it. nut wit,n it 
uhat we are really concerned. Hatlier, tne point to 
note is tnr.t nerc, aa y.uovt, Calvin is ue&<,in& tne quebtiou. 
now is one to determine the 'general tenor of Scripture 1 
and its 'uniform declarations' apart from euch particular 
texts as these, which in the present case are simply made 
to conform to what is judged to be the uniform teaching of 
Scripture apart from any consideration of them? The
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question to answer first is whether or not there is a 
'uniform teaching of the Scripture 1 , or merely a 'dominant 
trend'. But in settling this question one would have to 
consider just such texts as these dealt with, together 
with those apparently substantiating a different position; 
and it is certainly not just merely to assume at the outset 
that they must mean something which they apparently do not 
mean, simply because one is already determined that the 
teaching of Scripture shall "be uniform and shall "be such as 
the obvious interpretation, or implications, of these texts 
would contradict.
The trouble is that Calvin's whole attitude towards 
the Scriptures is at fault. Instead of his reliance upon 
them being open to question, it is rather the extent of 
his dependence which is of doubtful wisdom. Sometimes 
he hammers them into an impossible unity; at other times 
he is patently inconsistent rather than oppose their teach­ 
ing. How one need not discard the Scriptures in order 
to disagree with Calvin's view of them. They may have 
authority; they may be God's Word. They are; and'they 
should be carefully studied accordingly. They are most 
certainly the historical foundation for Christianity, and
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one might as well hope to discover the meaning of Christianity 
apart from them as to discover the meaning of P&atonism*
without ever reading Plato. But nevertheless, the Bible
is apparently not any such unity as Calvin supposed; and one 
cannot dig in here and dig in there and "be confident in 
every case of pulling up a text which is evidently consist­ 
ent with every ooner one. There is a certain fundamental
unity, perhaps; but it is on broad and rather general lines,
it
and/does not seem that all the Biblical writers saw eye to
eye on every slightest point. There may be very real dis­ 
agreement about minor matters without necessitating more 
fundamental discrepancy
It does seem that the Bible simply is not .to be under­ 
stood from the Calvinistic assumption that the Holy Spirit 
is its one real author. It may be inspired; but this is 
no warrant for presuming that all the men who did the actual 
work of writings were mere amanuenses* who either under­ 
stood what they wrote in the same way and meant to say exact­ 
ly what CalTin understands by their words and wants to 
make them mean, or that they did not understand what they 
were writing but were merely putting it down for later 
generations to understand* These men understood what 
they wrote in the light of the learning of the time in
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which they wrote it. They meant to say exactly what they do 
say, and they were expressing what they conceived to be 
their own ideas. They may have used figurative language, 
but they intended it to convey a very definite meaning, and 
it was a meaning for their own generation, to be understood 
in the light of the circumstances of their own day. They 
were not expressing theological propositions for 16th or 
20th century disputation. They were trying to solve 
certain problems and discover certsin truths, - in many 
instances the same problems and the same truths that 16th 
century theologians were concerned with; "but they did not 
approach them in the same way, they did not work out any 
elaborate system's within the Bible itself, and they did not 
always succeed in solving the problem'they were working on, 
nor did they always discover the truth they were seeking 
to discover. They had remarkable spiritual insight and 
a more profound knowledge of the mind of God than can be 
discovered elsewhere; but there were some depths they could 
not fathom. Calvin supposed that this was because God 
had only revealed what v/ould be-of use to us» He held 
that God had revealed all that we should know, and that we 
should ask for no more. He distinctly affirms that
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"our wisdom ought to consist in embracing with 
gentle docility, and without any exception, 
all that is delivered in the sacred Scriptures." l)
But all knowledge is not contained in the Bible, s,nd to 
suppose that it is is to do the Bible itself a great 
injustice. God has revealed Himself in the world as well 
as in the Word, and we cannot limit ourselves to the views 
of the ancients on every point. We may still have a 
great deal to learn from them; and the revelation of God 
in Christ Jesus our Lord may indeed be final: but there 
is much even of religious truth that the Bible itself 
does not make clear*
For onetMng it contains no solution of the problem 
of evil. This may indicate, as Calvin has supposed, that 
the solution is beyond the powers of human understanding; 
but one can justly ask for a proof of the suppositions and 
such a proof will force a man to go outside the Scripture for 
his materials and to grapple with the problem itself. Why 
is it beyond the powers of human understanding? To 
answer this question one must look at life itself. He 
may be helped to a deeper understanding of it by study of 
the Bible; but the Bible here is like a commentary, and 
the light it throws upon the f text* is to be carefully
1) Institutes, Book 1., ch. 18, par.
MISTAKEN VHW. 210
examined in the light of a study of the 'text 1 itself* and 
the 'text* is in this instance life» or the world in which 
we live,
I think we have put our finger here upon the cause 
for the major inconsistency in the system of Calvin, l) 
He found in the Scriptures the elements of a deterministic 
conception of God and the universe. Ke systematized them 
into his great doctrines of Creation and Providence and Pre­ 
destination, and around these he "built one of the most 
logical systems of Christian theology which has ever been 
developed. It was not so perfectly logical in every state­ 
ment and detail as some of his great admirers who have never 
even looked into the institutes would suppose. But it is a 
far more commanding system than most of his opponents have 
been able to construct. It had one thorn in the flesh, 
however, which has always been a source of weakness to it: 
the Problem of Evil, Calvin could get around this no better 
than the early Gnostics, And the Scriptures offered him no 
help. In fact it seems to be his complete dependence upon 
them which kept him from attacking the problem with the full 
force of his jpiearception that the solution lay somewhere along 
the line of the distinction between ends. The Bible held
l) See eh, 8 above.
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out no such solution* Isaiah may have said that Jehovah 
made peace and created evil, 1.) and Calvin may have used the 
passage to support his contention that all events are decreed 
"by God; 2-) hut in Ecclesiastes (chapter 7, v.29) it says:
"Behold, this only have I found: that God made man 
upright; "but they have sought out many inventions,"
and Calvin took this to indicate that God made men perfectly 
good and they created evil. He never seems really to deal 
with this passage from Isaiah. He is aware of the fact 
that the Scriptures present God as "being a"bove all evilp 
regardless of what He does* and he feels that this must "be so, 
God. cannot sin. But how, then, can He will the existence 
of that which is evil? The Bible does not say. The Bible 
says: All things are of God; God is wholly good; Sin is 
real; God hates Sin. HOY/ to reconcile these statements is 
beyond Calvin. How to reconcile the facts upon which they 
are each based, was beyond the ancient Hebrews. One time 
they emphasised one aspect of the difficulty, at another 
time another, according to the point of view of the individ­ 
ual author or the trend of the same author's thought at 
different times. With all their occasional use of deter­ 
ministic conceptions, their language and thought is almost
1> Isaiah 45:7.
2) Institutes, Bk.I, ch.17, par.8.
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universally pluralistic* and the "blame for sin is always 
attached to men. In the classic explanation of the origin 
of evil» in the 3rd chapter of Genesis* sin is presented 
as the work of the devil, and man. Calvin simply rests here. 
How this could he the ultimate explanation is not clear. That 
it was merely the rather sketchy and figurative solution of an 
ancient people given to sketchy and figurative thought, never 
entered seriously into Calvin's mind. It was God's explan­ 
ation of the origin of evil; it was therefore final' Hothing 
more need "be said upon the subject; nothing more could be 
said upon the subject. He therefore incorporated it into his 
system; in spite of the fact that as it stood it had no 
place there.
Calvin systematized the thought of the Scriptures; 
he worked out its details? he got no nearer a solution 
of the great problems of religious thought than did the 
writers of the books of the two Testaments. 
Paul
Of all individual writers of the Bible, Calvin probably 
has the greatest dependence upon Paul; because Paul was 
the theologian par excellence of the Scriptures. John 
developed a profound Christology and Soteriology; but the
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nearest thing to a complete system is to be found in the 
Epistles of Paul. It is not arranged in text-book form; it 
must be pieced together from the various letters: but from 
all of them together there does come to us a rather complete 
and definite view. And in the main Calvinism is but an 
elaboration of Paulinism. Paul carried his belief in Pro­ 
vidence to the extent of an affirmation of Predestination. 
But he also was convinced that God could do no wrong. He 
was forced, therefore,to grapple with the problem of evil. 
"Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid."
"Why doth he still find fault? For who withstandeth 
his will? Nay but, 0 man, who art thou that repliest 
against God?"
"0 the depth, of the riches both of the wisdom and 
the knowledge of God* how unsearchable are his 
judgments, and his ways past tracing out I"
Perhaps as Augustine believed Paul put his finger 
on the solution of the difficulty l) when he answered one 
troubling question by asking another:
"Hay but, C man, who art thou that repliest against 
God?".
Here may be the answer. Paul, as Augustine contended, may not 
be merely trying to avoid the issue; he may be giving the 
real answer to the problem. But if so, he leaves it still 
dim and obscure. Perhaps the answer 'jbo ;hi.s question, and
1) Tfestiiejon the Eternal Prestination of God, "Calvin 1 
Calvinism", Part I» p.53«
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the answer to the other to which it is a reply* is that 
we are nothing really. But Paul does not say this. He 
leaves the matter still a njystery. Perhaps he saw some 
answer to it and hints at it here. Perhaps for him also f 
there was on this point only darkness. This much he 
certainly affirms: we are only God's creatures* clay in 
the hand of the Great Potter.
Augustine.
Next to the Bible* Calvin's chief source of reliance 
is upon Augustine. Between Calvin and Augustine there is 
such a "bond of sympathy and agreement that it would almost 
seem that they are of one mind. In fact* in the Treatise 
on the Eternal Predestination of God ("Calvin's Calvinism," 
Part I, pp.2Of.). Calvin says:
"In a word, Augustine' is so wholly with me, that if 
I wished to write a confession of my faith, I could 
do so, with all fulness and satisfaction to myself, 
out of his writings,"
And the whole treatise iss© filled with quotations from 
Augustine in support 01 n.is points that one can well 
believe the truth of his profession of agreement. There is 
scarcely a page but what Calvin .turns at least once to the 
writings of Augustine to find corroboration for his own
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views, or their more adequate expression; for it seems 
that he is so pleased with the words of Augustine thr.t he 
prefers them to his own. Calvin himself acloi owl edges this 
delight in the expression of Augustine and his awareness of 
the greater worth of his words in the eyes of his own con­ 
temporaries, for he says on one occasion, l) in replying to 
those who seem dissatisfied with his own answers to their
objections:
"But if there lie any ultramorose ones, vrho are not 
yet Boviifexicuj and who consider that there is more 
weight in the testimony of Augustine(which acknow­ 
ledgment I have often e,r.d willingly made myself); 
I will produce his sentiments on this subject, in 
his own words; thereby testifying my own assent to 
their truth."
Similiar reliance upon and agreement with Auguctine are 
manifest in the treatises on Providence, as well. Several 
pages of that appended to the principal Predestination tract 
are almost wholly from Augustine, 2) and in his later re­ 
futation of calumnies he maintains that if his opponent will
take the trouble to investigate the matter, he will find 
that his (Calvin's)
and substance of argument are precisely the 
same with those of that holy father, of happy memory," 
JUigustine. 3)
1) ^Calvin's Calvinism," Part I, pp. 129f.
2) "Calvin's Calvinism," Part II, pp.23-27.
3) Ibid. ?•*«• on p«43 it is Calvin's further contention 
that calumnies similiar to those against him were 
hurled at Augustine in his day.
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In the Institutes he refers to Augustine and his 
words almost as often. He finds certain things in common 
with the rest of the Fathers* and throughout indicates a 
remarkable knowledge of their writings; but he has much 
fault to find with all of them except the great Carthaginian, 
In him alone does he find a truly congenial spirit.
Undoubtedly Augustine had a profound influence upon 
Calvin. His words are forever in Calvin's mouth, and 
Calvin holds his opinions to be worthy of the greatest 
consideration. But Calvin is something more than the 
shadow of Augustine, and he does not hesitate, to disagree 
with his master vrlien he thinks his master wrong* It is not 
often thet he finds any reason for disagreement5 but when 
he does, he has no hesitancy in saying so., For one thing 
he is not exactly pleased with some of Augustine T s ideas, 
about how man is made in the linage of God, for he says,
"That speculation of Augustine is far from being 
solid, that the soul is a mirror of the Trinity, 
because it contains understanding, will, and 
memory." l)
This is practically his only definite notice of disagreement 
with the great Latin Father; but it indicates that his 
doctrines were his own and not just somebody else's trani.-- 
scribed in a latfcar generation.
l) Institutes* Bk I, ch.l5 t par.
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cr* T"Tet .there are decided points of difference between 
Calvin and Augustine. Cr.lvin would, of course, hc.ve had as 
little sympathy with. Augustine 1 s earlier writines in defence 
of free v;ill as Augustine himself had later. And while it 
may have been true that Calvin could have framed a complete 
confession of the essentials of his faith from the writings 
of Augustine; it is not quite so certain that he could have 
found all the teachings of his faith in Augustine, or that he 
could have subscribed to all that is to be found in Augustine's 
writings.
According to Professor James Orr* in his article on 
Calvinism in the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics,
"Regeneration is for Augustine an act effected through 
baptism; for Calvin* it is effected through the agency of the 
word and spirit of God. —— Next, Augustine's doctrine of pre­ 
destination was necessarily crossed by his doctrine of bap­ 
tismal regeneration. -— For Augustine* therefore* the test of 
predestination to life* or of election, was found* not in re­ 
generation* but in perserverance. The elect have given to 
them the grace to persevere. Calvin entirely separates him­ 
self from this view. Regeneration is a spiritual work wrought 
in the souls of the elect* and of them alone. The elect 
persevere* but the seed of their perseverance is already im-
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planted in them in regeneration. The sacramentarian element is 
completely purged out from this doctrine." And Professor Orr 
continuesi
"There is one more distinction. Augustine, with 
justice, confines predestination to lifet The 
word is thus synonymous with election. Calvin, on 
the other hand, speaks "boldly of a twofold predestina­ 
tion - a predestination to salvation and a predes­ 
tination to destruction." l)
It is true that Augustine was a great deal more of a 
sacramentarian than was Calvin, and this is a point where 
Calvin would probably be out of sympathy with his predecessor. 
But whether or not there is such a great difference between 
them with regard to the test of predestination as Professor 
Orr seems to think, is a matter that strikes one as being not 
quite clear. The test of regeneration, after all, would be 
perseverance, and the seeds of perseverance would have to "be 
sown'in regeneration, if it were a real regeneration. But 
there does seem to "be a difference "between Augustine and 
Calvin v/ith regard to the matter of assurance! for as 
Professor 3-Tarnack points out, 2)
"according to Augustine, no one can he certain that 
he possesses this grrce"
which is irresistible and -enables one to persevere, and he 
is not so much concerned about assurance; while for Calvin
11 Hastings' Encyc. of Rel. and Ethics, vol.3,pp.!50f. Harnack, History of Dogma, yol.5,p.210,footnote.
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it is a matter of first importance, and his whole preaching of 
predestination and election is to bring assurance of persever­ 
ance to tho^se who believe in Christ, l) According to Calvin, 
election is confirmed "by God's call, 2) - not the mere hearing 
of the word, but the accepting of it, - and the assurance of our 
election is in the Son, in our sense of communion with Him 
and our acceptance of His promises of sustenance and pro­ 
tection* But since some who appear to believe fall away, 
Calvin contends that in the last analysis we must say that
"such persons never adhered to Christ with that same 
confidence of heart which, we say, gives us an assur­ 
ance of our election. w 3)
Assurance of salvation, then, for Calvin, comes through assur­ 
ance of faith. But since one's assurance of faith depends 
upon the perseverance of faith, there is really no great point 
of difference between the thought of Calvin and that of Aug­ 
ustine, though they each stress different aspects of the same 
doctrine. They do have a different point of view with regard 
to assurance; but there is no fundamental disagreement with 
regard to the doctrine of predestination on this point.
Professor Orr's second point of difference is a more 
important one, because it relates not merely to assurance of 
election, but to the very scope of God's predestination.
1) Institutes, Bk.III., ch.21, par.l.
2) Institutes, Bk.III., ch.24,
3) Ibid., ch.24,par.7.
AUGUSTIHE.
However, one may be inclined to disagree with Professor Orr's 
judgment as to the greater justice of Augustine's position. 
The logic of the case is clearly against Augustine and in favor 
of Calvin; and this is the one great advance which Calvin 
makes over Augustine. Here Calvin carries the logic of their 
common position a step farther: than either Paul or Augustine . 
does5 for Paul leaves the matter obscure, and Augustine draws 
back. But both are committed to it, because as Calvin says,
"election itself could not exist without being opposed 
to reprobation," l)
unless all are saved, which Augustine 'does not teach. *• 
In the same place he remarks,
"Many, indeed, as if they v/ished'to avert odium from 
God,- -admit election in such a Y/a; c.s 'to deny that any 
one is; reprobated. "But this is puerile and absurd. 
--- God is said to separate those whom he adopts to 
salvation. To say that others obtain by chance, or 
acquire by their own efforts, that which election alone 
confers on a fev;, will be worse than absurd. Whom God 
passes by, therefore, he reprobates, and from no other 
cause than Ms determination to exclude them fron the 
inheritance vhich he predestines for his children. --- 
V/e have heard that hardening proce. els from the Divine 
power and will, as much as mercy. Unlike .the persons 
I have mentioned, Paul never strives to excuse G.QCL by 
false allegations; he only declares that it ic unlaw­ 
ful for a thing formed to quarrel v/ith its maker,"
77ith regard to the development of Augustine's doctrine 
of frace we quote the following from Professor He.rnacl:* 2)
1) Institutes* Bk. III., ch.23» par.l.
2) History of Dogma,vol.5,p.168.
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He declares:
"Augustine's flcc+rine of grace and sin was constructed 
independent!"*/ of the Tfi ll'r ''c v! controversy* It was 
substantially complete when he entered tlie conflict; 
but he was by no means clear as to its application in 
separate questions in the year of his conversion. At 
the time of his fight with Manichaeism (see the Tres 
libri de libero arbitrio) he had rather emphasised, 
following'the tradition of the Church teachers, the 
independence of human freedom, and had spoken of 
original sin merely as inherited evil. It was his 
clerical office, a renewed study of Romans, and the 
criticism of his spiritual development, as instituted 
in the Confessions? that first led him to the Ueop- 
latonic Christian conviction that all good, and. there­ 
fore faith, came from God, and'that nan T.vas only goxl 
and free in dependence upon 'Toe1.. Thus lie gained a 
point of viev; which he confessed at the close of his 
life h e ft a? not ^ ~i ̂ T. v •• possessed, and whi ch he op p o s e.d 
to the earlier, erroneous conceptions that friends and 
enemies frequently reminded hiir of. It can be said 
that his doctrine of grace, in so far as it vTa« ,a 
doctrine of C-oc1 , T ' r -s complete as early as A.D.3S7; but 
it was not, in its application'to i;T.~ble history, or to 
the problem of conversion rnd snnctificatxon (i.n the 
Church), before the beginning of the fifth century. 
It can also be shown that he was at all times slightly 
influenced by the popular Catholic view, and this all 
the more as he was not capable of drawing the whole con­ 
sequences of his system, which, if he had done so, 
would have led to determinism."
For again, it is Harnack's opinion that
"The carrying out of the conception of predestinating 
grace, which should be no more than a sentiment, 
confined to himself, of the redeemed, leads to a 
determinism that conflicts with the gospel and im­ 
perils the vigour of our sense of freedom." l)
How one may not be so sure that if the 'sentiment of
l) History of Dogma,vol*5 rp.218. For a very full and 
able treatment of Augustine's doctrines, see Mozley, 
"IQie Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination."
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predestinating grace' has a true ground in fact, 'the con­ 
ception' should not "be carried to its logical conclusion* even 
if it does conflict with-what some people conceive to be the 
gospel, and even if it does imperil the vigor of our sense 
of freedom. If our sense of freedom is a mistake, its 
vigor should "be imperilled; and any "benefit previously de­ 
rived from an erroneous sense of freedom may "be expected to ce 
offset "by even greater "benefit from a true sense of dependence 
on God* There is no need avoiding the logic of the facts 
merely to preserve the vigor of our sense of freedom, if the 
sense of freedom has not enough of the vigor of truth to stand 
Toy it self. The thing to note is that in Karnack's opinion 
Augustine f s doctrine of predestination logically developed 
leads to determinism. If this is so, and Augustine's doctrine 
is true, there seems no worth in Professor Orr's contention 
that Augustine justly confines predestination to salvation*
But Professor Orr has certainly hit upon an important 
difference "between the teachings of the two men. And Pro­ 
fessor Harnack cites another when he says*
"The infralapsarian doctrine of predestination, as 
understood by Augustine, is very different from 
Calvin's." l"
For while Calvin is not clear on the order of the foreordir- 
l) History of Dogma,vol.5,p.216, footnote
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ration of events, he certainly leans towards a supralapsarian 
view, which again is far more logical than the more "half-way" 
view of Augustine. Yet as we have already seen, it is Calvin's 
inconsistency with regard to the origin of evil which is the 
great weakness of his whole system* His contention for 
Adam's having real freedom of the will, though his admission 
that God decreed his fall makes this contention less excTaS'able 
for him, lays him open to the charges similiar to those which 
Harnack brings against Augustine, Then he maintains tnat
Augustine's
"\Vhole doctrine of the primitive state, like all teach­ 
ing, on this subject, is full of contradictions; for 
v;e have here a grace that is meant to be actual, and 
is yet merely a condition, i.».e»> it by no means makes 
a man good, but only leaves scope to the will. There­ 
by the whole doctrine of grace is upset; for if there 
is a grace at all which only produces the posse non 
peccare,is not this the sole significance of all grace? 
and if that is correct, were not the Pelagians right? 
They, of course, maintained that grace was only a con­ 
dition. Augustine's doctrine of grace in the primi­ 
tive state (the adjutorium) is Pelagian, and contra- 
dicts his doctrine of grace elsewhere. We have here 
the clearest proof that it is impossible to construct 
a history from the standpoint of predestinating grace. 
Augustine falls back-on the assumption that God wished 
to bestow on man a higher good than he had received at 
first. --- At the beginning and end (the primitive 
state and the Judgment) the moral view is set above 
the religious. The whole doctrine of predestinating 
irresistible grace is set in a frame incompatible 
with it. Thus Augustine is himself responsible if 
his Church in after times, arguing from the primitive
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state and the Judgment (secudum merita)j has elimin­ 
ated practically his doctrine of gratia.gratis data." l)
How one need not agree with Professor Harnack that 
Augustine's inconsistency here clearly proves that
"it is impossible to construct a history from the 
standpoint of predestinating grace";
for one might still wish to see the doctrine carried out to 
its logical limits to see if such a construction is actually 
impossible. But there can be no doubt that Augustine was 
inconsistent with regard to the condition of Adam; and that 
'Calvin, in spite of his more suprala£sarian tendency* was still 
"befogged" on the matter of Adam's condition, and in his ex­ 
planation of the Pall laid himself open to the charge of 
similiar inconsistency.
There are other minor differences betv^een Augustine 
and Calvin: as, for instance, that regarding the relation 
of the law to faith. As Harnack says, Augustine
"had no assured experience that the law prepared the 
way for wrath and despair.*1
And he adds,
"At this point Luther intervened. 11 2)
It is probable that Calvin drew from Luther; for at any rate 
he teaches that the law is only to prepare the way for faith
ij Op.cit.,p.216, footnote. 
2) Ibid.,p.219, footnote.
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or to take away all ground of excuse.l) There are the
additional differences regarding the Atonement, penance, and 
the 
/distinction between commands and counsels, together with
certain views regarding purgatory and prayers for the dead. 
But the chief points of difference as far as we are con­ 
cerned, are those derived from the fact that Augustine 
does not carry predestination to the eternal decreeing 
of destruction to the damned, and that he is infralap- 
sarian in his treatment of the Pall, whereas Calviniis- 
cludes damnation under predestination and is more supra- 
lapsarian with regard to the Pall, though he fails to
deal with the problem of the origin of evil along lines
2) 
consistent with a supralapsarianuview.
i! Institutes,Bk.II, It is interesting to note Professor Warfield's and 
Professor Kuijper's points of difference between 
Augustine and Calvins the former with regard to 
the testimony of the Spirit (*!Salvin and the Reform­ 
ation11 ), and the latter with regard to God's grace 
("Calvinism," pp.55f«)« Both show that Augustine 
remained a Bishop regarding these matters and inter­ 
posed the Church as a mediator between God and man, 
whereas Calvin developed a doctrine of the Spirit 
which left JK> room for human mediation. It is 
Kuijper's contention that Augustine's doctrine of Pre­ 
destination presents religion "for the sake of man," 
whereas Calvin's presents it "for the sake of God."
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The Stoics and Others*
In Dr. A. liitchell Hunter's boe> on "The Teaching of 
Calvin," we find the following very important paragraph:
"Calvin of course found in Scripture his ultimate and 
decisive authority for the doctrine (of Predestination) 
on "both its sides of election and reprobation. Never­ 
theless his mind had received a strong MT towrrcLs 
certain views on the subject from men whose early 
influence upon him. had been very great. It is note­ 
worthy that his first published writing, the Com-ent- 
ary on the Stoic Seneca's De dementia* disclosed an 
intellectual sympathy with a philosopher whose fatal­ 
istic doctrine, though radically different from that of 
predestination, appealed to the same mental disposition, 
It was undoubtedly Augustine, howevert who made the 
profoundest impression upon Calvin, not only in this 
particular but in many others. A rapid comparison 
with that Father's Anti-Pelagian writings is enough 
to show that Calvin reproduces in large measure his 
argumentation on the doctrine, the only considerable 
difference being that the later champion lays greater 
stress on the reprobrtion side of it. The influence 
of Luther l) could not but strongly reinforce the 
impression made upon him by Augustine. Calvin echoes 
the older Reformer in deprecating the attempt to explore 
the secrets of the divine v;ill and in asserting the 
Christian duty of limiting ourselves to what is re­ 
vealed in Scripture and through Christ. It may be 
thrt he v/as more indebted for the exact form of his 
views to lePevre vrhose teaching was transmitted through 
his pupil Roussel, one of Calvin's instructors* In 
LePevre's Commentary on Paul's Hpp» the s^me attitucle 
is assumed to the matter as Calvin subsequently adopted, 
^specially in his insistence that all things, however
mysterious, contribute to enhance the glory of God, 
the interest of His creatures being of only secondary
moment. According to Calvin T s ov:n v.'itness, hoy/ever, 
it was Bucer who was most of all the informing mind 
and guiding spirit. 'Principally,' saic. he, 'I 
have wished J-o follow Bucer, man of holy memory. 1 But 
here again Calvin's independent mind would alloy; him.
l) Kuijper very properly maintains that "Luther can "be 
interpreted without Calvin, but not Calvin without 
Luther." ("Calvinism," p.20)
STOICS. 227
to call no man master, "Bucer, touched by the com ~on 
repugnance, kept reprobation in the background, while 
Calvin kept it in the f r reground in lin~ with. its 
"better half, election. C^lvin'c convictions were not 
the result of his respect for the ipre clixit of my 
man, whatever his regard for him. Doubtless others 
disposed hi? mind to a more zealous and unhesitating 
adoption of views in harmony with thei~:-«, but nothing 
save proof, based on grounds that approved themselves 
to mm as moontJL'OVfci'oiwIti* wcula produce the absolute 
certainty with which he held them. He was no parrot; 
he was one- of those whoj l^lre Ps.ul, can cay, I believe:., 
therefore do I s^eah. ITor was his acceptance of th 
doctrine due to the compulsion of mere logical c 
gtsms with the. aovreignty of Tod as major premiss* 
any more than it was held by hi in v.ith the jealous 
assertion of the professional theologian who- v/ishes 
the children of his brain to command the homage of all. 
His convictions were of the heart as well as of the 
mind and rested on a variety of grounds." l)
It is interesting to note the reference to Calvin's in­ 
debtedness to other men of the time of the Reformation. But 
chiefly interesting is the suggestion that he owes something 
to the early influence of the study of Seneca. It is impos­ 
sible here to determine how much. As Dr* Hunter says* Calvin's 
doctrine of predestination is very different from the Stoic 
fatalism; yet "both do appeal to the same type of mind. They 
are kindred answers to the same great questions that are ever 
troubling the minds of thoughtful men. Just as Stoic meta­ 
physics was filled with inconsistencies, so we have seen Calvin's 
system, not to be entirely free from them. "3ut they were both
l) H"nter, "The teaching of Calvin*" pp.93-93.
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attempts to solve the £ret.t problems of lire and of the 
universe on the line 'of Determinism; .°n?. th€ir respective 
inconsistencies come in their deviations from this line. With 
all its deficiencies there was much in Stoicism that would 
appeal to Calvin. Its whole view of life, its stern stress­ 
ing of the harsher virtues, its seeking for an ultimate ration­ 
al foundation. Its natural congeniality would influence him 
to seek in the Scriptures the same elements adjusted to a 
different religious foundation.
It is the suggestion of Edwyn Bevan (in his "Stoics and 
Sceptics") that Paul himself might have "been influenced in his 
youth by the Stoic teaching and the Stoic point of view, since 
Tarsus was at that time a strong Stoic centre, and that perhaps 
Stoicism, in turn* may owe something to the Semitic origin of 
Zeno its founder.l) There is indeed something which strikes 
the imagination in the similiarity between Paul quoting from 
the Stoics in Athens and Zeno coming to this same city some
three centuries before from the same Syrian coast, to learn
and 
philosophy/ later to preach his Stoic message with a similiar
prophetic quality of utterance.
It is wholly a matter of conjecture; but there does seem 
to be a constitutional disposition with regard to these matters.
1) Beran, "Stoics and Sceptics*" pp.14 and 20,21.
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There are some men who crave freedom and long only for the 
possibility of what they call 'progress*. They desire a 
universe of change and uncertainty* the ultimate reality of 
Time; they would even welcome Chance in the physical order 
if it gave grounds for a belief in the Freedom of the Will* 
Such among us in recent times are William James and Bergson. 
But there are others who seek stability, who long for some­ 
thing which will never change, who crave order, and can only 
be happy in the thought of an eternal and inevitable plan for 
the whole universe. For such there is no joy in uncertainty; 
they prefer a certain and sure purpose to all the possibilities 
held out in the conception of Preedom. They have no love 
for rrecf.oin as such; they do not believe it is the sole 
ground for the possibility of moral goodness; they seek for a 
meaning in life that is not dependent upon chance and uncertain­ 
ty. Of such were some of the old Hebrew psalmists and prophets, 
of such were Zeno and Paul, Augustine and Calvin. They lean 
inevitably towards some form of Determinism. The Hebrews and 
the Christians among them differ much from the Hindus and the 
Buddhists; but still there is something in common even with 
these: an"attitude of mind that seeks rest, assurance, peace, 
a haven at the heart oi the universe from all the confusion
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and change r,nd strife in the world about us.
Is there any development of Determinism consistent with 
Theism and Christianity? Hinduism and Buddhism are shot 
through with conflicting ideas; Stoicism never succeeded in 
working out a consistent metaphysics; the Hebrews wavered 
between two views; Paul left much uncertain and obscure; 
Augustine drew back lest he accuse God of evil; and Calvin, 
bolder, approaching even nearer to a consistent conclusion of 
their common beliefs, himself wavered, and in his confusion 
of the issues chose the wrong road in his attempt to reach a 
solution of the great problem confronting them, - afraid, too, 
lest he be found guilty of accusing God of evil*
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF CALVIN'S TEACHING.
Chapter X.
THE DETERMINISM OJF EDWARDS •.
Hia Development of Calvinism.
The Calvinistic system of doctrine was ably de­ 
fended and the issues it raises substantially clarified 
in the subsequent Anninian controversy. And in this 
clarifying of issues, especially in the development of 
the Supra- and Sub-lapsarian schools, it may be supposed 
that a real advance was made over the teaching of Calvin 
himself. Certain decisions with regard to points left 
obscure by the founder had to be made, and were made, in 
accordance with the individual's decision as to whether 
he would follow Calvin's high road to the bitter end, or 
push farther along the by-path which Calvin himself 
withdrew into, lest he should arrive at a destination he 
had no desire to reach. Among English speaking Calvin- 
ists it would be hard to find one more logically consis­ 
tent than the great American divine of the middle of the 
l8th century, Jonathan Edwards, a former President of what
w*
is no/ Princeton University.
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Edwards says of himself:
*I should not take it at all amiss to be called 
a Calvinist, for distinction's sake* though I 
utterly disclaim a dependence on Calvin, or 
believing the doctrines which I hold, because 
he believed and taught them; and cannot justly 
be charged with believing in everything just 
as he taught. 11 l)
After reading Edwards 1 book entitled "An Inquiry 
into the Modern Prevailing Notions respecting that Freedom 
of Will which is supposed to be essential to Moral 
Agency, Virtue and Vice, Rewards and Punishment, Praise 
and Blame,* (called for convenience "On the Will"), one 
wishes that there had been more such Calvinists, - men 
imbued with some of the independent spirit of the 
Genevan Reformer, and endowed with some of his critical 
and logical faculties, - instead of so many who have simply 
adhered to his doctrines because they lived in a community 
where they were considered orthodox, without really under­ 
standing or appreciating them; or instead of so many others, 
who, unable to follow the arguments of their leader, have 
continued to call themselves by his name, for the sake of 
prestige, without really believing in his major tenets; 
or instead of so many others, (an even larger number) who 
have grown up in Calvinistic churches and, incapable of 
appreciating the wisdom and soundness of the doctrines of 
their founder, are now ashamed of him and of his teaching.
l) Jonathan Edwards, On the Will, preface, p. vi.
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1« Refutation of the Arminianism doctrine of the 
EauiliMum of the Bill.
Edwards devotes the most of his treatise to a 
definite refutation of the arguments of contemporary 
Arminians, and shows most conclusively that not only is 
there no possibility of the human will "being free in any 
such way as they suppose, but that such a freedom is not 
only not necessary to moral responsibility but would 
entirely preclude the possibility of it. There are 
doubtless no philosophers to-day who hold any such 
doctrine of the equilibrium of the will as was held by 
18th century Arminians; but there are perhaps a good 
many ordinary folk who do, without realizing that their 
view has such a highly technical name. And such folk 
could do no better by way of realizing the insufficiency 
of their position than to read this treatise of Edwards', 
in which he shows that volition is necessarily connected 
with the influence of motive, that the causal order is 
unbroken, even in the realm of the activity of human 
minds*
We are not so much concerned here with this part of 
Edwards' teaching. In this controversy he supports most 
ably the Calvinistic position; but after all, it is , *-
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only the Calvinistic position which he is supporting, 
and Calvin himself stood for the same conclusions, - 
only the exigencies of the controversies of his day 
did not force him"to resort to the same arguments in 
advancing his views. Calvin, too, taught that the will 
is not in equilibrium "but is subject to the character, 
that if God foreknows all things He must have foreordained 
them, and that the only freedom necessary to and consistent 
with the grounding of moral responsibility is (save in the 
case of Adam) freedom from constraint, and not at all any 
such freedom as makes the individual's choices wholly 
undetermined. But even in this Edwards does make an 
advance. The war is waged in a different field. Cal­ 
vin depended almost wholly upon Scripture for the 
grounding of his doctrines. Edwards depends wholly upon
the observations of psychological study, and is greatly
1) 
influenced by Locke. He does not in every case agree
with Locke; but he knows Locke f s writings, and he is con­ 
cerned to argue for the truth of Calvinistic conclusions 
in the light of a new philosophical outlook. And the 
important point is that he is able to strengthen the
l) See pp. 14, 16, 17, 21, etc.
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Calvinistic position in the light of the new philoso­ 
phy, and only when he comes to the consideration of 
the evidence of God's foreknowledge, does he fall 
back on Scripture.
2. Advance on Calvinism - God's Will Determined.
But while there is an advance in argument, the con­ 
clusions here are the same. There is one conclusion, 
however, which is a marked advance. Edwards definitely 
maintains that not only is man's will determined "by his 
understanding and character, and ultimately "by God, 
but that God's will is equally as fixed and determined - 
by His character of ineffable goodness. Thus with Edwards 
the determinism is complete. Calvin made all things to 
depend on God's will. Beyond that he did not go. 
Edwards makes even God's will to depend on His character, 
and His decrees to depend on His purposes. The ultimate 
factor, then, is not will, but Intellect^ Calvin himself 
taught the fundamental character of God's purposes; but he 
did not distinguish so clearly between the 'understanding' 
and the 'will', and did not show definitely the latter's 
dependence ,on the former. He seemed rather to think that
l) See also Aquinas, "Compendium", ch. 19.
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God's will was free, in a different sense, of course, 
from that in which ours might "be said to be free; where­ 
as Edwards taught very definitely that God's will is fixed, 
in exactly the same sense that ours is. God's character 
determines His will as completely as our character 
determines ours. The only difference is one of situation. 
It is God's character alone which determines His will or 
choice; whereas ours is determined "by our characters in 
view of certain limiting circumstances beyond our control.
But now as we have seen, the greatest problem 
confronting any Deterministic system in theology, is the 
problem of evil. It is with regard to this, then, that 
we are most interested in Edwards' development of Calvinism. 
Does he make any advance on the master here?
3« Apparent Disagreement with Augustine - Only Apparent.
Before considering this, however, it would be well 
to look at another matter, namely, a certain verbal dis­ 
agreement with Augustine. Augustine contends that the 
'cause', - the 'end' or 'motive', - of the act determines 
its moral quality in so far as this moral quality is an 
index to the moral character of the actor. Thus, as we 
have seen, he maintains that God may will the same act 
which man wills, and yet God be free from all sin while 
the man is guilty of sin, - simply because God and the man
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have different motives for willing this act, or in other 
words, the causes in each case are different. But now 
Edwards is concerned to show that
"The essence of the virtue and vice of disposi­ 
tions of the heart, and acts of the will, lies not 
in their cause, but their nature."
He is, however, in no disagreement with Augustine; for he 
is speaking not of the moral qualities of acts, as 
Augustine was, but of the moral quality of dispositions. 
With regard to the former he declares:
"I suppose the way that men came to entertain 
this absurd inconsistent notion, with respect 
to internal inclinations and volitions them- 
selves (or notions that imply it), viz. that 
the essence of their moral good or evil lies 
not in their nature, but their cause; was, 
that it is indeed a very plain dictate of 
common sense, that it is so with respect to 
all outward actions r and sensible motions of 
the body: that the moral good or evil of them 
does not lie at all in the motions themselves, 
which taken by themselves, are nothing of a 
moral nature; and the essence of all the moral 
good or evil that concerns them, lies in those 
internal dispositions and volitions which are 
the cause of them.* l)
Which goes to show very definitely that there is perfect 
agreement between Augustine and Edwards on this point, and 
that Edwards' only reason for contending that the moral 
quality of dispositions is not determined by their causes 
is simply that the^ are the very things which possess
l) Edwards, On the Will, p. 2?8.
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moral quality in themselves, and that their moral 
quality is what determines that of the acts of which 
they are the causes.
4. The Difference with Calvin on 'Common Sense*.
There is one other minor matter to dispose of. 
In his argument with his calumniator, in the treatise on 
Providence, Calvin shows a marked distrust of 'common
sense*, and virtually contends that 'common sense' is not
l) 
a competent judge of such profound matters; whereas
Edwards is forever referring to it as a court of final 
appeal. Part of the difference here is to be accounted 
for by the fact that, as Professor Kemp Smith says, the 
philosophy of one century is the common sense of the 
next. The common sense to which Edwards is appealing is 
not that of the l6th century, but that of the l8th, 
enlightened by the philosophical speculations of the 17th 
and early l8th. Most of the rest of the difference is to 
be reconciled by the fact that by 'common sense* Calvin and 
Edwards mean different things. By 'common sense* Calvin 
refers more specifically to the unenlightened intelligence
of the ordinary individual who knows nothing of either the 
true interpretation of Scripture, or the speculations of
l) "Calvin's Calvinism11 , Part 2, pp. ?6f.
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philosophy. It has never "been true that the ordinary 
"man in the street" could understand all the deep 
mysteries either of philosophy or of Sod. And in this 
Edwards would agree. The 'common sense 1 he refers to is the 
enlightened reason; and when he contends that a proposition 
is in accord with 'common sense 1 he generally merely means 
that it is logical, or clearly in accord with reason.
But there may "be some slight degree of real difference 
still remaining between these two. Edwards would doubtless 
agree with Calvin, as against the latter's opponent, that 
the deepest truths of the Gospel and of Christian metaphysics 
are matters of revelation and definitely beyond the powers 
of any degree of 'common sense' to discover or fathom. 
But it seems that there is little question Taut that Edwards 
would push the territories in which enlightened 'common 
sense* was arbiter, beyond the realms which Calvin would 
relegate to its rule. The point is not one which I am 
prepared to argue at length; but one has the feeling in 
reading Calvin, that though he is really all the while 
testing his own arguments by a very enlightened reason 
and rejecting those of his opponents by the application 
of the same criterion, he is yet very much in the dark as 
to how far reason will go and just where it is that the 
mysterious begins, and he is apparently much more willing
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than Edwards simply to rest on the Scriptures. Edwards, 
on the other hand, "because he lived in a later day, 
pushed the domain of reason farther into the realm of what 
had "been mystery; but he, no less than Calvin, rests his 
position finally upon the foundations of the Bible, and 
he is no more critical of its mysteries than Calvin is. 
Both would agree that the purposes of God are beyond 
human comprehension.
The real difference is that while Calvin actually applied 
the test of reason, which may be, as far as he is concerned, 
summarily stated in the form of the law of non-contradiction, 
he was not at all clear how far it vras possible for the 
human mind &o apply this test; whereas Edwards saw more 
clearly that it must be applicable everywhere, that the 
whole world must be rational, - that it could be understood 
by enlightened 'common sense* if only 'common sense' could 
become sufficiently enlightened. Calvin would really have 
been forced to the same position; but he did not see the 
ground here so clearly.
Both Calvin and Edwards were arguing with people 
who apparently accepted the teaching of Scripture: but in 
Calvin's day the argument was over the question of what 
was the teaching of Scripture; while in Edwards' time the
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argument was about points not specifically settled "by 
the teaching of Scripture. Consequently, while Calvin 
used reason to interpret Scripture, and apply it, he 
argues on the assumption that Scripture properly inter­ 
preted and applied furnishes man with a solution of all 
his theological difficulties. It was not until the 
Arminian controversy had "brought out the comflicting 
character of what appeared to be equally possible 
interpretations of Scripture, that it became evident that 
there were issues involved which the Scripture itself 
did not settle, and which in turn must be settled before 
one could satisfactorily reduce the apparent conflicts 
of the Scripture itself to complete harmony. In other 
words, if the Bible was the Word of God, it could not 
teach a system of doctrine which was obviously false. 
And each side in the controversy began to try to make 
it appear that this was exactly what the other side was 
trying to make the Bible do.
But evidently, the criterion of truth and falsehood 
here was not the teaching of the Bible itself, but the 
requirements of reason. Actually, it seemed that one 
had to decide certain psychological and philosophical 
questions'before he could interpret the Bible properly;
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and the only faculty he had with which to decide these 
questions was his reason, or what Edwards calls his 
'common sense'. Thus, from Calvin's conflict between 
the Scriptures and 'common sense', in which the 
Scriptures are accepted as having absolute authority, and 
'common sense' is discredited because the Scriptures 
disparage it, we have advanced to Edwards' reliance upon 
'common sense' as the guide to that truth with which the 
teaching of Scripture must necessarily conform, not be­ 
cause the authority of reason is superior to the authority 
of Scripture, but because both are disclosures of the 
same Divine truth and cannot really conflict.
Th,e rofrj ffln of Evil.
But now we must consider what advance Edwards makes, 
if any, with regard to what has shown itself to be the 
chief problem for Calvinism, namely, the problem of evil.
Edwards begins his discussion of this point by stating 
the Anninian accusation against the Calvinists.
"It is urged by Arminians," he remarks, "that 
the doctrine of the necessity of men's volitions, 
or their necessary connection with antecedent 
events and circumstances, makes the First Cause, 
and Supreme Orderer of all things, the author
l) It must, of course, be remembered that to a certain 
extent Calvin and Edwards are, as has been indicated, not 
speaking of the same 'common sense*. Yet, in part ifehey are; 
and in so far as they are, this difference between them exists.
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"of sin; in that he has so constituted the 
state and course of things, that sinful 
volitions become necessary, in consequence 
of his disposal," l)
Thus Edwards is confronted with exactly the same 
difficulty as Calvin, the difficulty of defending his 
system of doctrine from the accusation that it makes God 
the author of sin. But as Edwards points out, this 
difficulty is not one peculiar to Calvinism, "but confronts 
amy theological system which incorporates the doctrine of 
Divine foreknowledge. (As a matter of fact, it confronts 
any theological system in which there is the doctrine of 
an omnipotent Creator.)
1. Gqd the Autfoor^ of Sj,n - Permj.S3ive|ly.
Edwards, however, unlike Calvin, definitely admits 
that God is the author of sin - in a particular sense. 
The trouble is that the Arminians do not define the sense 
in which they suppose the Calvinists make God the author 
of sin. And here Edwards draws what might have been a 
most important distinction if only he had stood by Calvin.
;
The distinction which he should have drawn is that between 
'the decreer of sin 1 and 'the sinner', but the one he 
actually does draw is that between 'the sinner' and 'the
l) "On the Will", p. 353.
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pennitter of sin 1 . In the sense of permitting sin, 
God is its author. He even admits that God is f the 
orderer of sin 1 ; "but it is in the sense of permitting 
it or disposing oi it.
a. The mistake of resorting to the already discredited 
distinction regarding Permission.
It would seem that Edwards here makes an advance 
over the position of Calvin, in that he admits God to be 
the author of sin in some sense. But in trying to 
explain in what sense , he relinguishes some of the ground 
which Calvin had already won. For Calvin had very rightly 
pointed out that there can be no real difference between 
God's so-called permissive decrees and His active decrees. 
Since God is ultimately the Creator of all things, if He 
permits anything, He actively wills it to be, - just as 
actively as He wills anything to be. If by 'permission 1 
Edwards simply means the distinction between the one who 
wills an act and the immediate actor, the distinction meant 
is the legitimate one; but 'permission' is not the proper 
word for its designation. As a matter of fact, Edwards 
does mean this in part; but he does not see the issue 
clearly, and in his confusion he apparently thinks that 
this distinction is one with that between 'permission 1 and
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'action} and he actually treats this latter as the 
real distinction, - which, as we have seen, Calvin 
had shown to be a mere delusion as far as God's part 
in the affairs of the world is concerned. Edwards 
declares:
"There is a great difference between God's 
being concerned thus, by his permission* in 
an event and act, which, in the inherent 
subject and agent of it, is sin, (though the 
event will certainly follow on his permission), 
and his being concerned in it by producing it 
and exerting the act of sin; or between his 
being the orderer of its certain existence, 
by got hindering it, under certain circumstances* 
and his being the proper actor or anther of it, 
by a positive agency or efficiency. And this, 
notwithstanding what Dr. Whitby offers about a 
saying of philosophers, that causa deficiena. 
in rebus neceggft-ri i f «^ ^anon™ |P?T se efficientem 
reducenda eat. As there is a vast difference 
between the sun's being the cause of the light- 
someness and warmth of the atmosphere, and bright­ 
ness of gold and diamonds, by its presence and 
positive influence; and its being the occasion of 
darkness and frost in the night, by its motion, 
whereby it descends below the horizon. The 
motion of the sun is the occasion of the latter 
kind of events; but it is not the proper cause, 
efficient, or producer of them; though they are 
necessarily consequent on that motion under such 
circumstances: no more is any action of the Divine/ 
Being the cause of the evil of men's wills.* l)
But now as Calvin was so careful to point out, if a sinful 
act happens, it happens not because God has permitteft it 
to happen, but because He has decreed that it should 
happen. In other words, God is the ultimate producer of
l) Op. Git., p. ^63. (The construction of Edwards' sentences 
is not always above reproach.)
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every act. According to Edwards 1 own argument with regard 
to the necessity of our volitions and the universality of 
the causal order, God as Creator is the First Cause of all 
things; and though he may draw a distinction "between 
remote cause and immediate cause, as he does (and as Calvin 
had also done), yet the one is no more cause than the other, 
there is ho break in the causal connection, and it is not 
God's 'permission' but His 'action' which is the First 
Cause - if one is to draw any real distinction between per­ 
mission and action. TO speak of God's permitting things in 
the way Edwards does is to speak as if there were other forces 
at work in the world which were not started by Him. But 
Edwards would not admit that this is the case. Consequently, 
there is no difference at all between God's being concerned 
in the act of sin by His permission and His "being concerned 
in it by producing it". The real distinction, as we shall 
see, comes between His producing it as the act of a creature 
and His doing it Himself as His own sinful act. God is not 
"the orderer of its certain existence" merely Mbv not 
hindering it under certain circumstances"; He is the "author 
of it by a positive agency or efficiency." Yet He is not its 
"proper actor*anv more than it is God who dies when He
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actively decrees, wills, and brings about by His eternal 
and inevitable agency, the death of one of His creatures. 
The real point of distinction is that the sinfulness of 
the act attaches itself solely to the creature's partici­ 
pation in it; it is the creature's sin and not God's, as 
Calvin and Edwards are forever telling us, - yet without ever 
telling us why this is or how it can be.
Moreover, all such similes as that of the sun's 
being the cause of the warmth of the atmosphere but not 
the cause of darkness, are of no use whatever for the 
argument. No one ever contended that the sun was the 
cause of darkness, - at least no one who understood the 
situation as Edwards does, - simply because no such, person 
ever contended that the sun was the First Cause of all things. 
This is the grand point of difference, which is the very 
point pertinent to the argument. "What Edwards has said 
about the difference between God's permission of sin and 
His producing it, is not true r notwithstanding what Dr. 
Ihitby says about a deficient cause, in necessary things,
being reducible to an efficient 1*; because it is not true
l) 
at all. Dr. "Whitby is correct in maintaining that
if God does not come to the assistance of sinful men it 
l) Op. cit., pp. 353f »
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mulit be because He wills their sin; and Edwards' bring­ 
ing up the necessity of the sin of devils, which Dr. whitby 
will not deny, does not alter the case. The reason Dr. 
Whitby's remark does not apply, is not that it is not 
true, but rather that God is never merely a deficient 
cause, but always, as Calvin pointed out, an efficient 
one, - efficient not in this derived sense of refraining 
from a certain activity, "but in the direct sense of 
positively willing what is. Edwards' case of the devils 
shows that Dr. Whitby gets nowhere in this attempt to prove 
that Calvinism differs from Arminianism in making God 
the author of sin; but at the same time it does not throw 
any very clear light upon how Calvinism is to explain the 
fact that God can be the author of sin and yet not be a 
sinner. This is the real problem for Calvinism;, and it 
is not enough merely to show that Arminians are logically 
forced by their doctrines also to conclude that God is the 
author of sin.
b. Results in the equally fatal distinction between 
Natural and Supernatural.
In attempting to solve this problem, Edwards, largely 
because of his falling back on the already discredited
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distinction with regard to permission, makes the mistake 
of resorting to what really amounts to the equally fatal 
distinction "between the natural and the supernatural^ 
The two distinctions are of a piece; but neither has 
any place in a Theistic Determinism. Calvin, too, might
be said to have distinguished "between the natural and the
l) 
supernatural, especially in his treatment of grace; but
the distinction he makes is not such a far-reaching one as 
that which Edwards falls into as a result of following the 
idea of permission, which Calvin had rejected. The dis­ 
tinction implicit in Edwards is of such a far-reaching order 
that it lands him in what looks very much like a definite 
Dualism or Pluralism. For he says:
"So, inasmuch as sin is not the fruit of any 
positive agenay or influence of tKe Most High, 
but, on the contrary, arises from the with­ 
holding of his action and energy, and, under 
certain circumstances, necessarily follows on 
the want of his influence; this is no argument 
that he is sinful, or his operation evil, or 
has anything of the nature of evil; but on 
the contrary, that he, and his agency, are 
altogether good and holy, and that he is the 
fountain of all holiness. It would be strange 
arguing, indeed, because men never commit sin, 
but only when God leaves them to themselves T 
and necessarily sin when he does so, that 
therefore their sin is not from themselves,. 
but from God; and so that God must be a sinful
l) See "CalvinsCalvinism11 , Part 2, p. 27; also ch. 8 above
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""being; as strange as it would be to argue, 
"because it is always dark when the sun is gone, 
and never dark when the sun is present, that 
therefore all darkness is from the sun, and that 
his disc and "beams Must needs "be black." l)
Now several things may be said about this. In the 
first place, it has not been shown that "sin is not the 
fruit of any positive agency or influence of the Most 
High, but, on the contrary, arises from the witholding
,f
of his action and energy"; and while this latter clause 
may express what the Aminians think the Calvinists are 
forced to admit, it is not necessarily the limit of what 
the Calvinists should contend. And in the second place, 
this whole idea that men sin when God leaves them to 
themselves, and only when He leaves them to themselves, 
while it may, as Edwards maintains, give no ground at 
all for calling God a sinful being, is yet in itself an 
unproved assumption, and one which rests upon the distinction 
between the natural and the supernatural, a distinction which 
in this context amounts to saying either that there is an 
independent force of evil in the world which lays hold upon 
men when they are deserted by God, or else that men are in 
themselves independent of God and are evil, though inferior 
in strength to God. All of which ia to aav r not nnly that
l) Op. cit. f p. 364.
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nature is evil f but that evil ia natural. But the 
impossibility of such an explanation is immediately 
made apparent when we ask, Whence came nature? and How 
does it happen in a world made by God that evil, which 
on the very assumption being considered is contrary to 
His raature, is natural? And again this analogy of the sun 
is worse than useless, because the point we are concerned 
about is not whether men sin when God deserts them, but 
granting toat they do, why does God desert them, and how 
does it happen when He does desert them that they 
necessarily sin. If the sun had anything to say about 
whether it would stay and shine, or sink below the hori­ 
zon and be followed by darkness, then it would just 
to that extent be responsible for the darkness which 
followed on its departure. -^he fact that it has not any 
such voice in the matter is the very thing which prevents 
it from being in any sense the cause of the darkness; but 
it is just the point, also, which destroys all the force of 
the analogy. Edwards is right in contending that even if 
one 6'hould argue that darkness was from the sun in this sense 
that the sun was responsible for it by deliberately departing 
that it might appear, no sensible person would therefore
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contend that "his disc and "beams must needs by black", - 
for the simple reason that darkness did not charac - 
fceiaae their appearance but their absence. And so it 
is with God. We can believe that God is good and that 
His influence is good; and even if we say that evil 
follows upon the removal of His influence, as Edwards 
and the Arminians seem to be agreed that it does; yet 
there is no reason here to conclude that God must be evil 
and that His influence is such. The very thing noticed 
is the difference between good and evil, and if it be dis­ 
covered that the former follows from the presence of God, 
and the latter from His absence, surely this discovery 
furnishes no legitimate reason for a conclusion which 
would amount to its contradiction. But it is hard to 
believe that this is really what the Arminians were 
concerned about - or at any rate it is not what they 
should have been concerned about; for even if one should 
suppose that it rested with the sun to decide whether it 
would stay and shine or depart and be followed by darkness, 
there still remains ^EKis even greater distinction between 
the sun and God, namely that there is nothing other than 
God saye what He has.Himself created. The thing Edwards 
should have seen, and apparently did not, was simply that 
if one granted all this supposed Arminian argument to be
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foolishness, there still remained the great problem 
of how there appeared this difference between good
and evil in a world created by what we are all willing
1)
to believe is a good G-od, and also how it happens
1) There does appear to be a marked difference between 
the possibility of the appearance of evil in a good 
universe and the possibility of the appearance of good 
in an evil universe. If God is the omnipotent Creator 
of the universe and is Himself evil, the universe is 
evil. But this only means that it is morally evil from 
our standpoint; it cannot possibly be actually evil 
from God's standpoint, for if it were so, there would 
be no reason for His having created it. In a rational 
universe, not even an evil God does things which to 
Him are evil. (See Aquinas,"Compendium", ch. 19) And 
if the universe is not rational, there can be no moral 
distinctions, and we can say nothing about this or any 
other matter. And if in a rational universe we consider 
both God and the universe evil, then it simply means 
that our moral standard is different from God's stand­ 
ard of actual good and evil; and we are not justified 
in concluding that God's moral standard is the same as 
ours, and that what is actually good and desirable to 
Him is in His view morally evil, because the very 
fact that our conception of moral goodness was out of 
accord with what to God was actually good, might lead 
us to suppose that our conception was mistaken. Our 
conception of moral goodness is closely wrapped up 
with what we judge to be actually good for us in the 
universe. What reason have we, therefore, for concluding 
that God's moral standard is In conformity with ours, 
and not in conformity with His own view of what to Him 
is desirable? The very possibility of such a supposition 
presupposes a moral standard altogether apart from G-od. 
But if this IB so, whence came this moral standard? - 
a moral standard in which goodness corresponds not to 
what is, but to what is not? If we divorce the moral 
from the actual in any such way as this, then we are 
left with the difficulty of accounting for how we 
happen to have such a moral standard. Either we must 
conclude that our moral standard is a mistaken one, *» 
in which case God and the universe are really morally 
good; or we must conclude that it was good from God's 
standpoint that we have the true standard of morality,
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that God can actually leave men to themselves. This 
raises the whole question of God's activity in the world, 
which in turn involves the question of the nature of 
creation.
Edwards touches upon neither of these last two 
points, "but he does go on to deal with a problem closely 
related to the first. He does not raise the question 
how the difference "between good and evil appears in a 
world created "by a good God; he simply takes the actual 
existence of both good and evil for granted, and proceeds 
to argue that it is fitting that God should order and 
govern "both. He asks:
"Is it not "better that the good and evil which 
happens in God f s world, should "be ordered, 
regulated, "bounded, and determined, "by the good 
pleasure of an infinitely v/ise Being, --- 
than to leave these tilings to fall out "by 
chance, and to be determined by those causes 
which imve no understanding or aim?" l)
but that for us to have the true standard is a moral 
evil. But now, according to our own standard it cannot 
be morally evil for us to know what is really morally 
good and morally evil. Therefore, in this respect, at 
least, we must conclude that God ! s action is morally 
good, and that in this particular His- conception of the 
desirable corresponds with the morally good. God cannot, 
then, be wholly; and an absolutely evil universe 
becomes an impossibility.
1) Op. cit., p. 365.
255
EVIL.
But now the question is not, whether it is not better 
if we are to have good and evil, to have the matter under 
the control of God. The question is, if the matter is 
entirely under the control of God, how there can "be any 
evil at all. Edwards' remarks on this point suggest very 
strongly that the whole position is a compromise, a choice 
between two evils*of which the better is evil under con­ 
trol. But the enigma is, how evil ever gets into the uni­ 
verse to start with; and the question which still remains 
is: Can there by any real evil in a good universe?
2. God Does No Evil.
Edwards very rightly maintains that God does no evil 
in allowing sin; but the thing he does not see is that this 
is really to contend that sin is not evil. He declares:
"On the whole it is manifest, that God may be, 
in the manner which has been described, the 
orderer and disposer of that event, which, in 
the inherent subject and agent is moral evil; 
and yet his so doing may be no moral evil. —- 
Sin may be an evil thing; and yet that there 
should be such a disposal and permission as that 
it should come to pass, may be a good thing." l)
l) Op. cit., p. 366, See Aquinas, "Compendium11 , ch. 19.
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And then Edwards strikes the point which Calvin had 
already "brought out and which if followed through might 
possibly be the solution of the difficulty. He says,
"Joseph's brethren selling him into Egypt, 
consider it only as it was acted by them, 
and with respect to their views and aims, 
which were evil, was a very bad thing; but 
it was a good thing, as it was an event of 
God's ordering, and considered with respect 
to his views and aims, which were good." l)
But this is to say, not merely that it is not 
wrong for God to permit sin or moral evil - which is a 
most highly doubtful assertion, though it is the assertion 
Edwards is guilty of making, - this is to say that the event 
which from one point of view is evil, is from a more ade­ 
quate point of view, namely that of God, not evil at all 
but good. And Edwards specifically says as much when he 
says
"Joseph's brethren selling him into Egypt ——- was 
a good thing —— considered with respect to God's 
views and aims."
The thing Edwards is forever failing to see is that 
the same thing cannot be both good and evil at the s&me 
time and from the same point of view; and that consequently 
if any event is good from God's point of view, it cannot 




that evil is good to God is to contend that God is evil, 
a. Distinction between God's Secret and Revealed Wills*
TiS/hile there may be a real distinction between God's 
secret and revealed will* Edwards 1 treatment of the subject 
is too obscure to be of much value to the Calvinist 
argument. He remarks t
"God's secret and revealed will, or, in other 
words, his disposing and perceptive will, may 
be diverse, and exercised in dissimilar acts, 
the one in disapproving and opposing, the other 
in willing and determining, without inconsistence. 
^e«-v**ci although these dissimilar exercises of the 
Divine will may, in some respects, relate to the 
same things, yet, in strictness, they have different 
objects, the one evil, and the other good. Thus, 
for instance, the crucifixion of Christ was a 
thing contrary to the revealed or perceptive will 
of God; because, as it was viewed and done by 
his malignant murderers, it was a thing infinitely 
contrary to the holy inclination of his heart, re­ 
vealed in his law. Yet this does not at all hinder 
but that the crucifixion of Christ, considered with 
all those glorious consequences which were within 
the view of the Divine Omniscience, might be> 
indeed, and therefore might appear to God to be f 
a glorious event; and consequently be agreeable 
to his will, though this will may be secret, i.e. 
not revealed in God's law. Adn thus considered, 
the crucifixion of Christ was not evil, but good*"
Kow here Edwards seems to be contending that God's
Op. cit., pp. 367f. One is not certain whether per­ 
ceptive or preceptive is meant in this.
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revealed will is His will of opposition to evil* and His 
secret will* His will of determination of good. And he 
maintains that this position is not inconsistent, because 
these two acts of willing relate really to different objects* 
And then he cites, not two objects, but one: the Crucifixion, - 
taking it in what he conceives to be two different aspects* 
But they are not two different aspects from the same point of 
view; but rather, two different points of view* How it is 
undeniable that there are connected with the Crucifixion cer­ 
tain features which appear to us as definitely evil and nec­ 
essarily opposed to the will of God. But if we maintain this, 
as Edwards does, how are we, on the supposition of Divine 
Omnipotence, to account for their existence? The Crucifixion 
itself, as an historical event, involves all these features; 
they actually characterize it. Hay, it is impossible to 
conceive how the Crucifixion could ever have occurred with­ 
out these or some other apparently evil features* And in 
a world governed by a Divine Omnipotent Providence, if 
this event occurred, it must have occurred just as it did, 
because it and all its attending circumstances were willed by 
God* Edwards supposes that when he points out the
1) As Aquinas says, "Since, therefore, the Will of God
is the universal cause of all things, it must necessarily
be always fulfilled." ("Compendium", ch. 19, p. 55).
But if it is the cause of all things and is always fulfilled,
nothing can happen but as a result of it.
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gloriouaness of the Crucifixion from the standpoint of its
consequences in the Divine economy he is obviously
justifying God's secretly willing it, without in any
way involving God's secret will in conflict with what he
has just contended was His revealed will in the matter.
But he has actually succeeded in doing nothing "but put them
in the most direct opposition. God's revealed will, being
a will of opposition to evil, has rejected the very events which
God's secret will has decreed shall occur. Apparently
Edwards is supposing that God's secret will wills only
those characteristics of the Crucifixion which he calls
good. But obviously it wills also those characteristics
which he calls evil and contends are opposed by God's
revealed will; because these latter are just as much
a part of the Crucifixion, as it actually occurred in
world history, as the former. Edwards supposes that he
has reconciled the two aspects of God's will be ascribing
to God
"different and opposite exercises of heart respecting 
different objects, and objects contrary to one 
another; 11
but he has done nothing of the sort. He has given us one 
object, the Crucifixion, and called it both good and evil,
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and argued accordingly that it was decreed by God's 
secret will and opposed "by His revealed will. Which is 
as consistent as saying that God willed it and did not 
will it at the same time; or rather that God "both willed 
it and opposed it; or that it was both pleasing to God 
and displeasing to Him,
To characterize God's revealed will as a will of 
the rejection of evil in such a way as Edwards does, is 
wholly erroneous. The real distinction between God's 
secret will and His revealed will, which Edwards seems 
never able to discover, is simply that when we use these 
two terms we are using 'will* in two definitely different
meanings• God's secret will is His active choice of
a 
what exists in the world. His revealed will is merely/name
given to a moral code which presumably expresses such an 
ideal for human conduct as if followed would make it 
conform, not to God's actual will, which is His secret 
will, but to the same degree of moral perfection as 
characterizes God. The simple fact of the matter is that 
God does not will all men to be like Himself with respect 
to the righteousness of their motives. Yet this is not 
to say, as Edwards appears to say, that God in so doing 
wills the existence of evil, - nor is it to say that He
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does evil, - since we have just supposed His motives, to "be 
righteous.
Furthermore i t is extremely difficult to see why 
Edwards should speak of God's revealed will as expressing 
itself only in "disapproving and opposing". It surely 
indicates what a man should do, as well as what he should 
not do, and indicates the Divine approval as well as 
disapproval.
whatever the relation between God's secret and revealed 
will, Edwards does not seem yet to have discovered it, and 
his references to it, instead of clearing up difficulties, 
only make his development of the Calvinistic position more 
confused. In strict accord with a thoroughly consistent 
Calvinism there seems to be only one thing to be said 
about God's revealed will: it is the expression of an ideal 
for human conduct. God does not will that every man shall 
reach it; He wills that some shall strive to reach it; 
and that a great many, at least, shall have some conception 
of what the ideal is. This view presents tremendous 
difficulties; but it avoids the inconsistency of saying 
that God's revealed will refers to one thing and His secret 
to another, and then pointing to an illustration, which shows 
that they refer to the same.
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One may suspect that what Edwards was trying to say 
was that the same act may appear evil from our standpoint 
and not so from God's, merely because we have only a 
partial view of it. And it is the vague awareness of this 
truth that Edwards expresses in the foilowing*
"There is no inconsistence in supposing, 
that God may hate a thing as it is in'itself, 
and considered simply as evil, and yet that 
it may be his will it should come to pass, 
considering all consequences•" l)
flow it is perfectly true that God may hate a thing 
'considered simply as evil 1 and yet may will that it should 
come to pass because He sees that its consequences are 
good. But if the consequences of the thing are good and 
such as God desired, there would seem to be some mistake 
about considering it simply as evil; and one may very 
rightly question whether or not it is possible to know 
what a thing is in itself apart from its universal re­ 
lations and consequences. And if its consequences are good and 
God chooses that the thing shall exist, how can He hate it?
Edwards is certainly close to the truth here, As we 
shall see later, God would hate certain things if they 
existed alone, or if their relations and consequences were 
different, which He very justly wills to be exactly as they
l) Op. cit. t pp.
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are. This is almost what Edwards says, but not quite. 
There is this significant difference: Edwards says the
V
thing is in itself evil and hateful to God, yet He wills 
it - "because of its good consequences (which is simply saying, 
not that God does evil, but that He wills evil, that good 
may come)j while what would seem to be the correct statement 
from the Calvinistic point .of view is that that v/hich God 
willg often appears to us as evil f and would doubtless "be 
si6 f if it were taken out of its universal context. 
Edwards goes on to remark:
"I believe there is no person of good understanding, 
who will venture to say, he is certain that it is 
impossible it should be best, taking in the whole 
compass and extent of existence, and all consequences 
in the endless series of events, that there should be 
such a thing as moral evil in the world* And if so, 
it will certainly follow, that an infinitely wise 
Being who always chooses what is best, must choose 
that there should be such a thing, And if so, then 
such a choice is not evil, but a wise and holy 
choice." l)
3» Does Edwards Leave Anv Place for Evil?
Now one will not question for a moment that if things 
are as Edwards here declares them to be, the choice is a 
wise and holy one. But ""hat also seems to follow is that 
if the choice is wise and holy, the thing chosen must itself 
be gQod r and that if it be good for the world that moral
l) Op. cit,, pp.
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evil exist, then what we call moral evil is not really 
moral evil at all, but good. But that Edwards did not 
see this, is clear from his further remark that
God's "willing to order things so that evil 
should come to pass, for the sake of the contrary 
good, is no argument that he does not hate evil 
as evil: and if so, then it is no reason why he 
may not reasonably forbid evil as evil, and punish 
it as such." l)
In the first place, it seems most strange that evil 
should result in its contrary, and questionable, to say the 
least. In the second place, if God really does forbid evil 
as evil, then evil as evil does not exist to be punished. 
Edwards is evidently thinking here, not of God the Creator 
but of God the Righteous Judge* But are these conceptions 
the same? Evidently they are not; for what applies to 
the one does not apply to the other.
A better statement of the actual situation is found 
in the following assertions of Turnbull in his Christian 
Philosophy, quoted from Edwards 5
"If the Author and Governor of all things be 
infinitely perfect, then whatever is, is right; 
of all possible systems he hath chosen the best; 
and consequently there is no absolute evil in the 
universe. This being the case, all the seeming 
imperfections or evils in it are such only in a 
partial view; and, with respect to the whole 
system, they are goodfl."
"There is no evil in the univ&rse."
God "intends and pursues the universal go04 
of his creation: and the evil which happens, 
is not permitted for its own sake, or through
P. 370
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Many pleasure in evil, but "because it is requisite 
to the greater good pursued. 11 l)
This agrees with what Calvin acknowledges to have
been truly said by Augustine:
"In sin, or in evil, there is nothing positive.* 2)
no 
And it is/more than is logically deducible from what
Edwards goes on to observe concerning the perfect happiness 
of God and the nature of moral evil. It would seem that the 
Calvinist in any case is forced to agree with Leibniz that this 
is the best of all possible worlds.
Edwards lays down the following as "maxims of plain 
truth, and indisputable evidence 11 :
"1. That God is a perfectly happy ..being, in 
the most absolute and highest sense possible.
2. That it will follow from hence, that God 
is free from everything that is contrary to 
happiness; and so, that in strict propriety 
of speech, there is no such thing as any 
pain, grief, or trouble in God.
3. When any intelligent being is really crossed 
and disappointed, and things are contrary to what 
he truly desires, he is the leas pleased, or has 
less pleasure, his pleasure and happiness is 
diminished f and he suffers what is disagreeable to 
him, or is the subject of something that is of a
1) Turnbull, "Christian Philosophy11 , pp. 35, 37, and 40 
respectively; quoted from Edwards, "On the Will 11 , pp. 
footnote.
In the last chapter of the present thesis, a view 
similar to that of Turnbull is expressed, though neither 
Edwards nor Turnbull were read until after this chapter 
Tsas witten, the present chapter having been inserted after 
the completion of the first draft of the thesis.
2) Calvin, "Defence of the Secret Providence of God", p. 13. 
("Calvin's Calvinism", PartII.)
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"nature contrary to joy and happiness, even 
pain and grief." l)
And in a footnote he adds,
"Certainly it is not less absurd and unreasonable 
to talk of God's will and desires being truly 
and properly crossed, without his suffering 
any uneasiness, or anything grievous or dis­ 
agreeable, than it is to talk of something that 
may be called a revealed will fwhich may,in 
some respect, be different from a secret purpose; 
which purpose may be fulfilled, when the other 
is opposed." 2)
But this strikes one as being exactly what Edwards has 
done. There is nothing left in the Crucifixion, e.g., 
for the 'revealed will* to oppose, which the 'secret 
purpose* has not decreed. The 'revealed will' cannot 
really oppose the sin and evil which, according to Edwards, 
characterized the Crucifixion*because so far as he makes 
evident these were no less real and actual phases of it 
than its eternal consequences; they actually happened, 
and if they did happen, they were decreed by God's 'secret 
will*. It not only follows from what Edwards says about 
God's perfect happiness, that G0d is free from everything 
contrary to happiness, it also follows either that evil 
does not exist, or that God does not hate it; and that 
either sin does not exist, or is not evil. Edwards sees that 
his three axioms involve somebody in a dilemma; but
Edwards, "On the Will", p. 371. 
Ibid., footnote, the same page.
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strangely enough he appears to imagine that it is his 
opponent! For he remarks,
"From this last axiom it follows, that if no 
distinction is to "be admitted between God's 
hatred of sin, and his will with respect to 
the event and the existence of sin, as the 
all-wise Determiner of all events, under the 
view of all consequences through the whole 
compass and series of things; —— then, it 
certainly follows, that the coming to pass 
of every individual act of sin is truly, all 
things considered, contrary to his will, and 
that his will is really crossed in it; and 
this in proportion as he hates it. -— TOiich 
would be to make him infinitely the most miserable 
of all beings;*since if some distinction is not made, 
"he must continually be the subject of an immense 
number of real and truly infinitely great crosses 
and vexations."l)
But if Edwards sees so clearly the need for making 
a distinction "between God's hatred of sin, and his will 
with respect to the event and the existence of sin", why 
does he not make one? He admits that God wills the exist­ 
ence of sin, and yet he goes on speaking of His hatred of it, 
as if His hatred of it and His choice of it were equally 
true and existed on the same level of reality. Edwards 
firmly maintains that a distinction must be made. But 
what distinction? Hi/hat the reader craves to know is, how 
God can both hate and desire sin at the same time. And 
this is exactly what Edwards never makes clear. It does 
not suffice merely to say, as Edwards does, that God
Op.cit.,p.372,
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does not desire sin as sin, without going on and saying 
what inevitably follows from this on Edwards' view, namely, 
that sin as sin does not exist, and that therefore God does 
not hate the sin which exists, because it is not really sin. 
But this is exactly what Edwards does not go on to say. 
a. Not a case of "Evil that good mav come."
He is perfectly right in maintaining that this is 
not the same as saying that God may do evil that good 
mav comes because even if evil is real, and God wills 
its existence, He does no evil, if He wills it for a 
good end. There is still a distinction between God's 
doing this and a man's committing what he recognizes to 
be a sinful act in order that what he conceives to be a 
good may result from it. And this distinction is simply 
that God being the sole Creator and Governor of the 
universe has the right to order all things for the ult­ 
imate good, and if the existence of evil is good - which 
is part of the argument - then to will its existence is 
not an evil but a good; whereas man has not the right 
actually to do evil that good may result from it, which 
is an entirely different thing. Of course, if we deny 
that the man in so doing actually does dp evil, then we 
are simply destroying the whole force of the argument, 
and the consequence is that we arrive at the conclusion
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that it is impossible for anyone to do evil that good 
may come of it, "because the motive wholly determines the 
character of the act and so to act is not to do evil. 
But it is questionable if there does not still remain a 
difference between God and man with regard to this 
matter on the score of wisdom and consequent assurance. 
It may be doubted whether a man is a competent judge in 
such a case, and whether or not he is morally warranted in 
deciding that the actual good outweighs the actual evil 
resulting from his decision to act in this way. Consider­ 
ing his ignorance and the tremendous possibility of his 
being mistaken, he may be guilty in so acting of, at least, 
the sin of presumption. But such cannot be said of God 
on this supposition. If He wills the existence of actual 
evil, He does so with definite assurance that it is un­ 
questionably best. If man so acted, he would not sin 
either. His sin comes from the impossibility of his being 
a competent judge in such matters.
But the question still remains whether or not God 
does will the existence of actual moral evil that good 
may come of it. If He does do so, His doing it is not 
evil. But, is it logically possible for Him to do so? 
According to Edwards,
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"In order to a thing's "being morally evil, 
there must "be one of these things belonging 
to iti either it must be a thing unfit and 
unsuitable in its own nature* or it must 
have a bad tendency: or it must proceed from 
an evil disposition, and be done for an evil 
end7"lj
But while Edwards' contention that God's conduct is on 
no account reprehensible, because it is not in itself 
unsuitable that He should govern the world and do exact­ 
ly as He does, nor does His conduct have a bad tendency, 
nor does it proceed from an evil disposition, is perfect­ 
ly sound; yet, all this being true, wherein can the things 
which happen in the world according to God's good plan, them­ 
selves be considered evil? Edwards quite rightly remarks,
"It is no evil desire to desire good, and to 
desire that which, all things considered, is 
best. "2)
But if it is good which is desired, and that which is 
really beat f wherein is the thing itself, the event, the 
actual historical happening, evi^.? 
Edwards continues*
"2. It is not of a bad tendency,, for the 
Supreme Being thus to order and permit that 
moral evil to be, which it is best should 
come to pass.
All Edwards is saying is that it is ^ood that evil 








of the thing, and 'good' to its existence. But since it 
exists only through the choice of God, the thing itself 
must be good from His standpoint, or He would not choose 
it. The particular thing cannot itself be evil and its 
existence good from the same standpoint, without making 
'evil 1 equivalent to 'good*. The 'evil 1 , then, must 
refer to the nature of the thing simply from our stand­ 
point; and the thing appears evil to us because we do 
not see it in its relation to the whole.l) As far as God 
is concerned, to use Edwards' own words,
"what is aimed at is good, and good is the 
actual issue in the final result of things."2)
And the conclusion to be drawn from this is that from
»
God's standpoint evil does not exist. There is evil;
but it do«s not exist,
The Sntrance of Sin into the World.
With regard to the problem of the entrance of sin 
into the world, it is difficult to say just what Edwards' 
position is. He appears to admit that God so ordered 
the circumstances of man's life that "his sin would in­ 
fallibly follow" from the withholding of Divine assist-* 
tan&e, but he denies that God "first made man with a fixed 
prevailing principle of sin in his heart,"
1) One comes here, through following Calvinism to its 
logical limits, to what appears to be the Hegelian 'concrete 






"It was meet, if sin did come into existence, 
and appear in the world, it should arise from 
the imperfection which properly belongs to a 
creature, as such, and should appear so to do, 
that it might appear not to be from God as the 
efficient or fountain. But this could hot have 
been, if man had been made at first with sin 
in his heart; nor unless the abiding principle 
and habit of sin were first introduced by an 
evil act of the creature. If sin had not arose (?!'- 
from the imperfection of the creature, it 
would not have been so visible, that it did 
not arise from Grod, as the positive cause, 
and real source of it." l)
But this is to say practically nothing as to what sin is 
and how it came into the world. Edwards, like Calvin, 
offers no real explanation, and he does not even avoid 
the unmeaning attempts at explanation which he ridicules 
the Arminians for making.
In the first place, is 'the imperfection which properly 
belongs to a creature* moral imperfection? If so, then it 
is evident that the Creator is the positive cause of sin, and 
that man is made 'with a fixed prevailing principle of sin in 
his heart*. And if not, then this imperfection is no ex­ 
planation of how sin comes to be.
In the second place, to contend that "the abiding prin­ 
ciple and habit of sin were first introduced by an evil act
l) Op. cit., pp.
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of the creature" (in which Edwards again agrees with 
Calvin), is to offer no explanation at all for the 
first sinful act. What we want to know is, how man 
came to sin in the first place5 and Edwards, full of 
wisdom, tells us that the habit of sinning resulted from 
the first sin. But this is to say nothing at all about 
the reason for the first sin* As a matter of fact Edwards 
runs away from the problem by pretending that it would require 
too much space to go into all the difficulties which arise 
in connection with it. Later he ridicules the Arminians 
roundly for supposing that it is an explanation of the 
difficulty to say, either that "the first sinful act of 
choice was before the first sinful act of choice, and chose 
and determined it, aid brought it to pass", or that "the 
first sinful volition chose, determined, and produced itself; 
which is to say, it was before it v/as", or that "the first 
sinful volition arose accidentally, without any cause at all". 
But do not he and Calvin put themselves in the same position 
with regard to this matter as the Arminians? The only 
alternative is to say boldly that God being the First Cause 
of all things, is the First Cause of sin, "the positive 
cause, and real source of it," in so far as we are concerned 
with its existence. But Edwards does not say this, because
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he evidently thinks that to say so, is to call God a
sinner. So he speaks of the creature as introducing
something. But how can the creature introduce anything
in such a way as to relieve God of the final responsibility
of being its ultimate originator? The whole force of
Edwards' "book is to show that the causal chain cannot "be
broken. If Edwards means to imply that sin first entered
into the world as a result of an evil act of the creature,
he is only admitting that the creature was already sinful
before the first evil act. And then the question is,
how did he become sinful. Certainly not as a result of
his own sinful acts, for he had not yet committed any.
Thus Edwards is as bad off as his opponents, and he can only say,
either that "the first sinful act 6'£ choice was before the 
first sinful act of choice", or that it chose itself, or 
else that it arooe from pure chance and was caused by 
nothing. He supposed that he had another alternative; 
but if he had really pushed his explanation farther, instead 
of running away from it, he would have seen that he was 
involved in exactly the same cul-de-sac as the Arminians, 
and which he had all along been pointing out to them was a 
cul-de-sac.
The thing Edwards failed to see, or saw only vaguely, l)
l) This may be the explanation Edwards really was feeling 
for; but he certainly never makes it clear, and he very 
evidently turns off into another way.
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was that to admit that God was the First Cause of sin in the 
same positive fashion that He was the First Cause of every­ 
thing else which existed, was not to make God a sinner. 
God is undeniably the First Cause of the fact of my riding 
a "bicycle, He is the positive cause of it, and the one 
ultimately responsible for it; yet this is not to say that 
it is not I but G0d who rides the bicycle. The distinction 
is not that of degree of positiveness; but simply that between 
Determiner and actor. Edwards like Calvin seems to think 
that by putting a time interval between the creation of man 
and the first appearance of sin, he relieves God of the 
responsibility of sin; but this is a mere delusion, - and a 
most senseless one in view of the fact that he has almost 
arrived at the conclusion that even if evil exists, its 
existence is good. All he needed to say, therefore, was that 
the existence of sin was good, and therefore God was not a 
sinner in causing it to exist. But just as he failed to 
see that what we call 'evil 1 must not be such in reality to 
God, because He chooses that it shall be; so he fails to 
see the only way open to him to avoid calling God a sinner.
He really makes no advance on Calvin with regard to the 
explanation of the entrance of sin into the world. Both 
alike desert their guns and hide behind a hedge row in a side
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lane on this controversy.
But, for all their shortcomings in attacking this 
problem, we are much indebted to Calvin and Edwards for 
carrying their Theistic Determinism as far as they did, 
and it can scarcely be considered a mark of wisdom to 
join the group of those who ignorantly ridicule the major 
tenets of their system of theology. We may upbraid them 
for not going farther; but this in itself is commendation 
of the great high-road on which they were travelling. It 
is interesting to note again ir. closing, the already quoted 
remark of Professor James Ward, together with a portion of 
its elaboration:
M If we start from theism —- then indeed the ne­ 
cessitarian position appears to be axiomatic. It is 
I think, generally allowed that in the long theological 
controversies, which for centuries have raged round our 
problem, logic has been on the side of those who, like 
Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin and Edwards, have maintained 
the doctrine of divine predestination, the doctrine 'that 
God orders all events, and the volitions of moral agents 
amongst others, by such a decisive disposal, that the 
events are infallibly connected vjith his disposal 1 . -— 
The absolute omniscience and omnipotence of God are 
regarded as beyond question; and from these follow as 
a corollary the absolute and eternal decrees. As Jonathan 
Edwards concisely put it: 'All things are perfectly and 
equally in his view from eternity; hence it will follow 
that his designs or purposes are not things formed anew, 
founded on any new views or appearances, but are all et­ 
ernal purposes.' 11 l)
l) James Ward, "Realm of Ends", p. 308. The quotations are 
both from what Prof. Ward calls "Jonathan Edwards'* 
classical treatise".
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A THfil&TIG
Haying seen that Calvin and Edwards dereloped a system of 
theology which while tending towards a complete Determinism yet 
drew back "before the Problem of Evil; we hare now to consider 
whether or not there can be a thorough-going Determinism which 
is both Theistic and Christian; for if what purports to be a 
system of Christian Theology, is really neither Theistic nor 
Christian, it must definitely be rejected. As a philosophy 
it may be highly satisfactory; but as a Christian Theology it is 
of no value.
As we have also seen, the deterministic features ©f
are 
CalTinism/consistent with the teaching of the Scriptures, -
and what is particularly important, the Scriptural teaching of 
our Lord Himself. If it is not possible to develop this 
teaching into a consistent theological system, it would seem 
that Christianity itself is illogical, and must either be 
changed or discounted accordingly. However, I think it is 
possible to develop Calvin's major trend into a thoroughly 
consistent system which will be at the same time Theistic and 
Christian: that is, the different elements in the Christian 
teaching can be woven together into a consistent system of 
theology, and this theology will be deterministic.
MONISM.
But now, let us have no false ideas about the far reaching 
effects of the acceptance of any form of Determinism. A 
deterministic theology will lead us into fields which have 
been generally considered "beyond the province of orthodox 
Christianity. They may not really have been so; they may 
hr..ve been underneath our Christian conceptions all the while, 
but they have not generally "been considered so, 
Determinism leads ultimately to Tlonism.
1$. the first place, Determinism, it seems to me, leads 
ultimately to Monism. There is no place in a thorough-going 
Determinism for real and ultimate indiriduality. And frankly, 
Theism has generally been considered as a particular form of 
Pluralism. Orthodox Christianity has always considered that 
while God made us, we were other than He, and He was other than 
we. Between us there was interaction through providence and 
prayer. God acted upon us> He influenced us> He ruled and 
governed us; and we in turn were obligated to surrender ourselres 
to Him. With all its expressions regarding God being all 
in allt the language of the Bible and of all Christian theology 
has been almost invariably pluralistic. And the language of 
Calvin is pluralistic. He is talking to us as if were 
individuals, and he is speaking of God's dealings with us as 
though we were separate from God; in spite of the fact that his
979
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conceptions are almost wholly deterministic. To speak so is 
only natural; and we shall never be able to avoid it. Nor 
is it desirable that we should. We still speak of the sun 
rising and setting, merely because to our eyes it does rise and 
set. We know as a matter of fact that with regard to this 
Matter it is the earth that moves and not the sun, but that 
does not enable us to see the earth moving about the sun; it 
still looks to us as if the sun were moving about the earth. 
Our increase of knowledge on this point has not made things 
appear any differently. We are simply aware of the fact that 
"Things are not always what they seenu" But, knowing that they 
are not, we shall still continue to speak of them in many cases 
as if they Were, simply because in these cases we are speaking 
of them not as we know them to be but as they still appear to 
be. And we do appear to ourselves and to one another to be 
separate and distinct individuals, however much we may believe 
ourselves to have no' existence apart from God. We cannot see 
God with the physical eye, so that when we are living in a 
physical world as physical beings, talking to other people who 
are physical beings other than ourselves, we cannot avoid con­ 
sidering ourselves as individuals and speaking and living accord­ 
ingly* But thi* does not mean at all that we may not at the
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same time believe that the physical world is not the ultimately 
real world.
The fact that we cannot lire and act on a thoroughly 
deterministic and monistic basis does not at all disprove the 
truth of Determinism and Monism; it merely shows that bare 
Determinism and bare Monism are not the whole of the truth* 
But we shall hare more to say of this later. We have not yet 
shown how Determinism leads ultimately to Monism*
Let us accept, for the sake of argument) the Calvinistic
their 
doctrines of Creation and Providence and/logical corollary*
Predestination, We say, then, that erery thing is created by 
God and every event happens according to His will* We hold 
that everything happens according to a strict law of causation* 
and therefore God as their Creator must be the First Cause of 
all things* But we say that all things are as they are because 
God decreed or willed them to be so, and this indicates that we 
are really speaking of God not only as a First Cause, but 
as a First Cause which is a Divine and Supreme Intelligence* 
In other words, the universe is not only causal but also 
rational* The two terms may ultimately mean the same thing; 
but they do not mean the same thing to a mechanistic determinist, 
at least, not if one uses 'rational* to imply the existence of a
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Supreme Reason or Intelligence behind the world.
It must be remembered that we are not concerned here to 
prove the existence of God. We are merely concerned to see 
if it is possible to develop a consistent Theistic Determinism 
which is also Christian. 
!• The Dependence of the Individual«
Let us consider* then* an individual life on a determin­ 
istic or Calvinistic hypothesis* The world in which one lives 
is not created by the individual* We may say that he molds 
certain parts of it and affects many of its elements; but in 
the main it is determined by other things than man* A man 
is born into this world-of-a-particular-sort, where things act 
according to certain apparently fixed laws* He is born at 
a particular time in the history of the world* when certain 
definite conditions characterize it. Over these thing the 
individual has no control, yet they greatly affect the course 
of his life* The background of his existence is made for him 
and not by him. The motions of the stars* the movements of 
the tides* the rotation of seasons* the mountains and the 
valleys* the rivers and the; seas* - all these are things which 
greatly affect the life of a man but are not made by him* We 
are born into the world* to take it as we find it and make the 
best of it*
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But it may be replied that in making the best of 
it we are showing our individuality* expressing our free­ 
dom. If we do not make the world, neither does the 
world make us* Ho, we are not contending that the 
physical world which forms the background of our earth­ 
ly lives makes us. We are only saying that it affects 
us* and we are perfectly willing to admit that we affect 
it. But our affect upon it is often very much over­ 
emphasised by optimistic theologians. There are a few 
instances in history where people have "made the desert 
blossom like a rose 1*; and there are doubtless a good 
many thousands of acres of land reclaimed from rivers and 
swamps. But generally it is the desert which dictates 
terms to those who inhabit it; and there is a limit to 
the control of rivers and the reclamation of swamps* 
So far in the history of man, the deserts and the moun­ 
tains* the rivers and ths seas* the forests and the plains* 
have had far more effect upon men than men have had upon 
them. We may mine our ore from the mountains and sail 
our ships on the sea; but the fact remains that we 
have to conform our lives to them* instead of conform­ 
ing them to our desires. We may sometimes overcome
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them when they stand in the way of the fulfilment of our 
desires; "but they are there to be overcome* and we have 
to take them as we find them. The world may have "been 
made for us; but it was not made by^ us. We may be the 
lords of creation; but we are still ourselves only crea­ 
tures. There is no use having an exaggerated idea of 
our importance. We are still merely sojourners in the 
world, pilgrims* not owners; and do what we will, one 
day we all strike our tents and depart. In the end we 
are defeated by the world. 
2. The Individual Is Nothing Apart from God.
But now, admitting all this; admitting that our 
liveB are much circumscribed, that the apparent alternati­ 
ves before us in any situation are very limited; yet are 
we not free within that small area, and does not- this 
limited freedom enable. us to control our own eternal 
destiny, if the grave is not the end of life, and the 
universe is moral?
In ansTveriri*-.; tmp *u«yiuion let UP confio.er ior a 
moment what we are ourselves. All men share in common 
this background of the physical world, and a good many 
siiare tne particular gco^rapnic<Ai uondrtiuns oi' any one 
area. In addition tnere is tne social environment of
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the civilization, the nation* the smaller social group* 
and the home. These also are things into which a man is 
horn. He may effect changes in them later; but not until 
they have affected him. But what determines his reaction 
to this and the larger, more strictly physical environ­ 
ment? The character of the man himself, But what, 
over and above these things* determines a man's char­ 
acter? The first thing of course is his heredity, his 
physical and mental inheritance from his pa.rents and the 
long line of his ancestors. All these things help to 
determine the character of the man himself; he neither 
makes nor chooses any of them.
But in addition to all this, one will say, there is 
the individual nature of the man himself, something over 
and above both heredity and environment. That is the 
thing which in the last analysis determines the individ­ 
ual's destiny. It is in this that freedom is grounded. 
But the man had no more choice with regard to his nature 
than he had with regard to his heredity and environment. 
His nature, if anything more tnaii nerecuty, j.s created 
by God. To begin with the man no more makes himself 
than he makes the world in which he lives.
a. Some form of Determinism inevitable in a. rational 
universe.
But one will say this is all beside the point. We 
are not concerned with what a man is to start with, but 
what he does after he is started. He cannot be free to
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choose whether he will be or not, because he does not 
even exist to make the choice. Nor can he choose his 
individual nature to start with* nor his physical and 
mental inheritance, nor his environment. But once he 
has been created and placed in a particular setting, 
then he is free to make the best of the situation and 
is morally responsible to do so. Let us take the case, 
then, of deciding what one is to do in a particular 
situation. To all appearances one seems to have free­ 
dom of choice, within the limits prescribed by the cir­ 
cumstances. I may not be able to do whatever I want to 
do regardless of circumstances; but it seems that I can 
do what I want to do within the limits prescribed. For 
instance, a man who is dying may not be able to choose 
to live. He may choose to live in the sense of desir­ 
ing to, but the choice is not open to him. He is cer­ 
tainly not free to do whatever he wants to do. Neither 
is he free to choose the particular physical circum­ 
stances of the kind of death he will die. But it does 
seeia that he vrili "be a>)le to choose how he will behave 
under the circumstances. He will be brave or cowardly; 
he will be calm and quiet in spite of pain, or he will 
"be terrified and cry out in his agony; he will be gbli- 
•'oitous of the welfare of'his loved ones, or he will be
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only concerned with the dreadfulness of his own predic­ 
ament and the uncertainty of his own future; he will 
long for the blessedness of eternal life in Christ, or 
else will be afraid to leave this familiar world in 
which he has come to feel at home. But what he does 
depends on what he is, and what he is depends on what 
he was to start with plus what he has experienced and 
done in the course of his life. But in no single in­ 
stance has there been any real choice. Every decision 
has been similiarly determined by the present circum­ 
stances plus the past that has gone into the making 
of the individual himself.
But it will .be said that there are very different 
meanings of 'causality 1 and that we must not think of 
motives and desires in the same v/ay we think of physical 
causes. Certainly not; but motives and desires are 
causes nevertheless, and the effects are as inevit­ 
able.l) We need not think of the situation in mech­ 
anical terms at all; but given a particular individ­ 
ual in a particular situation, and a particular result 
is inevitable, if the lav/ of causality really is univer­ 
sal. And if not, it seems that we are left with the 
impossible position of having to maintain the equili­ 
brium of the will. In other words that the individual
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l) See Edwards, "On the Will," Part 2, Sect.10.
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himself does not determine hie own conduct under the 
circumstances, "but it is a mere matter of chance 'be­ 
tween a limited number of alternatives. If one thinks 
Determinism undermines the foundations of morality, what 
can be said for this strictly irrational element of 
real chance? If it is foolish to hold a man responsible 
for his conduct on a deterministic basis* it is worse 
than foolish even to mention responsibility in a world 
in which there is actually equilibrium of the human: .will, 
*lb that a man's actions are beyond his own control and 
just happen for no reason at all, without any cause or 
any sufficient ground. If such were the case, it would 
not only be the law of causality which vrould have to be 
discarded as not universal, the very rationality of the 
universe would have to be thrown over as well.
Some form of Determinism seems inevitable in a 
rational world. But many prefer to speak of Self- 
Determination, thereby either avoiding committing, them­ 
selves on deeper metaphysical questions or supposing 
that they are thus solving the whole problem without 
really being Determinists,-without really precluding 
the possibility of human freedom. The idea is that 
everything is free to express itself, that the only thing 
impeding a man is his own character. Such a view is
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thoroughly Calvinistic, and thoroughly deterministic. 
For the point is, what determines a man's character. 
Is it wholly a matter of chance? Or is it determined 
"by the chain of circumstances we have already mentioned: 
heredity, environment, his original nature as Ire was 
created by God, plus the extraneous elements in the cir­ 
cumstances of his life over which he obviously has no 
control? It seems that the man himself is only part of 
some larger whole. He is in no sense an independent 
being, a member of a pluralistic universe. In the end 
it all goes back to God. God makes the world what it is, 
and He makes us what we are. We do nothing but what He 
decrees; we are nothing but what He makes us.
The doctrines of Creation, Providence, and Predesti­ 
nation force us to adopt a deterministic view of the 
world; Determinism leads ultimately to Monism. Each 
individual is but part of a larger whole, the universe 
itself. If all that I do is decreed by God and deter­ 
mined by my character and the circumstances in which I 
am placed, and my character is itself decreed by God, 
then in the last analysis I am nothing and God is all. 
b. Not the common-sense view.
This may seem strange and far-fetched to people 
who take a common-sense view of life. It makes the
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whole experience of life far different from what it seems. 
But it is far different from what it seems. The world 
in which we live seems as far as ordinary vision is 
concerned a comparatively small* flat surface with a sol­ 
id "blue dome overhead, in which many small lights shine 
at night. And for thousands of years the rank and file 
of men thought it was so. "But it is not. Until quite 
recently all of us thought that tables and chairs, and 
all so-called solid objects, actually were solid. And 
now the physicists tell us they are not solid at all. 
According to Professor I!cwlngton,l) if all the ii*tt*r- 
0tta.es in the human body were removed and. the actually 
solid matter were collected into one compact thoroughly 
solid "body, it would, "be about the size of a microscopic 
pin point. IP/het appears to us a solid body is r-eally 
a million inf initessimal solar systems, v;ith open 
spaces as large proportionally as the spaces in the 
stellar universe. Things just are not what they seem.
We seem to be free, separate, distinct, more or 
less independent individuals* But when we begin to 
look for, ourselves, we are hard to find. Self conscious­ 
ness seems a basic fact in our experience. And so it is. 
There is something more than brain motions and mental
l) Gifford Lectures* Edinburgh, 1927.
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states. But the something more is not itself independ­ 
ent and free. Tt is a created thing. Tt acts accord­ 
ing to a definitely decreed plan. It fits into a cer­ 
tain scheme of things. It plays a definite, prearranged,
foreordained part in a physico-spiritual universe. 
It has no existence apart from that universe. . And 
that universe has no existence apart from God.
5. ?To place for Calvin T s Pluralism.
Calvin continually speaks a.K if we were other than 
God, as if God acted upon us, secured His will "by con­ 
straining us to o~bey Him unconsciously. And yet when 
he is definitely dealing with the problem he contends 
that God acts through us, that every mental state is de­ 
termined "by Him. Tlow it would seem that there can be 
nc half-way ground. Either we are ultimately and act­ 
ually other than God, independent, free creatures, either 
always coerced by God because He is more powerful than 
we, or else sufficiently powerful in ourselves to stand 
against Him and thwart Him occasionally; or else we 
are not ultimately and actually other than God, and He 
alone is the one and only real actor.
But if we are ultimately and actually other than 
God, and it is necessary for Him to coerce us, even 
though He does it without our knowing it, then we must
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have certain mental states which are independent of 
Him, He may have created us originally 9 He may "be able 
to use us and manipulate us alv/ays so that v/e do just 
His will; but v/e are other than He and He is forced 
to take account of us, and therefore there most now be 
something in our mental life which is as It is simply 
because of ourselves and not because of God. Other­ 
wise there can be no such complete otherness as this 
pluralistic view requires.
But where in a deterministic universe there can be 
found a place for such otherness it is hard to see. 
Pluralism of any sort means a plurality of creators; 
and a plurality of creators means that there is in the 
world today an element of real Freedom, and hence un­ 
certainty. Our attitudes and conduct may be overrid­ 
den and controlled; but according to such a view, they 
are not determined. On such a theory God created me to 
start with, but now I am other than He and in some res­ 
pects at least independent of Him. But I cannot be in 
any sense independent of Him if He determines everything 
that I am and think and do. Therefore if I am in such 
sense other than He, I am to that extent free, and to 
that extent there is no Determinism, no Providence, and
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no Predestination. This may not affect the ultimate 
end of things. It is no doubt the view which Calvin him­ 
self took of the situation* and is doubtless the view 
of most who today call themselves Calvinists. But it is 
not the view logically deduci"ble from Calvin's major doc­ 
trines of Providence and Predestination.
And besides» it is very difficult to see how even 
God could make something truly and ultimately other than 
Himself, to any degree independent of Himself. If God 
made me and made the world in which I live, then I can 
in no sense be ultimately independent of Him, a creator 
myself, without there being a break in the causal order. 
For if I create something apart from God, even though it 
be but a mental state, an attitude of mind, there is a 
break in the chain of cause and effect; something ab­ 
solutely new has come into "being for which there is no 
root in the past. It does not suffice to say that I 
created this thing and God created me, therefore the caus­ 
al order is not actually "broken. For if the existence 
of this thing is to be linked up'to the past in any such 
way as that and the causal chain is not to "be broken, then 
the ultimate creator even of this mental state is God, and 
the very case we are supposing becomes an impossibility.l)
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l) See EtieaBB Gifts on f s "Le IFhomi sme," ch.8., where he says: 
"Si tel est bien le mode de production que 1'on de"signe 
par le nom de creation, il apparatt imm^diatement que 
Dieu peut cre'er et qu'il est le seul a pouvoir creer. 
—— Dire que Dieu est^. cause universelle de tout I'etre, 
pris dans sa totalite', c'est done affirmer que Dieu 
est capable de cre'er. - — Or, il faut savoir que la 
notion de creature creatrice est contradictoire." (p.96.)
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Unirersal causality. Determinism, Monism; in the end
there is only God.
The Problem of Creation.
But if this is so, vhat is left of the Calvinistic 
doctrine of Creation, on v;hich we have depended to some 
extent for our arrival at llonicm? We have grounded our 
Determinism in God's creation of us and the v;orld. But 
if in the end there is nothing other than God, in what 
sense can there "be any creation? God simply is, and. that 
is the end of it. 'Creation does seem to imply some degree 
or form of otherness. 
1. Artistic * Great ion* perhaps a Dim and Distant Analogy*
But how can there "be any such thing as creation? 
what is it? Professor James Ward suggests in his Realm 
of Ends»l) that perhaps the 'creative activity' of the 
artist is somewhat akin to the creative activity of God* 
And if I remember correctly Professor Bowman of Glasgow 
holds a similiar view,2) that creation ex nihilo is not 
creation out of nothing; but simply that all things come 
to be in God's experience. If I understand what these 
men mean, it is a view v/hich reduces itself to a Theistic 
form of Idealism, In any case it is from their suggestions 
that I present the following as a possible surmise, I
1! Ward,"Realm of Ends." pp.238ff.Paper "before the Philosophy Club of Yale Uniyersity,
1926.
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presume we can never know definitely how the world was 
created, or just what is its nature. We can only 
speculate and seek for a consistent theory. Our attempt 
therefore at present is merely to present a possible devel­ 
opment of a Theistic form of Determinism. There seems no 
way of saying with any dogmatic assurance that it is a true 
metaphysic. One can only "believe it or reject it because 
of certain definite reasons,for doing so. 
a. Tfoe 'Anthropomorphic* aa Intelligible as the ' ^Mechanical * .
I am not sure but that this view will seem a very crude 
one. There is much in it which would lay it open to that most 
condemnatory charge of being 'anthropomorphic*. But personally 
I should prefer it to be called 'anthropomorphic* to 'mechanical'; 
for surely there is as much reality in man as in a machine,- 
man is of quite as high an order of being, and in any case it 
is only one analogy against another. We seem forced to try 
to understand unseen and unknown things in terms of something 
we appear to know already, and I can see no objections
applicable to 'anthropomorphic' representations which do not
a 
apply equally well to 'mechanical'. Certainly/man is as
intelligible apart from all knowledge of mechanics as a
from 
machine is apart/all knowledge of man. We may not be able to
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discover ourselves, and may not know what we are; "but 
we seem to know as little about mechanical things. If 
we cannot posit a knower without some form of mechanism 
no more can we posit the knowledge of mechanical things 
without a knower. What we call 'intelligence* seems quite 
as fundamental and intelligible as what we call a 'mechanism 1 .
b. The Biblical Account.
In the 2nd chapter of Genesis, verse 7> we read,
"And Jehovak God formed man of the dust of the ground, 
and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; 
and man became a living soul. 11
We understand this figuratively. Even prior to a belief in 
Evolution, few people indeed thought of God as moulding a 
figure out of dirt and making it alive by breathing into it. 
But it is not at all unlikely that the original writer of this 
passage understood it literally. We have little difficulty 
in supposing that the neighbouring people of the Mes^opotamian 
valley understood their similar story of the creation or 
making of man literally; and apart from pure assumption we 
have no grounds for thinking the Hebrews took an entirely 
different view of the situation. The thing they were 
attempting to account for was the existence of man. It is 
most &&tural to suppose that they really thought of God as 
doing exactly what they here speak of Him as doing. And 
in looking for a material from which He could form man there
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was none so likely to them as the very substance of the 
earth itself. Evidently the earth was in existence "before 
man, for we know that it exists apart from man, in that there 
are parts of it uninhabited, whereas man is only known as 
living upon it. As a matter of fact, what else could 
they suppose man to "be made of? Earth was the most 
basic thing they knew. And modern scientific knowledge or 
theory seems to substantiate their view. Man as a physical 
organism was made from the dust of the ground, and it 
must have been God who breathed into him the breath of 
life and made him a living soul; since we can account for 
it still in no other way. But we think of the process 
as different. God formed man from the dust of the ground, 
not as a sculptor would model his clay into a human figure, - 
which is evidently the way the ancient writer thought of it, 
since it is clearly the way he spoke of it, and he gives us 
no other clue^ to its interpretation, - but by the long process 
of evolution.
But now to form man in any way out of previously exist­ 
ing matter is not creation, in the strict sense. It is a 
creative act to make something entirely new, such as man,out 
of materials already existing which did not in themselves have 
the potentiality of becoming what was formed from them.
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But creation in the last analysis really means creation 
of the whole, material as well as form. And it is so 
understood probably both in the Bible and in Christian 
theology, for both in the first and second chapters of 
Genesis it speaks of the heavens and the earth as being 
created. In any case, whatever critical scholars may 
think of the teaching of the first two chapters of Genesis, 
Christian theologians have not posited some eternally ex­ 
isting matter for God to work upon, but have taught that 
creation was ex nihilo f - by which should be meant, not 
that 'nothing* is the material from which God formed the 
universe, but simply that nothing but God existed prior 
to creation, whether we take f prior 1 in a chronological or 
merely in a'logical sense. In other words, the doctrine is 
simply that God actually created all that is. And the 
orthodox Christian view has most emphatically not been that 
God took some part of Himself and from that made a world or a 
universe. God created a world, brought it into being - as 
something in some sense other than Himself,, yet as never 
existing apart from Himself. For Christian Theologians 
have ever maintained, not only that God created the world, 
but that He sustains it and that it is eternally dependent 
upon Him.
In the 1st chapter of Genesis we read, at the 1st verse, 
H In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth."
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And then after an account which accords most remarkably with 
our modern idea of the order of the evolutionary process, we 
read that after God had made all the beasts of the earth He 
said,
"Let us make man in our image, after our likeness", 
(verse 26).
Now this cannot possibly be orthodoxly interpreted as refer­ 
ring to the body of man; for God is a spiritual being and 
has no body. But again we cannot be certain that the under­ 
standing we must have of this verse is necessarily that which 
the original writer had of it. "What for us refers to spirit 
may for him have referred to a being whose elements were 
undifferentiated. But the fact remains that we think of 
God as a spirit, like unto what we conceive to be the spiri — 
tual or mental part of ourselves. In other words God is a 
Mind, and so far, we must say, only a Mind.
2« The Divine Creation a Purely Mental Activity.
But if God is pure Mind, creation must have been a 
purely mental activity. Or, we should say, God created the 
world siraply by thought. Thus the creative activity of the 
artist la like the creative activity of God. But it is not 
the work of the artist as it is displayed on the canvas or on
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paper, for in order for it to take this form bodily activity 
is required, in addition to that of mind, and the use of 
previously existing materials. The artistic creative activity 
analogous to that of God, is the creation of the picture or 
the play, the novel or the symphony, in the mind of the artist, 
before the colour is ever put on canvas or the words or notes 
on paper. Here indeed we have what from our standpoint truly 
approaches the creative; for there is no utilization of 
previously existing and external materials. It is true that 
the artist makes use of his past experience, which in his case 
involves contact with an external world, and probably also 
involves the use- of images of things previously existing and 
external. But all that is needed at the time of the 'creation' 
is what the 'creatpj?^ himself brings to the work* External 
things may have entered in to cause or produce the different 
thought elements which are used by the mind of the artist, 
but these external things are not themselves used by the mind 
of the artist at the time of 'creation*. An external stimulus 
may be required to arouse the human 'creator 1 to his work, but 
this stimulus does not itself enter into the 'creative' act 
as a factor in it. Its influence ceases with the beginning 
of the 'creative 1 act itself. Perhaps it is impossible for 
the human mind to produce in thought any single element which 
it has not previously experienced, and all it can do is to
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produce new combinations. Or perhaps there is nothing 
really external to the human mind. These are questions 
which do not concern us here. The only qualification we 
are required to make is that God's creative activity must 
of necessity differ from ours in this respect that according 
to the hypothesis of a Divine Creator there is nothing ex­ 
ternal to Him which could serve in any way to produce images 
in His mind. We should expect that His creative activity 
would "be different in this regard. Yet the analogy is still 
quite appropriate to indicate the form of this activity, 
and it even lends some measure of probability that this is the 
actual form of the Divine Creation* As far as the materials 
of the work are concerned we need only the mind of the creator; 
and though in the case of the human artist we must postulate 
a past rich in experience in order to have a present ripe 
with understanding, in the case of God we need postulate no 
such acquirement of knowledge, since He is to begin with the 
epitome of all wisdom.
a. The World exists only in God's Mind - or rather in God f
for He is only Mind.
This work of creation, however, is wholly imaginary. 
It is not only the work of the mind; it exists only in the 
mind. ^he world in which we live, we ourselves, exist only 
in the mind of God.
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This does not mean that we and the world are unreal. 
It simply means that we do not exist in the same realm of 
reality as the Creator. The symphony in the mind of the 
composer is not unreal; it does not first come into exis-* 
leaoe with its transcription to paper. It exists the 
moment it is thought, "but it does not exist on the ®an£ee 
level, or one might say, in the same world, as the composer 
himself. The symphony itself can never exist in the physical 
world of the composer f s body. It is always a mental thing, 
though the moment it is put on paper what may Toe called its 
physical equivalent exists in the physical world of the com­ 
poser^ "body. And the moment it is read or heard by another 
mind, it exists in the world of the composer's mind as a thing 
outside his mind. But as long as it remains in his mind, 
it does not exist on the same level of reality as his mind.
b« The Twfl Rea^s of Reality.
This may be brought out more clearly by thinking of 
the work of the novelist or dramatist. As the story or 
play exists in the mind of the :writer, it is wholly imaginary. 
Its characters are real in the imaginary world of the story or 
play, but they are not real in the world of men. As soon as 
the novel or play is transcribed to paper, something comes into 
being in the physical world which enables other people to
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Imagine the characters and plot which formerly existed only 
in the mind of the writer himself. There come to be then 
as many little imaginary worlds in which these characters, or 
characters like them, and this plot, or a plot like it, exist, 
as there are readers of the novel or readers and witnesses of 
the play, l) Something mental comes into "being outside 
the mind of the writer, which attaches itself to the "book and 
exists in the world of men's minds. But it is not the char­ 
acters nor the world in which they live in the mind of the writer 
These never exist in the world of men, even in the world of 
men's minds. Th« only thing which exists in the external 
world of minds is the description of them. This is a mental 
thing, something more than the writing on the paper; it is 
the meaning or significance of the writing on the paper. It 
has real existence as an object in the realm of minds. But it 
requires the previous existence of a mental world outside the 
mind of the -writer, the existence of other minds and, except 
perhaps in very rare cases, the use of physical means of
l) In the case of the acting of the play what is written is 
visualized in the common physical world of men. Yet it is 
not the ordinary world but an imaginary, sort of picture 
world, which in turn produces in the minds of witnesses a 
purely mental world which is its counterpart.
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communication. The image in the writer's mind is never 
an object for other minds, but only some description of it. 
Therefore it is only the description which has what we may 
call reality in the mental world in which the writer's mind 
exists. The world of the story or play as it exists in his 
mind is always a different world from this.
In the rgalpi where God dwells there is only God.
We live only in the world of His thought. If we 
interpret Kant's phenomenal and noumenal as being .what 
in ordinary language we call the physical and the spiritual, 
or mental, worlds, we may say that God exists "beyond both 
of them, and that "both of these exist only in His mind or 
imagination. It is in this way that
"in Him we live and move and have our "being*1 . 
It is so that He determines all the events of our lives 
just as an author determines the lives of his characters. 
They can do nothing iDut by his will; yet they are not 
conscious of his constraint, simply because they do not live 
in the same realm in which he lives. As the author is 
governed by his desire to make his story conform in some 
measure to the facts of the world in which he lives, so 




C. The Reconciliation of the two historic, conceptions of God - 
'God the Creator* and 'God the Power for Righteousness* •
But now if we exist only in the thought of God, then 
we exist in entirely different realms, and while God as 
our Creator determines all things which we do or think, 
since in His thought He creates us as self-conscious think­ 
ing "beings somewhat like Himself, yet we being only creatures 
of His imagination can have no knowledge of Him or communion 
with Him. This situation, then, simply makes religion impos­ 
sible. The world is in God, but God is not in the world. 
But men feel some Power for Righteousness working in the world, 
which they call God, and prayer is considered the experience 
of communing with Him. Christian theology is based upon 
the supposition of the possibility of eternal fellowship with 
Him. But clearly fellowship with Him is not possible if He 
does not even exist in our world. We have here two different 
conceptions which run through all the Scriptures and through 
all Christian theology. How to reconcile them into one God, 
is the problem. Nothing can exist in our world save as it 
exists in the thought of God. If God, then, is to exist 
in our world, He must think Himself to be an actor in the 
drama of our existence. 
3• Creation an Sternal Activity of the Divine Mind.
It is the function of minds to think, and thought is 
inevitably creative within the mind thinking. Creation
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is then an eternal activity of the Divine Intelligence*!) 
But it is also the function of minds to conceive ends and 
have purposes; else the thinking is mere irrational 
wandering. But the existence of purpose implies desire, 
and desire implies a lack. But now, nora is it possible 
for God the Omnipotent Creator to lack anything? How 
is it possible for Him, then, to create a teleological 
universe?
If the universe is not teleol.ogical, it is not 
rational. If there is no purposeful thread running 
through all the events of the world, there is no ration­ 
al order in it at al!2)« It is not enough that it be 
the creation of a mind; it must be unified by a purpose 
of that mind. 
The Divine Purpose•
But what purpose can exist for an Omnipotent Divine 
Intelligence? What lack can there be for Omnipotence? 
The simple fact of the matter is that the more omni­ 
potent God is, the more infinite and eternal, the more 
He is. There must inevitably be for Him a lack
1) See Prof. Pringle - Pattison's "The Idea of God," 
ch*l6. See also Gils on, "Le Thomisme, 11 pp. 110, 111 
where he affirms* "Thomas d'Aguin maintient la pos r~ 
slbilite d'un commencement de I* univers dans le temps, 
mais il maintient aussi, meme contra murmurantes P la 
possibilite de son eternite'."
2) See Gilson, "Le Thomisme," p«97«- "On est oblige de 
reconnaltre que 1*univers est ordonne' en vue d'une 
certaine fin; s*il en etait autrement, tout, dans 
1'unive^a, se produirait par hasard»"
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of fellowship. There are no other gods. There are no 
other minds save as He creates them in His own. This 
lack, then, may "be sufficient to account for the exist­ 
ence of desire. But while it is a lack, it is not a 
deficiency in power. The desire is not a thwarted desire, 
1. Implies no Hi^ffl^ation of God* a Infinity and Omnipotence..
Since creation may, or father, must "be eternal, it 
need riot be a desire which ever exists apart from its 
gratification. Its existence, however, is enough to 
give purpose to thought, an end and order to the world 
created. The purpose of the world is that God may have 
fellowship with other minds, some of which, at least, 
are men. But in order to have fellowship with these 
other minds which exist only within His mind, He must 
think Himself into their world. The Intellectual Creator 
can never have fellowship with His creatures without 
Himself becoming a Creature.
Now I grant that this is a most anthropomorphic 
way of speaking, and that there is no necessity apparent 
to us why the Infinite and Omnipotent One should feel 
any need or desire for fellowship. But the fact remains 
that the universe exists, and unless it is itself God, - 
in which cas$ there is no possibility for religion or 
any objective moral standard either, presumably, - there 
must be some reason for the creation in God Himself, if He
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is a Mind and the world is rational. And as we have 
tried to indicate, this feeling of need or desire does 
not imply any inability to satisfy it on God's part. It 
does imply a certain insufficiency in God apart from 
creation; "but this need "be nothing more than the in­ 
sufficiency of a mind which was not thinking. Since 
it is the function of a mind to think, there is no in­ 
capacity for thought involved in the conception of a mind. 
It is simply impossible to think of a live mind as not 
thinking. Why God should think in this way instead of 
in some other, is a matter we cannot determine. What 
His purpose in creating the world is, is a mere matter 
of conjecture as far as we are concerned. But we can 
conjecture in the light of the teaching of Christ and 
certain reasonable presuppositions. And in accord with 
these I have merely suggested that God's purpose in 
creation may have been the securing of fellowship with 
other minds.l) It is the nature of minds to think; 
and it is the nature of thought to direct itself to ends» 
If God is a mind, the inability to think in accord with 
a definite purpose would be a greater deficiency than
l) This idea of the Divine desire for fellowship, plus 
the older idea of the Divine purpose being the mani­ 
festation of the Divine glory, or as it would be better 
expressed - a desire to have others share in the Divine 
blessedness (see Pringle - Pattison,op.cit.,pp*308f 
especially quotation from the Timaeua.) f puts content 
into the Christian conception of Love as the Supreme 
Power in the universe| for Love not only desires to 
give itself, but craves the presence of the beloved. 
There is no reason why these two ideas of the Divine 
purpose should not be combined. As a matter of fact 
the former seems to include the latter.
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that implied "by the existence of a purpose in His thought. 
The only alternative to purposive thought for the Divine 
Intelligence seems to "be complete inactivity. But the 
existence of purpose implies no lack of omnipotence, since 
this would only be implied in the inability to accomplish 
what is purposed. And it implies no denial of infinity, 
since it is something which is accomplished within itself. 
If the creation is wholly within God's mind, it shows 
not the previous insufficiency of His mind, but rather 
its potentialities and ability. Besides, there need not 
have been anything previous at all. In the Divine Mind 
the fulfilment may be simultaneous with the desire. And 
the desire and fulfilment may be both alike eternal. 
So there seems to be no teleological dilemma involved. 
2. A Purpose Certain of Fulfillment Bflplies Ultimate Monism.
There seem but three possibilities in an Idealist 
universe. Either there is no purpose in the universe, - 
in which case it is wholly irrational, and it is extreme­ 
ly difficult to see how it could in any sense be the result 
of the activity of Mind, since a mind without a purpose of 
some sort would appear to be an absolutely inactive mind. 
Or else, if there is purpose it may be of two kinds: 
either a purpose sure of fulfilment as we have supposed - 
in which case the Divine Mind can be said to be Infinite 
and Omnipotent; or else a purpose which is uncertain, -
PURPOSE. 309
in which case the Divine Mind is neither infinite nor
omnipotent, and the result is probably a Pluralism in
which nothing is certain of accomplishment, and the
whole universe is simply on its way, like a ship in a
hurricane.
A Spiritual Pluralism wfrtftin the Universe*
But if a desire for fellowship is the key to the 
activity of the Divine Mind, then, as we have s-een, 
God must think Himself into our world. But God-as-He- 
thinks-Himself-in-the-world can be neither infinite nor 
omnipotent, and the result is that within the mind of 
the Creator we have a Spiritual Pluralism. It is as 
though a man contemplated in imagination the events of 
some future time in which he himself was an actor. As 
the thinker of these events he would determine them, 
Nothing would happen save as he thought it to be; the 
incidents would be exactly as he willed them; all the 
actors would do exactly as he decreed; and the o&tcome 
would be in complete accord with his desire (provided his 
imagination was not too much hampered by a regard to a 
pessimistic conception of human possibilities). But 
aq an actor in this little drama of ^is mind he wpyil^ 
not determine all the events.. He would be merely one 
among others, more powerful perhaps than they, ultimate­ 
ly successful in his attempts to secure his own ends
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through interaction, with them. But the relation 
would "be one of interaction, and the others would be 
free from his absolute control. And thus it is that 
God may be the Omnipotent Creator and Governor of the 
Universe and at the same time the Force for Righteousness 
within the World, In the one capacity He determines 
all things, and "in Him we live and move and have our 
being"j in the other He is continually striving with us 
and trying to win us to Himself,
Now it is not possible here to do more than suggest 
this as a possible sdheme for working out consistently 
the Deterministic elements in Calvinism to their logical 
conclusions and at the same time showing the way in 
which this Deterministic Monism may be reconciled with 
the orthodox Christian theology. To carry out this 
reconciliation in every detail would require the writ­ 
ing of a complete text on Christian Theology, and to 
justify it as a philosophical view of the world, sub­ 
stantiating every point, refuting all objections, working 
out all the implications, would require a life time of 
careful labor to accomplish even partially. It is our 
purpose to do neither of these things. As far as the 
particular doctrines of Christian theology are concerned,
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it will suffice to say that there need be little or no 
change at all in any of them. All the doctrines which 
imply a deterministic view of the world may be referred
to 6rod the Creator, the only ultimate Reality; all 
which imply a pluralistic freedom on the part of men 
may be referred to God as He thinks Himself to dwell 
amongst us.
If it be asked how we know these are one and the 
same, the reply must be that we don't. The whole scheme 
is a purely speculative attempt to reconcile two apparent­ 
ly contradictory conceptions of God which have come down 
to us from the Bible and run through all subsequent 
Christian theology. It is a purely speculative 
attempt to solve the problems of Calvinism in a manner 
consistent with its main tenets, while at the same time 
retaining the complete Christian conception of God as a 
Loving Father and a Force for Righteousness within the 
world of men. 
The Problem of Evil.
But now, as we have seen, the great problem which 
Calvin was never able to solve consistently with his 
deterministic principles was the Problem of Evil; and 
it may not be at all clear how our scheme of Theistic 
Monism helps us out of the difficulty.
EVIL.
To begin with it will be advisable to contrast this
view with a Monism such as that of Spinoza. Whatever its
1) ,
other difficulties»the Monism of Spinoza. (and all sub­ 
sequent forms of Absolute Idealism similiar to it) seemed 
to leave no place at all for moral standards, since accord­ 
ing to this view God was everything, and whatever could be 
said of the world could be said of God. Either, then, 
it seemed that God was good and bad together, or else 
moral distinctions were a mere illusion without any objective
validity whatever. But how there could be people 
with illusions was also a mystery, since the people were 
merely aspects of God and the partial character of their 
thought must in some way characterize Him as well as them. 
They were, according to this view, part of God; but they 
had characteristics which were not applicable to God.
Now the theory we are propounding avoids this diffi­ 
culty by the supposition of intellectual creation on the 
part of God. We are not, according to this view, in any 
such way a part of God. We exist only in His thought; 
but we are thought to be other than He. We do not exist 
on the same level of reality at all, Therefore what applies
to us need not logically apply to God. We do not exist
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apart from God; but there is no identifying us with 
God. We are as different from God as the characters 
of a novel are from its author. We are what we are 
because He makes us so; we are entirely dependent upon 
Him for our very being itself. Yet we exist in an 
entirely different realm from that in which He exists. 
If one asks how it is possible for us to have self- 
consciousness, awareness of ourselves and of the world, 
if we are not real in the same sense and in the same 
realm as that in which God is real;; the reply is simply* 
How do we have self-consciousness anyway? The whole 
matter is a mystery. The characters in a novel or a 
play have self-consciousness and are aware of the world 
of the novel or the play in a similiar way to that in 
which we are aware .of our world,from the standpoint of one 
outside our world. Yet one will reply that this is pure 
simile, that the characters of a work of fiction have no 
real self-consciousness at all, nor any real awareness, 
No, they have none in our world;- simply because they 
do not really exist - from our standpoint. But within 
the world of the novel or the play they have real exist­ 
ence, and they have real self-consciousness and aware­ 
ness as well. Their consciousness is just as real as 
they are; and what more can be said of us? Is the self- 
consciousness of fictional characters any different from 
that of historical to one who observes their world from 
outside?
EVIL.
We may "be ignorant and sinful without God's "being 
ignorant and sinful, simply because while we only exist 
in Gofl T God does not exist in ua« What Paul said was, 
"In Him we live and move and have our being"; not, "In 
us He lives and moves and has His being." And there is 
a tremendous difference. Again, while God may not be 
ignorant and sinful, this does not mean that ignorance 
and sin have no reality. These qualities may relate 
to us without relating to God, simply because we exist 
in a different realm from God. Ignorance and sin may 
be characteristics of our world without having any place 
whatever in God; just as an author may introduce evil 
characters into his novel without himself being evil*
The point which determines the character of the 
novelist is not the existence of aril characters in the 
novel, but th$ part they play, and what becomes of them. 
Or rather, the character of the novelist is disclosed 
in his own attitude of approval or disapproval of the 
part they play and what becomes of them; for it is 
right here that the analogy with God breaks down, since 
the novelist is giving an interpretation of life and not 
making it to suit his own ideals, and he may conceiv­ 
ably represent evil as triumphing over good without 
himself approving of this outcome, though of course his 
pessimism may not be justified philosophically. With
314
EVIL. 315
God, however, the case in this respect is different, 
since He is really creating the world and not merely pro­ 
ducing an interpretation of anything which already exists 
outside Himself. The significant detail, however, is 
simply that in "both cases the existence of ignorant and 
sinful characters within the world of thought, their 
creation, indeed, does not imply either ignorance or sin 
in the character of the author. 
1. God Himself ^fre Ultimate Moral Standard.
But until we have decided what 'evil 1 is, there is 
no use asking whether or not it really exists, and if it 
does, how it gets into the world. The first thing we 
must know is, what is 'good 1 and what is 'evil'; and this 
is just what it seems most difficult to find out. Within 
the confines of Christian theology one may "be allowed to 
assume that God is good. And as a matter of fact it would 
seem that from any Theistic view of the world we must 
"begin heres God is good.
But now most people when they say this act as if they 
were giving a judicial opinion which they had come to accept 
through experience or an investigation of the facts, and 
the implication is that were He discovered to "be "bad, they 
have nothing more to do with Him. Now this whole atti­ 
tude on the part of theologians and others implies that
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there is an objective standard of right and wrong which 
is external to God and may therefore "be applied to Him as 
it is to everything else. They say it exists in the very 
nature of things; but what they forget is that 'the very 
nature of things' exists in God, There is no standard 
of good and evil, of right and wrong, apart from God, 
Whatever ideas we have on the subject are there because 
He put them there, and they are most faulty and inade­ 
quate with regard to everything other than our own con­ 
duct; and they will in most cases barely suffice there, 
if at all. It is the height of presumption to begin 
judging God and the universe by our standards, as 
though we and our standards were something apart from 
God and the universe. We may very well say that from 
our standpoint God and the universe are so and so; but 
we must always remember that our standpoint may be 
neither correct nor adequate*
The correctness and adequacy of our standards 
is determined by their conformity with the universe and 
God, What God calls good, is good. And nothing 
other than what He calls good, is good. But since God 
alone exists in the ultimate realm of reality, His con­ 
ception of goodness depends solely upon what He Himself is. 
And since there is nothing external to Himself to exert
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any influence upon Him, whatever He does is exactly what 
He wants to do, and whatever He creates is exactly as He 
wants it to "be. And it is therefore good. Because good­ 
ness in the last analysis is simply relative to the desires 
of persons. Whatever a man desires is to him good. It 
may not "be good for him; but it is because he either 
does not know, or doubts, this that it is good JLQ him. 
For as Plato contends, nobody deliberately chooses what 
he knows to be evil.l) But this does not mean that 
nobody ever chooses what he believes to be morally evils 
it merely means that in such a case the man does not 
believe in the ultimate truth or worth of the moral dis­ 
tinctions.
For God there are no moral distinctions as such.
What He is may determine what He desires; but 
what He desires determines what is go 04 to Him. And 
there is no question of what is good for Him, since He 
is forever the same.
The Universe Wholly Good - "The Best of All Possible
Because He is omnipotent, therefore, and there is 
nought beyond Himself to restrain His will, the universe 
is exactly as He desires it to be; and it is consequently 
from His standpoint, good. But it exists, as we have
l) See also "Compendium of the Summa/1 of St. Thomas,
p.56, where it is saidf "Evil, as such, cannot attract 
any one's desire, natural, animal or intellectual»w
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said, only in His thought, Whatever, therefore, exists 
in His thought, is good. And since He can think what­ 
ever He wants to think, all that is good exists in His thought, 
In the realm of the reality of our universe, therefore, 
all that is is good, and all that is good is. Evil, 
therefore, not only does not exist;l) all that does not 
exist is evil, since if it were not evil it would exist.
But we must bear in mind here that we are speaking 
of 'good 1 and 'evil 1 from God's standpoint, and that God 
sees all that is in its entirety. Using the term Ult­ 
imate Reality to designate the realm of God the Creator, 
and Reality to designate the realm of the universe, we 
may say that the whole of Reality is good. But there may 
"be parts of Reality which taken alone, without their 
proper relation to the whole, would be evil or bad. The 
reason, however, that they are good to God is because He 
sees them in their proper relation to the whole.
Now it may very well be asked how a good universe 
can be made up of bad parts. The simple answer is that 
the parts as parts are not bad; they would ofcly be bad 
if they were the whole of Reality, or if their relation 
to the whole of Reality were not exactly as it is. This, 
I think, may be illustrated from the life of a man. Pew
l) See Gil8on,op.cit.p..2., where he contends: "Le mal 
pris en lui-m&ne n'est rien."
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people would say that a life filled with nothing but 
what they called good things was a good life. And by 
f a good life 1 we do not mean a morally good life, for we 
are not talking about morality at all as yet; we simply 
mean that such a life is not a life to be desired. If 
the world were other than it is or we were other than we 
are, such a life might in its totality be a good life; 
but the world being what it is and we being what we ar$, 
such a life lacks something in its totality. There is 
no single element of evil in it, but the whole is not 
good; perhaps simply because there is no variety of satis­ 
factions in it. Most of us would say that a life in 
which there was a certain amount of hardship and struggle, 
which things are in themselves, apart from the proper 
relation to other things, evil or bad from our standpoint, 
would be a much better life. Only there must not be too 
much hardship and struggle, and the hardship must be over­ 
come and the struggle lead to good. For a life which 
was all hardship and struggle we should consider a very 
bad life; and a life in which the good things resulted in 
bad, we should consider almost equally undesirable. Thus 
we see from our own experience that things which in them­ 
selves, apart from all else, we should consider bad, often 
become in their relation to the whole of life good, and
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even increase the goodness or desirability of the whole.
be
And so it may/with God. V/hatever is we must con­ 
clude is good to Him; but it may very well be that some 
things which apart from all else would be evil to Him are, 
because of their relation to the whole, good as parts of 
theT/faole. It is the universe just as it is that is good 
to Him; it is not just some small part of it alone: nor 
is it a slightly different universe with the same elements 
rearranged in a different order or in different proportions. 
If He had desired this, He would have made it so, and it 
would have been good to Him, but since He did not desire 
it, He did not make it so, and it is not good to Him.
But we must not forget that the universe is in Time, 
or that Time is real in the universe. Time may have no 
significance for God Himself. That is, His existence 
may not be characterized by Time and Spaces these may be 
peculiarities of the world as such. He may see the whole 
of Reality at once. We cannot imagine what such an 
existence would be like, nor can we attempt to describe 
it in any other language than that of our own experience, 
which is the language of a realm in which there is really 
such a thing as Time; but for God there may be nothing 
but a Present which includes all the Past and all the 
Future. Time, then, for Him may represent simply a
TIME.
certain order which is not for Him a time order at all. 
Yet the significant point for us is that within Reality 
there is a time order, and that being within this time 
order we necessarily see only a part of the whole. Our 
view of the universe is therefore necessarily limited and 
prescribed. Its limitations as to Space are not for our 
present consideration so important; but its limitation 
in Time precludes the possibility of our seeing the outcome 
of events, which can alone justify them. I^do not mean 
justify them in a moral sense, but rather in the sense of 
making them desirable to God, since it is their outcome 
rather than any other aspect of them which shows their re­ 
lation to the whole.
We do not, therefore, know the purpose and plan of God, 
and we cannot know definitely what is good and bad from His 
standpoint. We can only surmise, from the little that we 
see from the inside what the purpose and plan is, and we 
can only conclude from the supposition of God's omnipotence 
and infinity that all that, we see is in its relation to 
the whole good. But we can to some extent reason about 
the character of things in themselves from our observation 
of what appears to be the major trend in what we see. 
^. The Dawn of the Moral 0onsciousness.
But just what is it that we see? And by 'see* here,
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one means of course, not just what we see with the physical 
eye, but what we see as a result of scientific investi­ 
gation and study. It would "be rather generally agreed 
that what we see is a vast universe in which on one of 
the planets there has developed after a long process that 
has occupied millions of years, a form of life which is 
characterized by the feeling of moral obligation. But 
what is this feeling of moral obligation? So far there 
has appeared no morality or moral obligation whatever. 
Things have been considered simply as what they are be­ 
cause God willed them so. But now, morality and moral 
obligation implies that things ought to be a certain way, 
whether they are or not. But from God-the-Creator 1 s 
standpoint things are exactly as they ought to be. 
But, as we have seen, this is only because He sees the 
whole, and not just the part. Prom our standpoint things 
as they are at present are not as they ought to be; they 
are simply in process of becoming so»
Let us return to our supposition that God creates 
the world for the purpose of having fellowship with beings 
lifce Himself. He, then, thinks Himself to exist in our 
world, in the time order of our world, and as so existing H 
is striving to bring into being creatures who are conscious 
of Him and who Becil?rOcate; His affection.
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a. The Entrance of Sin into the World.
Now, I may "be entirely mistaken, but it seems to me 
that there is no place in the history of the world for 
a Fall from human perfection such as is pictured in the 
3rd chapter of Genesis. There is, however, a time when 
there awakes within man a sense of moral obligation and 
a resulting sense of sin. In the lower orders there 
appears to "be a "blind urge to perpetuate individual existence 
and to realize the apparent possibilities of the particular 
kind of organism. There is in addition a blind urge to 
perpetuate the species; and there must at one time have 
been a marked tendency to push upwards, which resulted in 
the production of what we should be pleased to call ever 
higher and higher orders of beings. There was nothing 
moral, however, in the progress of the lower organisms and 
the higher animals* And then one day there appeared in the 
world a strange creature with a dim and dark awareness of 
himself and of a Power beyond. There was in him, too, the 
blind urge of the animals; but there was something more: 
there was this dim awareness of spiritual possibiltiies, a 
faint, glimmering light which consciously attracted him, a 
sense of wonder and awe, a hope of immortality, a mysterious,
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haunting, frightfully dim sense of God, and a desire to 
draw near to Him. And it was in this religious con­ 
sciousness that there came to man the knowledge of moral 
good and evil. The good was immortality and the state 
of "being with God. The "bad was to live merely as an 
animal and to die.
But there were other goods as well. Somewhere in 
the development of the animal consciousness there had come 
the awareness that the things which satisfied the appetites 
of the "body were good, - good from the standpoint of the 
animal because they were desired (and good from the stand­ 
point of the universe "because they kept the organism alive 
and made for the continuance of the species, which was a 
result desired, though the animal did not know this). 
And the awareness of these as goods remained in man. There 
was a new factor, however, a faint sense of comparative 
values, a feeling that from the standpoint of the universe the 
spiritual goods were of greater value than the purely physical 
And with this sense of comparative values there is "born the 
feeling of moral obligation. In man the urge upwards becomes 
a conscious feeling of oughtness. He is not "by any means 
fully aware of the purpose and plan of things, he does not see
325 
SIN.
clearly why it is that from the standpoint of the universe 
spiritual goods should be of greater value than the merely 
physical; "but he feels somehow that they are. He has 
sufficient insight into the nature of things to feel that 
for him as a man immortality and fellowship with God are 
more to "be desired than the gratification of the physical 
appetites, and that from the standpoint of the universe 
it is fitting that they should be more desired. Of course, 
from the standpoint of the universe they are more to be 
desired because it is for the possibility of them that all 
the rest has gone before as a means to their production. 
Eternal fellowship with God has been all along the end of 
the whole process. It is that which has given value to what 
has gone before. But now man does not know all this. He 
is simply aware of his own being and feels the capacity for 
fellowship with God; and in addition, the urge toward this 
end, which has been blindly pushing the animals up to man, 
has in him come to consciousness in the feeling of oughtness 
or what we call the feeling of moral obligation.
It is only in man, therefore, that * the good 1 takes on 
the double meaning of that which is desired and that which 
ought to be desired. But the reason why it ought to be 
desired is because jjt generically is desired by God. Man,
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of course, does not see this clearly at the time; he 
is aware only of a very Prague feeling of obligation.
The trouble comes when he no longer "believes in the 
desirability of that which he feels obligated to desire. 
It is not that the feeling of obligatoriness is no longer 
present, nor is it exactly that he ceases to desire that 
which he feels obligated to desire. It is simply that there 
is within him a conflict of desires.
Sin is the deliberate choice of what is felt to be 
1 j
morally evil. The appetites of the body are not evil in 
themselves; nor is their gratification. The moral con­ 
ception of good and evil only enters into life with the
l) Prof. Mackintosh in "The Christian Experiences of For­ 
giveness", declares! "Sin in the last resort is radically 
unintelligible; it is incapable of being interpreted in 
terms of rational purpose; it is irreducible to factors 
which in a moral sense can be made transparent and self- 
accrediting11 .. (p. 6l) "We are born self-centred and 
egoistic, yet when we express our egoism in act or feeling 
we feel ashamed before God.-— If we have a will at all, 
it is guilty, free or not; and it is guilty just as being 
a will, i.e. something original which is no product of 
exterior constraint, but veritably our own. We are 
chargeable with sin - behind this fact we cannot go. No 
ulterior explanations can affect it", (pp. 66f f ).
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decision between two goods. Man feels a desire for 
fellowship with God; he also feels a desire for the 
gratification of his physical appetites. Which of them 
is to be the chief end of his life? It is in the wrong 
deciding of that question that Sin enters into life.
Man feels that he should decide in favor of fellow­ 
ship with God; but the urge of his lower nature is too 
strong. And here unbelief comes in. For the basis of 
all sin is unbelief. Man not only feels that he should 
seek fellowship with God; his undeveloped reason vaguely 
tells him that it is the greater good for him. He has 
the dim feeling that this way lies life, and that way 
death. But the animal is insistent in its demands. And 
because the cronflict is hard, a real evil, - not in the 
moral sense but in the sense of being something undesirable 
in itself apart from its possible results, - man wants to 
settle it as soon as possible. T&e easy way is to give 
the victory to his lov/er nature, because his desire for the 
gratification of his appetites is stronger than his desire 
for fellowship with God, - stronger because more immediate 
and more persistent in the stressing of its need. But a
against this stands his feeling of obligation,the belief that
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this other course of conduct is right; and in addition the 
belief that this other is ultimately the greater good, that 
from the s tandiDoint of wisdom it should "be the more desired. 
But because the lov/er desires are stronger he wants to 
yield to them. So he makes it an intellectual issue, and 
begins to argue against the reasons for the pursuit of 
fellowship vdth God as the greater good. It may not be the 
greater good. What if he gives up the satisfaction of these 
present and intensely felt desires, and then this good of 
eternal life is only a snare and a delusion? Hi/hat does he 
know about the nature of things? And then what finally de­ 
cides the issue is his acceptance of the age-long word of the 
devil, MYe shall not surely die 11 . The feeling of obligation 
still remains, but deprived of the aid of its intellectual 
support it is insufficient to withstand the onslaughts of 
passion. Man'Chooses what he feels to be morally evil, the 
way of death; because he comes to doubt that it is really 
evil, in the sense of being ultimately bad for him.
Man sins, therefore, because he deliberately chooses 
the course which he feels to be the wrong course. And he 
chooses this Voluntarily, because he wants to. But it is 
obvious that he could not do otherwise. He wants to choose
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this way because the lower desires are stronger than the 
higher. The spiritual side of man's nature is young and 
undeveloped. It offers courageous resistance; "but it 
cannot conquer the strength of a million years. The country 
it seeks is a far eountry; the glow it follows is a dim 
glow. But the country is ever there, and the glow is never 
completely extinguished for the race. It may die out 
forever in individual cases; "but if so, it is because the 
individual stifles it and becomes ultimately blind through 
continued unbelief. It is only the eye of faith that ever 
sees it; and when faith dies, the glow dies too. Arid thus 
it is that for all men there is sin, - original sin, because 
it comes as a result of our inheritance. No man follows the 
light always. But some there are, the chosen of the Father, 
who rise again and follow on, in spite of defeat and failure, 
seeking God - because more than their fellows they have f p.T t 
the -pressure of His hand.
Prom the standpoint of the Creator the existence of 
Sin in the world is not an evil. It may be an evil in 
itself; it would most certainly be an evil it it were the 
end of things, for as far as the individual is concerned it 
tends in itself towards death and destruction, and the opposite 
of eternal fellowship with God. But in the scheme of things 
it is necessary to the ultimate fulfillment of the purpose. 
It might have been otherwise if God had willed it so (though
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"being as He is He could not have willed it otherwise); but 
in the world as He thinks it to be, progress comes only 
through struggle and failure. The many fail, a few attain. 
That is the reality of it from our standpoint. It is no idle 
play as far as we are concerned,
"Many are called, but few are chosen";
"for wide is the gate, and broad is the way, that 
leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go 
in thereat: because strait is the gate, and narrow 
is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there 
be that find it*. (Matthew 20 j l6 [only in K. JamesJ; 
Matthew 7 : 13, 14).
It means life or death to us. But if it were not for 
the reality of sin, the alternatives would not even appear 
real to us. It is the experience of choosing the wrong 
which makes us see how possible it is from our standpoint. 
It is the apparent blindness and death of some which is a warn­ 
ing to the rest. Nothing draws a man to God like a sense 
of sin; but there is no sense of sin without some aware­ 
ness of God. It is the strength of this which ultimately 
determines the matter. God as He exists among us comes 
closer to some than to others. But now the Creator knows 
and has determined from all eternity whom He shall draw near 
to in the world.
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CONCLUSION. 
The end of the whole matter as far as we are concerned
is that God is, and He is the rewarder of them who diligently 
seek after Him; Tout He creates us ,too, and He determines who 
will seek after Him and whom He will aid in the search. He 
does no evil and commits no sin. Sin comes as the result 
of our partial view. It exists only in our world, and is 
simply our choice of what appears to us to be morally evil. 
God determines it by making us such that we do choose just that 
way. But this determination is not sinful in Him, because if 
we want to judge Him by our standard of morality we must say 
that His choice in this regard is not a choice of evil but of 
good, since He sees the whole and sees that this is a necessary 
part of it. But we do not see the whole. We do not choose it 
because we see that it plays a good part in the total scheme 
of things. We choose it because we have come to look upon 
what we feel to be morally evil as our actual good. And this, 
and this alome, is sin.
The Calvinist must simply say' that things are as they are
and 
ultimately "because God has willed them to be so;/ because God
has willed them to be so, they are good. But it is the whole 
that is good, and every part only as it is related to the whole. 
Sin exists in the world because we see things darkly and only 
in part. It really exists in the world; but from the stand­ 
point of the Creator its existence is good in its relation to
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the whole. It may be that its existence is good simply 
as something to "be overcome "by God Himself as He exists 
amongst us, and as something which in its overcoming 
makes possible a completer fellowship "between the Father 
and those redeemed from its power by the blood of the Son. 
If from our standpoint the whole play is for some of 
us merely a tragedy, then we can only say that from the 
standpoint of the Creator an element of tragedy is good. 
Yet the truth remains* God has made no man to desire 
eternal fellowship with Him above all things else and then 
deprived him of it; those who are deprived of it He has made 
such that they did not desire it so. In the end all get what 
they have wanted most. Thr tragedy of it is that a man 
as such appears to have capacities of desire above those of 
the lower animals. But if he actually ceases to have, the 
tragedy itself may only be an appearance. ^he trouble is that 
we are shut up to a world of appearance, a dream world, a little 
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